Organizing Immigrants

The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California

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2 Immigrant Workers and American Labor: Challenge . . . or Disaster?

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Somnolent for much of the past twenty-five years, American labor approaches century's end with new vigor. And not a moment too early, as the problems are legion. Unionization rates are down and still falling. Downward pressure on wages has not yet abated—even though the U.S. economy is enjoying a boom of unusual duration. The labor force is growing at galloping rates—making it hard for labor to simply tread water, let alone move ahead. And much of the job proliferation takes place in those sectors where unions have historically been weak, a situation aggravated by the fact that many of the new labor force entrants have uncertain, often transient connections to the organizations that employ them.

True, unions have learned a few quite potent new tricks, which they have used to some effect. But neither the arsenal of labor's weapons nor the political environment is such as to force employers to abandon the bad habits they acquired during the years of labor's decline. So the vicious cycle continues, with the steadily diminishing union presence at once weakening labor's appeal to potential members and increasing employers' motivation to resist organizing efforts.

Daunting as the situation may seem, the demographic transformation of America confronts unions with yet another challenge—the renewal of mass immigration. The 1930s and 1940s are known as the heyday of American labor; viewed from another perspective, they also encompass a period of highly restricted, indeed virtually negligible immigration. As such, labor's years of triumph represent a twentieth-century anomaly. Im-

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migration largely flowed unimpeded during the century's first two and a half decades, the World War I years excepted. And though the barriers put in place in 1924 were never entirely removed, the post–World War II turnaround is unmistakable, constant, and, in recent years, immense. If not record-breaking, immigration levels during the 1990s will fall short only of the total recorded during the first decade of this century; the 1980–2000 totals will significantly exceed the influx experienced during 1900–1920. Of course, correlation does not imply causality, as any social scientist knows all too well. Still, the historical record does suggest an uncomfortable relationship between America's high-water years of immigration and a flagging labor movement. And one only need look at the experience of the United Farm Workers, their ranks decimated just when immigrant labor surged through California's fields, to glimpse what immigration may have in store for organized labor.

If the picture is not hopelessly bleak, it certainly presents a somber aspect. The new "new immigration" of the late twentieth century is not as uniformly proletarian as the "new immigration" of old, but the numbers of new entrants moving in at the very bottom is impressive indeed (see Lopez and Feliciano, this volume). Convergence at the low end of the labor market both increases downward pressure on wages for less-skilled labor and adds to the looseness of the labor supply—neither of which developments gives labor any additional leverage. Many of the new immigrants are recent arrivals, altogether too uncertain of their status, standing, and orientation—will they settle down or return home?—to seriously consider unionization. Moreover, a substantial portion of the immigrant population—as many as one out of every four immigrants arriving each year—has an additional fear factor, associated with a condition rarely known earlier in the century, namely, a status prohibiting work in the United States. These "illegal" or "undocumented" immigrants—call them what you will—know all too well that the Immigration and Naturalization Service provides employers with an additional union-busting tool, yet another reason to desist from organizing activities.[1] Furthermore, the immigrants tend not to move into those industries where the labor presence remains entrenched—most notably, the public sector, where a varying combination of citizenship, educational, and testing requirements exclude many foreign-born workers. Instead, the newcomers head for notoriously union-resistant industries such as apparel or restaurants, where the addition of a seemingly limitless supply of labor makes organizing all the more difficult.

1. However, undocumented status may not prove an insuperable obstacle to unionization; see Delgado 1993.

But immigration does not necessarily spell bad news. In the past, many union leaders emerged from immigrant ranks; the history of American labor also includes countless extraordinary eruptions of immigrant militancy. And it is not simply hopeless nostalgia that suggests that the past may be prologue. Assimilation is a time-honored concept in the study of American immigration and now would not be the first time that "Americanization" involves a process whereby immigrants decide that they want—and deserve—the good things promised by American life.[2] If the newcomers have also acquired "a diploma in exploitation," to quote a rank-and-file immigrant janitor union leader (see Waldinger et al. 1998), and have come to resent the maltreatment and stigmatization experienced at the hands of employers and society alike, then immigrant workers may decide that unions provide them with a powerful instrument of collective voice.

From a historical point of view, one might also contend that it is labor, not the immigrants, that deserves the bad reputation. Few organizations could have rivaled the old AFL in its impassioned restrictionism—good reason for the immigrants of yore to be skeptical, if not skittish, about appeals to solidarity. This time around, however, organized labor does not seem likely to make the same mistake. Indeed, the AFL-CIO is one of the few mainstream organizations to have emerged as decidedly pro-immigrant, a stance marked not just by rhetoric but by action. As evidence, consider the efforts to organize America's newest workers, many of which are catalogued and analyzed in this volume.

This chapter offers an overview of the relationship between immigrant status and unionization, both nationally and in California, the capital of today's immigrant America. We analyze the factors affecting the likelihood that a worker will have a "union job," which we define as someone who is a union member or working in a unionized establishment. The occasion is the availability of a new data source, resulting from the recent adoption of questions about place of birth and parentage by the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), an instrument which also collects information about union membership and employment in establishments covered by union contracts. Though the CPS does offer a rich source of information, we should issue some cautions on its limitations before proceeding any further. Most important, the data shed light on the factors associated with union membership among immigrants and native-born workers, a matter quite distinct from the factors that would influence immigrants and natives to *join* unions at differential rates. The

2. As in the earlier CIO period studied by Cohen (1990).

CPS provides a repository of information on demographic characteristics; however, it contains neither attitudinal data that would measure preferences for union membership nor relevant behavioral data concerning voting behavior in elections for union representation. One can argue, as some researchers have, that membership status can be equated with the "demand for union services," and thus serves as a reasonable proxy for the attitudinal and behavior indicators of interest (Duncan and Stafford 1980). Survey research does provide some support for this point of view, as union members appear to be significantly more likely than their nonunion counterparts to vote union in a hypothetical election for union representation (Leigh 1986). In the current context of declining union membership, moreover, where there are more persons wanting union jobs than union jobs available, those with such jobs would seem highly likely to prefer whatever benefits unionization generates. Though this asymmetry between the supply and demand for union jobs also implies a considerable interest in unionization among the nonunionized workforce (as survey evidence indicates), here we examine patterns of union membership among persons holding "union jobs" by ethnicity and nativity.

Second, the CPS inquires broadly about labor unions and employee associations, not differentiating between the two; the membership information that it obtains is of a highly general sort and cannot be used to generate estimates of the membership of particular unions.

Third, the CPS takes a cross-section of the labor force, a complication for those arguments about unionization that involve change over time. As we've already suggested, a variant of the assimilation hypothesis would suggest that propensities to unionize increase over time, a hypothesis operationalized by comparing successive immigrant cohorts. But the econometric literature on immigration shows that cohorts may not share common characteristics, in which case generalizations from the cross-section will not hold true. These caveats aside, the CPS provides a unique window into the patterns of union membership among America's new immigrant workforce.

Background

This chapter stands at the confluence of two distinct literatures, one on immigration, the other on unionization, each of which is only peripherally aware of the other's existence. Labor matters play an important role in the historiography of American immigration (see Bodnar 1985; Barrett 1992), but even the historians have not yet generated a unified framework, integrating the insights from the study of immigration and the study of unionization. The contemporary literature is still more wanting. True, there are a small number of insightful case studies examining organizing among immigrant workers, of which the best known is Delgado's 1993 book; but these contributions tend to be nested more firmly within the immigration than the union literature. Labor economists have been moved to pursue an occasional inquiry; though this work evinces some methodological sophistication (for example, DeFreitas 1993), it provides a limited engagement with the broader intellectual issues at stake. In this section, we seek to distill lessons from both the immigration and the industrial relations literatures in an effort to specify the likely factors affecting unionization among today's immigrant workers.

Immigrants

This chapter implicitly asks a simple question: Are immigrants more or less likely than other workers to have union jobs, other background factors controlled? The question has the appeal of simplicity; regrettably it is also simplistic, at least as concerns contemporary immigration to the United States. Earlier in the century, during the great wave of migration from southern and eastern Europe, the category "immigrant" captured a reasonably homogeneous experience. Of course, not all groups were the same; the Jews arriving from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires differed in social characteristics and circumstances of migration from the Italians, the Slavs, and the Hungarians. But the Jews apart, and theirs was only a partial exception, most immigrants came with little skill; they moved into the bottom of the labor market, where they experienced a good deal of churning; often movement to the United States represented a temporary displacement on the route to return migration to the home country, if not the home community; and most immigrants were men, the advent of their wives and families representing a second-stage development signaling settlement.

The foreign-born population that has emerged in the three and a half decades since the Hart-Celler Act marked the renewal of immigration is strikingly different.[3] Today's newcomers unquestionably include a sizable mass deeply reminiscent—in characteristics, circumstances of migration, and societal reaction—to the labor migrations of the 1880–1920 period. Indeed, immigrants from Mexico simultaneously comprise the least skilled and the largest single national origins group among today's new-

3. Portes and Rumbaut (1996) outline a typology of contemporary immigration in much greater detail; our discussion here draws on their influential formulation.

comers: as of the mid-1990s, 27 percent of all foreign-born persons residing in the United States were born in Mexico; persons with an elementary education or less comprised the single largest group of adults in this contingent. Like the Italians or the Poles, the Mexicans are involved in a pattern of circular migration, in which many, perhaps most, depart with the intention of returning home. Though the longevity of Mexican migration and its deeply implanted networks ensure that high proportions drop out of the circular streams and settle in the United States for good, the process of putting down roots remains a protracted affair. That extended transition is likely to exercise a powerful effect both on the social processes that connect workers to union jobs and on the preferences for union membership, for reasons discussed in greater detail below.

There are other migrations, in addition to the Mexican movement to *el norte*, that are disproportionately dominated by proletarians who move in response to labor needs in the United States. Nonetheless, diversity in circumstances of migration as well as in socioeconomic characteristics represent the salient characteristics of today's newcomers. Ever since World War II, the U.S.-bound migration flows have contained an increasing number of refugees. The relative prominence of refugees reflects, in part, immigration's new role in U.S. foreign policy: until the end of the Cold War the doors were generally opened for refugees fleeing Communist regimes, while typically closed for all others, as in the Haitian or Salvadoran cases. Sociologically, the refugee population includes many besides those who officially qualify for refugee status, and one might expect the entire group to develop a propensity for both union jobs and union membership. As immigrants in a no-return situation, refugees typically have been quick to aspire to the standards enjoyed by the native population, a powerful reason why frustration in the search for upward mobility should produce a search for union jobs as well as pro-union sentiment. But their political history may push refugees in the opposite direction: as real or self-perceived victims of Communist regimes, many may be ideologically opposed to unions, despite strong instrumental considerations to do otherwise. Thanks to generous programs of government assistance, as well as the presence of former elites and home-country entrepreneurs, many refugee communities have developed ethnic economies of sizable employment potential, yet another reason why refugees may neither gravitate toward nor prefer union jobs.

Though the refugee flow is impressive in both relative and absolute terms, what most clearly distinguishes today's situation from the past is the large proportion of highly educated persons among the immigrant

population. Highly-skilled immigrants have played a modest but significant role in immigration to the United States ever since the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965. Notwithstanding charges that America's immigrants are of "declining quality," the 1990 Census found that a college degree was as common among immigrants as among natives (one out of five). And among particular immigrant groups, the highly skilled are often present at levels well above the U.S. average, with the college graduate share ranging from 27 percent among Russians to 65 percent among Indians.

A significant proportion of those immigrants who arrive with high skills discover that their premigration training yields no payoff in the United States. Those who undergo such "blocked mobility" seek to get ahead in different ways, often through entrepreneurship, which also takes them out of the supply of persons seeking union jobs. Not every group of highly skilled immigrants shows the same propensity for self-employment; the Filipinos, for example, are highly educated but are particularly unlikely to work for themselves. More typical patterns, however, are the high self-employment rates among Koreans, Indians, Chinese, and Iranians, to cite the most notable cases.

Whether as business owners or salaried professionals and managers, a good proportion of the recent arrivals begin not at the bottom but in the middle class or above (see Lopez and Feliciano, this volume). In contemporary Los Angeles, for example, certain coveted professional occupations have become immigrant concentrations: more than 35 percent of the pharmacists in the region are foreign-born, as are more than 25 percent of the dentists and over 20 percent of engineers, computer specialists, and physicians. As migration selectivity diminishes over time, most of the important U.S.-bound flows include persons from all parts of the occupational spectrum. Even so, significant interethnic differences in occupational composition persist, such that the proportion of highly educated persons or those working in upper white-collar professions distinguishes many of the flows from Asia from those that come from Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean. The prevalence of professional, managerial, and entrepreneurial activities among immigrants implies that many can move ahead without the benefits that union jobs provide; that the size of this more highly skilled population varies considerably among the major immigrant streams reduces the likelihood that immigrant status as such will have a singular, unvarying effect on employment in a union job.

Work and its Rewards

The relationship between the rewards of work and unionization preferences is well known. As Freeman and Medoff note, "The results of studies are unequivocal across very different samples. One finds that increased desire for unionization (expressed in union activity or votes for union) is, indeed, a likely outcome of worker dissatisfaction" (1984, 146). While one hardly expects it to be otherwise, knowing that more dissatisfied workers are more likely to prefer unions also begs the question, which must include both the causal nexus between satisfaction and union preference, on the one hand, and the factors that influence job satisfaction, on the other. In general, dissatisfaction with the bread-and-butter aspects of work provides the strongest push for workers to want union representation, especially among blue-collar workers. Though of lesser importance, job content also affects union preferences; not surprisingly, workers whose jobs possess more desirable features turn out to be less likely to voice support for unionism.

These generalizations should cast immigrants as leading candidates for unionization while also generating a strong preference for union jobs, especially in light of unions' mitigating effects on undesirable job features. Immigrants, especially the least skilled, are more likely than natives to occupy jobs whose characteristics—low pay, unhealthy or dangerous working conditions, limited chances for promotion, and minimal job security—tend to be associated with higher levels of dissatisfaction. However, the conditions that generate dissatisfaction are surely evaluated in relative terms. While today's "bad jobs" might rank favorably when compared with the "bad jobs" of fifty years ago, what matters is how they contrast with today's average jobs. As Bakke put it in a classic article (albeit one composed in outdated vocabulary):

> The worker reacts favorably to union membership in proportion to the strength of his belief that this step will reduce his frustrations and anxieties and will further his opportunities relevant to the achievement of his standards of successful living (1967 [1945], 85).

But if immigrants do not use the same yardstick as natives, then the factors making for frustration are likely to be quite different. For many immigrants, the relevant standard is defined by significantly inferior conditions back home, not those that prevail in the United States. From that perspective, employment in a sewing factory or as a janitor cleaning office buildings not only ranks higher in the status hierarchy in which the immigrant grew up, but provides material rewards the likes of which the

newcomer never knew before. While the comparative frame changes over time, as exposure to the United States and its consumption standards pushes the immigrant's normative expectations higher, other factors—most notably, continued contact with and return travel to the home society—keep the older normative pattern in place.

Not every group is likely to experience change in normative expectations at the same rate. Those most committed to long-term settlement in the United States are most likely to experience rapid convergence with U.S.-based norms. But this is precisely why the most proletarian migrants may be least likely to experience their conditions as dissatisfying. Unlike their more skilled counterparts, the labor migrants begin as target earners, concerned with short-term rather than long-term rewards and assessing the adequacy of those rewards relative to some consumption objective located back home. Many of these initially temporary immigrants eventually drop out of the circular migration stream, their standards shifting as they settle down.[4] Even so, the phasing out of the back-and-forth flow is often an extended process, and the majority of those with at least one migratory experience probably never drop out—which means that at any point in time a large proportion of the most proletarianized immigrants see themselves as more likely to return home than to settle down.

"Demographic" Characteristics

So unhappy workers are likely to want unions. Some groups of workers—African Americans most definitely, women quite possibly—are both unhappier *and* more union-prone than the rest. The pro-union inclinations of African American workers is in fact one of the few matters on which almost all researchers who have studied the matter can agree; they are significantly more likely to want union representation and to vote for union representation, when given the choice, than whites. Furthermore, that relationship holds after controlling for background characteristics, including the much higher likelihood that African Americans will fill jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution, a characteristic strongly conducive to a union propensity regardless of race or ethnicity.

But the industrial relations literature is a good deal less certain as to how these intergroup differences in unionization propensities should be interpreted. As Farber and Saks suggest (1980), it may simply come down to differences in "taste": group differences in preference for unions may be exogenously determined. Alternatively, groups may make systematically distinctive evaluations of individual needs, on the one hand, and of

4. For elaborations of this theme, see Piore 1979 and Massey et al. 1987.

the rewards provided by employers and unions on the other. In particular, intergroup perceptions of the likelihood of employment discrimination and the potential for redress offered by unions could significantly affect both union propensities and preferences for union jobs. Indeed, African Americans discover that the wage standardizing and grievance procedures found in unionized establishments significantly reduce discrimination (Ashenfelter 1972). For that reason, it seems reasonable to conclude that "the 'nonwhite effect' appears to be a 'real' demographic effect in the sense that research has not yet developed attitudinal measures which would better account for differential unionism preferences" (Fiorito, Gallagher, and Greer 1986, 279).

This formulation implicitly assumes that such traits as race and ethnicity are real, existing characteristics of the individual, such that one's own and others' understanding of membership status are clear, consistent, and symmetrical. But this description fits awkwardly with the situation of immigrant workers, for whom membership in an ethnic group is not imported, but rather a phenomenon that emerges out of the migration experience itself. Immigrants do not arrive as "ethnics" but rather *become* ethnics. On the one hand, categorization as "other"—by dominants, competitors, and members of one's putative group—alters self-understanding; and on the other hand, shared experience with similarly categorized others imparts a sense of solidarity and an awareness of common interest. Most important, stigmatization and exclusion produce a reactive ethnicity, in which membership in a group is defined by virtue of opposition to dominants.

Assimilation

The concept of assimilation provides yet another key for understanding how immigrants may both secure union jobs and also come to change their views regarding the advantages of unionization. Of course, there are few more contested concepts in the social sciences than assimilation, and now is not the place and time to enter into that debate. The conventional definition will do just fine for the purposes of this chapter: assimilation involves the process whereby immigrants become increasingly like natives on a number of dimensions, moving up the economic ladder as they gain in skills and language ability, while also absorbing the values, orientations, and preferences held by the native-born population. In this sense assimilation might be expected both to generate the skills that will allow immigrants to obtain relatively scarce union jobs and also foster the preferences that would motivate immigrants to either seek out those jobs or

unionize their unorganized employer, at rates more or less comparable to counterparts in the native population.[5]

Whether this hypothesis bears true will partly depend on how immigrants evaluate the costs and benefits of union membership. Since unions tend to reduce wage differences, the econometric literature emphasizes the importance of workers' place in the wage hierarchy, with those below the median wage more likely to benefit from the union wage effect and therefore more likely to seek union jobs, and those above the median wage influenced in exactly the opposite way (Abowd and Farber 1982). At the very least, the heterogeneity of today's immigrant population ensures that the economic appeal of union membership will vary greatly. To the extent that a substantial portion of today's newcomers move immediately or quickly into the middle class, their assimilation trajectories are unlikely to lead them toward union jobs or make those jobs attractive.

Not every immigrant group, moreover, will assimilate the expectations and orientations of the native population in identical rate or fashion, regardless of how proletarian its background. Workers from groups in which refugees predominate are likely to experience a quicker commitment to life in the host society, accelerating the rate at which they aspire to the average standards of compensation and therefore come to appreciate the redistributional union wage effect. By contrast, workers emanating from groups with a history of circular or temporary migration will be more likely to retain a dual frame of reference, which in turn reduces the impetus to seek out union jobs.

Not only are immigrants thus likely to assimilate economic expectations and orientations at varying rates, the social nature of the processes of migration and incorporation makes for divergent paths up from the bottom. As Portes and Rumbaut argue, the fate of new arrivals largely depends "on the kind of community created by their co-nationals" (1996, 84). Labor migrants enjoy easy access to jobs at the bottom of the labor market, thanks to a dense web of social networks linking veterans and newcomers. However, those same connections funnel labor migrants into a narrow set of occupations and industries from which exit is difficult, in large measure because dependence on ethnic networks chokes off the flow of new information, constraining diffusion and the search for new opportunities. Similar influences affect members of more entrepreneur-

5. For a prominent recent example of a largely unself-conscious application of assimilation, see the National Research Council's report, *The New Americans* (Smith and Edmonston 1996). For the controversies surrounding the use and nature of the concept, see the essays in the special issue of the *International Migration Review* 31: 4 (1997).

ial streams while pushing them in a different direction: in this case, the business success of co-ethnics gives rise to a distinctive motivational structure, breeding a community-wide orientation toward small business and encouraging the acquisition of skills within a stable, commonly accepted framework. Regardless of the precise modality, the social structure of the immigrant community has an enduring effect on the trajectories that immigrants follow, reducing the likelihood that otherwise comparable immigrants will move into union jobs at a similar pace.

Summary

Thus the process by which immigrants develop a "demand for union services," to borrow the economists' language, is likely to take a variety of forms, proceeding along not one but several timetables. For all immigrants, time is likely to be the most decisive consideration, as both interest in the benefits obtained through unionization and the ability to obtain union jobs increase with time spent in the United States. In this respect, time points to the importance of assimilation: because standards change with settlement, the longer immigrants live in the United States the more likely their frame of reference will shift from the conditions prevailing in the country of origin to those prevailing in their new home.

However, time does not yield a uniform effect. Workers emanating from groups with a history of circular or temporary migration may be more likely to assimilate in a delayed fashion. Workers from groups dominated by refugee flows are likely to experience a quicker commitment to life in the host society, which in turn will accelerate the impact of time.[6]

Furthermore, time generates new self-understandings, and not simply because immigrants come to view themselves in terms consistent with the categories of the U.S. system of race and ethnic relations. As immigrants become ethnics, their perception of fairness in the employment system evolves, as does their view of the need for redress through unions. Reactive ethnicity is likely to exercise a powerful effect on Mexican immigrants: though preferences for unionization will be depressed, relative to other immigrants, at early stages of the migration, they should shift more sharply upward in the later stages of settlement. On the other hand, the social structure of Mexican migration is likely to impede access to existing union jobs, even relative to other immigrants of similar socioeconomic background.

The socioeconomic diversity of the immigrant population further complicates the impact of time. For the large middle-class contingent

6. Unfortunately, our sample size precludes an adequate test of this latter hypothesis.

among today's immigrants, occupational position will either preclude unionization—as among those who work as managers—or reduce its attractiveness or feasibility—as among the many immigrants who are employed in higher or even low white-collar positions. The importance of socioeconomic diversity suggests that controls for demographic characteristics and for industry or occupation will reduce the effects of immigrant status and time.

Data and Variables

This section analyzes data drawn from a four-year (1994–97) combined Current Population Survey (CPS) for the month of March.[7] The CPS inquires into union membership among only a relatively small portion of eligible respondents, and we have restricted the sample further to encompass only those aged 20–65 and who were also employed as wage and salary workers. The analysis, therefore, excludes the self-employed. The analysis is based on a sample of almost 32,000 persons, 2,998 of whom are foreign-born. The limited size of the foreign-born sample makes meaningful national-origin disaggregations for most immigrants problematic. Consequently we have merged data from several questions to recode the sample into five mutually exclusive "ethno-racial" groups: whites, blacks, Mexicans, other Hispanics, and others, the latter a largely Asian grouping. We also use controls for nativity and year of immigration to distinguish native from foreign-born members of these groupings. As additional controls, we use data on geographical location, gender, education, age, and industry of employment.[8]

7. The Current Population Survey is a monthly survey of a national probability sample of approximately sixty thousand households. In light of the limited size of the two populations of interest to us—immigrants on the one hand and union members on the other—we have sought to increase the size of these target populations by merging the March CPS samples from 1994 through 1997. However, the nature of the CPS precludes utilization of each year's full CPS sample. The CPS retains respondents during a two-year period, interviewing individuals for four consecutive months, dropping them from the sample for the next eight months, and then re-interviewing them for another four consecutive months, after which time they are dropped from the sample completely. Consequently, half of the persons interviewed in any given month reappear in the following year's sample in the same month. To avoid duplicate cases, we have retained nonoverlapping halves of the 1994, 1995, and 1996 samples, and included the entire 1997 sample. This procedure almost triples the size of the sample.

8. We have recoded industry of employment into six mutually exclusive categories, separating the public sector from all private sector industries, and recoding private sector industries into five categories: construction / manufacturing; agriculture, mining, and forestry; transportation, communications, and utilities; wholesale / retail trade; and finance, insurance, real estate and other services.

Characteristics

The immigrants in our sample differ from natives along a series of dimensions, as table 2.1 shows. First of all, natives are more likely to hold union jobs: just over 18 percent of native-born workers are unionized, as opposed to just over 15 percent for the foreign-born. Differences in age and labor force experience are negligible, in part because our sample is limited to workers aged 20–65. Immigrants are more heavily male than natives, which makes the difference in unionization rates even more striking, as generally male workers in the U.S. are more unionized than female workers.

Still more impressive are native / immigrant differences in ethnic characteristics. The native-born population in our sample remains overwhelmingly white. By contrast, whites comprise less than a quarter of the foreign-born; Hispanics, divided here between Mexicans and other Hispanics, account for the largest group of immigrants, followed by "Asians / Others."

By historical standards, relatively high skill levels distinguish today's immigrant population; but a smaller proportion of immigrants have gone beyond the high school degree than is true among the native-born. A much greater difference is found at the lower end of the spectrum: immigrants are disproportionately concentrated among persons who have not obtained the high school degree— a very small group among the native-born.

Though found in all major industrial sectors, immigrants evince a different sectoral distribution than natives. Construction and manufacturing constitute a sector of immigrant overconcentration; the public sector, not surprisingly, has relatively low levels of foreign-born employment.

We also note the relatively recent origins of the immigrant workforce, of whom just under 60 percent arrived in the United States after 1980. Even this figure probably underestimates new arrivals' share of the immigrant population, since our merged (1994–97) sample is such that it does not fully capture immigration throughout the 1990s.

Geography offers a final axis of differentiation. The geographic distribution of immigrants and natives is almost perfectly asymmetrical, the six states containing 65 percent of the foreign-born being home to less than 30 percent of all natives. California, with 26 percent of the foreign-born workers, contains only 6 percent of all native-born adults of working age.

Table 2.1. Characteristics by nativity, wage and salary workers aged 20–65.

	Natives (n = 27,703)	**Immigrants (n = 2,998)**
Holding union jobs	18.1%	15.1%
Mean age	40.3	39.8
Mean labor market experience	20.9	21.6
Male	50.0%	56.0%
Education		
Less than high school	7.6%	28.0%
High school diploma	33.7%	22.7%
More than high school	58.7%	49.4%
State		
California	5.8%	25.9%
New York	5.5%	12.8%
New Jersey	3.6%	8.0%
Illinois	4.1%	4.8%
Florida	4.1%	8.1%
Texas	4.7%	5.5%
Other states	72.3%	34.8%
Race		
White	83.2%	24.3%
Black	9.8%	6.3%
Mexican	2.7%	23.2%
Other Hispanic	1.8%	19.1%
Asian / other	2.6%	27.2%
Industry		
Agriculture / mining / forestry	1.7%	3.6%
Construction / manufacturing	21.7%	26.9%
Trans. / comm. / utilities	6.4%	4.3%
Wholesale / retail trade	18.5%	18.5%
Fin. / ins. / real est. / other services	32.9%	36.2%
Public admin. / public sector	18.9%	10.5%
Period of Immigration		
Before 1980		42.4%
1980–1989		36.1%
1990–1997		21.6%
U.S. Citizen		36.1%

But it is not simply that immigrant and native workers live in different regions of the country; there are geographic variations within the immigrant population as well. Those many immigrants who move to California differ significantly from their counterparts who settle elsewhere, as table 2.2 shows. Disparities in native-immigrant unionization rates stand at the top of the list: natives are unionized at almost twice the rate of immigrants in California, whereas elsewhere the difference is on the order of less than 20 percent. Educational characteristics also make California distinct; its native-born workers are far better educated than those elsewhere, but its immigrants are more likely to be concentrated among the very least schooled, making for an extraordinary large educational gap between natives and immigrants. More than half of California's immigrants are Hispanic, almost three-quarters of whom are Mexican; elsewhere, Hispanics comprise less than 40 percent of the foreign-born workforce. And California's immigrants are longer settled than those residing elsewhere in the United States, a characteristic reflecting California's importance as a prime immigrant destination ever since the late 1960s.

Thus California stands out from the rest of the nation with respect to the social characteristics of its immigrants, and with respect to the size and nature of differences between immigrants and natives. Not surprisingly, those differences are associated with distinctive patterns in immigrant/native unionization rates, as tables 2.3 and 2.4 show.

Overall, California still ranks as a state with relatively high unionization rates. Native-born workers are just a little less likely to have union jobs than their counterparts in New York or New Jersey, but far more so than in such immigrant states as Texas or Florida. Immigrant Californians are far less unionized than their New Jersey or New York counterparts, but compare favorably with foreign-born workers in Texas or Florida.

Nonetheless, a sizable foreign-native gap in unionization rates distinguishes Californians within almost every social category, residents of San Francisco excepted. Whether men or women, better educated or less educated, Mexicans or Asians, manufacturing workers or workers in trade, immigrant Californians are far less likely to hold union jobs than their native-born counterparts. Immigrants in the other forty-nine states are also less likely to hold union jobs than comparable native-born workers, but the gap is modest, especially by comparison to California. Moreover, unionization rates among recent immigrants to California are highly depressed.

Table 2.2. Characteristics by nativity, wage and salary workers aged 20–65, California vs. other 49 states.

	California		Other 49 states	
	Natives (n = 1,614)	**Immigrants (n = 777)**	**Natives (n = 26,089)**	**Immigrants (n = 2,221)**
Holding union jobs	24.7%	13.4%	17.7%	15.8%
Mean age	39.8	38.3	40.4	40.3
Mean labor market experience	19.9	20.6	21.0	21.9
Male	51.0%	59.2%	49.9%	54.8%
Education				
Less than high school	5.1%	33.1%	7.7%	26.2%
High school diploma	24.9%	21.1%	34.3%	23.2%
More than high school	70.4%	45.8%	58.0%	50.6%
Location				
Los Angeles	51.4%	68.7%		
San Francisco	20.9%	16.6%		
Other metropolitan	25.2%	13.5%		
Non-metro	2.5%	1.2%		
Race				
White	71.7%	13.6%	83.9%	27.9%
Black	7.5%	1.9%	10.0%	7.8%
Mexican	13.6%	39.8%	2.0%	17.4%
Other Hispanic	2.6%	14.4%	1.7%	20.7%
Asian / other	4.7%	30.2%	2.5%	26.1%
Industry				
Agriculture / mining / forestry	0.9%	3.9%	1.8%	3.5%
Construction / manufacturing	17.9%	30.2%	21.9%	25.7%
Trans. / comm. / utilities	7.5%	4.0%	6.3%	4.4%
Wholesale / retail trade	18.5%	18.4%	18.5%	18.5%
Fin. / ins. / real est. / other services	35.4%	33.3%	32.8%	37.2%
Public admin. / public sector	19.8%	10.2%	18.8%	10.6%
Period of immigration				
Before 1980		41.6%		42.6%
1980–1989		42.5%		33.9%
1990–1997		16.0%		23.5%
U.S. citizen		30.0%		38.3%

Table 2.3. Proportion of wage and salary workers aged 20–65 holding union jobs, United States (percentage).

	Natives (n = 27,703)	Immigrants (n = 2,998)
Gender		
Male	21.0%	15.7%
Female	15.2%	14.4%
Education		
Less than high school	14.8%	14.7%
High school diploma	19.1%	17.4%
More than high school	24.9%	16.9%
State		
California	24.7%	11.7%
New York	29.5%	26.4%
New Jersey	23.9%	25.2%
Illinois	21.5%	15.9%
Florida	12.3%	5.7%
Texas	9.1%	7.8%
Other states	16.6%	12.8%
Race		
White	17.2%	16.2%
Black	28.1%	23.4%
Mexican	24.7%	10.3%
Other Hispanic	23.6%	16.2%
Asian / other	25.1%	14.4%
Industry:		
Agriculture / mining / forestry	9.6%	1.9%
Construction / manufacturing	20.0%	15.1%
Trans. / comm. / utilities	32.1%	24.8%
Wholesale / retail trade	6.5%	6.3%
Fin. / ins. / real est. / other services	5.9%	11.4%
Public admin. / public sector	44.7%	44.1%
Period of immigration		
Before 1980		25.0%
1980–1989		12.9%
1990–1997		9.4%
U.S. Citizen		
Yes		20.50%
No		12.10%

Table 2.4. Proportion of wage and salary workers aged 20–65 holding union jobs, California vs. other 49 states (percentage).

	California		Other 49 states	
	Natives (n = 1,614)	Immigrants (n = 777)	Natives (n = 26,089)	Immigrants (n = 2,221)
Gender				
Male	28.4%	14.6%	20.6%	16.2%
Female	20.9%	11.7%	14.8%	15.3%
Education				
Less than high school	16.9%	9.7%	14.7%	16.8%
High school diploma	25.8%	11.6%	18.8%	19.2%
More than high school	24.9%	16.9%	17.5%	13.6%
Location				
Los Angeles	26.4%	11.4%		
San Francisco	24.9%	20.9%		
Other metropolitan	22.4%	14.3%		
Non-metro	12.5%	11.1%		
Race				
White	24.0%	17.9%	16.80%	15.90%
Black	28.1%	26.7%	24.50%	23.10%
Mexican	25.6%	12.3%	13.90%	8.80%
Other Hispanic	19.1%	15.2%	24.00%	18.70%
Asian / other	30.7%	11.1%	20.40%	15.70%
Industry:				
Agriculture / mining / forestry	13.3%	0.0%	9.5%	2.6%
Construction / manufacturing	18.0%	8.9%	20.1%	17.7%
Trans. / comm. / utilities	35.5%	19.4%	31.9%	26.5%
Wholesale / retail trade	13.4%	5.6%	6.1%	6.6%
Fin. / ins. / real est. / other services	10.0%	10.0%	5.6%	11.9%
Public admin. / public sector	64.1%	54.4%	43.4%	40.7%
Period of immigration				
Before 1980		21.4%		19.5%
1980–1989		8.8%		14.6%
1990–1997		4.8%		10.5%
U.S. Citizen				
Yes		24.90%		19.3%
No		8.50%		13.6%

Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate analysis can provide a more rigorous assessment of the factors associated with the probability of holding a union job. We seek to determine the likelihood of being a union member; as membership is a dichotomous category, we use logistic regression to predict the probability of membership status.[9] Because the coefficients produced by logistic regression are difficult to interpret, we exponentiate them to generate odds ratios. An odds ratio less than one indicates a negative relationship between a given independent variable and the probability of being unionized; an odds ratio greater than one points to a positive relationship. To enhance readability and facilitate intuitive understanding, our discussion below refers to graphical representations of the odds ratios. Detailed results appear in the chapter appendices. We will first examine patterns for the entire United States, and then review the findings for California.

We begin by looking at the effects of time, asking whether immigrant/native differences in unionization diminish as length of settlement in the United States increases. As figure 2.1 shows, immigrants in the more recent cohorts are indeed significantly less likely to be unionized than native workers; among immigrants of the longest tenure, however, foreign birth proves to be positively associated with union membership. The overall pattern persists after controlling for ethnicity, with other Hispanics, blacks, and others significantly more likely to be union members than whites, and Mexicans significantly less likely to be union members. Because there are strong effects linking ethnicity and union membership, controls for ethnicity slightly mute the impact of time among the most established of the foreign-born. Applying controls for demographic characteristics eliminates the union propensity among the longest-settled immigrants, while leaving the effects of migration in either the 1980s or 1990s virtually unchanged. Insertion of the industry dummies alters the association between immigrant status and union membership, though the effect is inconsistent: older immigrants are now

9. When analyzing categorical dependent variables, linear regression is not an appropriate method. Linear regression assumes continuous dependent variables. In analyzing our dichotomous dependent variable (union membership), we used logistic (or logit) regression. Logistic regression predicts the probability that an event occurs. Unlike linear regression, logit (or logistic) regression refers to models with a logit as the left-hand-side variable. A logit is the log of odds that an event occurs. Thus the estimated (logit) coefficients are reported in terms of log odds. The interpretation of log odds is rather difficult. Instead of log odds, odds allow a more intuitive interpretation, especially with dichotomous predictors. For dummy predictors, the odds ratio equals the antilogarithm of the logit coefficient. In this chapter, we present odds ratios for all predictors.



Figure 2.1. Odds of holding union job, United States: effect of immigrant cohort before and after controls.

significantly more likely than natives to hold union jobs; immigrants of the 1980s no longer differ from native counterparts; and though immigrants of the 1990s remain less likely than natives to hold union jobs, the effect is no longer as strong. Still, the most recent immigrants are only about half as likely as natives to be union members, other relevant background factors being controlled (see appendix A).

Location

Immigrants tend to converge on just a handful of states; ironically, those same immigrant-receiving states differ significantly in the industrial relations environment, as we've already noted. Compared to Californians, workers in New York are about 50 percent more likely and those in Florida over 50 percent less likely to hold union jobs. More important, adding variables for location to the controls applied earlier alters the effects and significance associated with migration cohorts: newcomers of the 1980s or the 1990s again become significantly less likely to be union members; older migrants are now no more likely than natives to hold union jobs.

Time / Ethnicity Interactions

Unionization rates among immigrants thus increase over time; immigrants with eighteen years or more of residence in the United States are just as likely to be union members as their native-born counterparts. More recent immigrants, however, show a strong union membership gap, a divergence that bears little relationship to background demographic factors and is only mildly affected by sectoral location.

But time may not work in quite the same way for all groups. In particular, labor migrants involved in circular movements from home to host society and back again may be slowest to adjust their standards of evaluation to the circumstances that prevail in the host society. Thus we hypothesize that Mexicans, as the quintessential labor migration group, will display a distinctive pattern, in that recency of arrival will have an even more negative effect on unionization status than among all other immigrants.

Indeed, as figure 2.2 shows, Mexican immigrants of the 1980s and of the 1990s are significantly less likely to be union members than members of all other immigrant groups. While the divergence is greatest among the immigrants of the 1990s, the cohort effect appears quite robust; application of demographic and industrial controls shows that recent Mexican immigrants are less likely to be union members than their demographic counterparts working in the same industries.



Figure 2.2. Odds of holding union job, United States: immigrant cohorts by ethnicity (background factors controlled).

The California Factor

Multivariate analysis confirms the initial comparison between the United States and California: immigrants in California are less likely to hold union jobs, as figure 2.3 shows. But unlike the pattern in the United States as a whole, immigrant Californians are significantly less likely to hold union jobs than native-born workers regardless of cohort, with the unionization gap especially wide among more recent arrivals. Sequential controls for ethnicity, demographics, sector, and location slightly diminish the difference between natives and immigrants in each cohort, but without altering the essential pattern: for immigrant Californians, a union job remains, if not out of reach, then awfully hard to find (see appendix B).



Figure 2.3. Odds of holding union job, California: effect of immigrant cohort before and after controls.

Propensity or Social Process?

Thus our analysis shows that immigrants are less likely than natives to hold union jobs for reasons that have relatively little to do with the social factors that otherwise distinguish immigrants from natives. But if background characteristics don't account for the disparity, what does? In the current environment, group differences in unionization rates are likely to be closely related to group differences in access to union jobs; as we've suggested, the process of immigrant incorporation systematically reduces the probability of moving into those sectors or organizations where union jobs are most likely to be found. On the other hand, circumstances of migration and settlement generate distinctive economic expectations and job preferences that can affect access to the types of positions that tend to be covered by union contracts. So can one reduce intergroup differences in unionization rates to employment patterns? Or do inter-group propensities for unionization play any role in the process?

Our data preclude any definitive assessment of immigrant propensities to unionization, but they do allow for an indirect test of the hypothesis that the circumstances of immigrant incorporation and settlement



Figure 2.4. Odds of union membership, United States: effect of immigrant cohort before and after controls.

may *reduce* the preference for unionization. Though getting a union job may be a matter of employment patterns, persons who hold such jobs choose whether to become union members or not. Of those persons in our sample who hold union jobs, as we've defined them in this chapter, 10.5 percent are not union members. As figure 2.4 shows, although immigrants who arrived before 1980 are more likely than their native-born counterparts to be union members, if covered by a union contract, those immigrants of the 1980s and 1990s who hold union jobs are significantly *less likely* to be union members than native-born unionized workers, a disparity that holds after controlling for education.

Conclusion

In this essay, we plumb a new data source to assess the factors associated with unionization among America's new immigrant workers. The effort yields a sobering conclusion: however much benefit they might derive from unionization, immigrant workers have difficulty finding union jobs. To be sure, the picture is not uniformly negative. Over time, unionization rates rise among immigrants, so that among the more settled of the arrivals, unionization rates are somewhat higher than among their native-born counterparts. However, the more recent cohorts are distinctly less likely to be union members than their native-born counterparts, a disparity that persists after controlling for a broad range of background factors. Furthermore, the difference between natives and immigrants is even greater among the largest, and most uniformly proletarian of contemporary immigrant groups, namely the Mexicans, among whom recent arrivals are especially unlikely to be union members. Union jobs are most elusive in California, home to one out of every four immigrant workers, where even the most settled immigrant workers are unlikely to hold a union job.

Our analysis is pitched in the language of variables, but it's always important to recall the distribution of populations among the values on those variables. From this perspective, our findings regarding unionization rates among the more recent cohorts would be of considerably reduced import had immigration to America subsided; were most immigrants of established vintage, recentness of arrival would have little net effect on the overall native / immigrant unionization gap. Similarly, if more immigrants lived in New York than California, recency would have a much milder overall effect, and immigrant unionization rates would soon surpass those of the native-born. However, the reality is rather different.

The great majority of immigrant workers have moved to the United States since 1980, with two-and-a-half times as many in California as in New York. Working-class immigrants have other characteristics—such as low levels of education and concentrations in industries of low union densities—which further reduce access to union jobs.

This paper can shed light only on the factors associated with access to existing union jobs, and that is a matter of little import to the future of organized labor. Immigrant workers may well find it difficult to connect with those jobs located in the shrinking union sector, but the factors influencing their prospective behavior may prove more crucial. Indeed, the central finding of this chapter is consistent with other research documenting the troubles that immigrants encounter in their search for progress in America. Today's newcomers thus have ample reason for turning to unions to voice their discontent; they are also quite capable of doing so, as the other chapters in this volume show.

Nonetheless, the factors that make union jobs elusive may weaken the appeal of unionization itself. Immigrant modes of incorporation generate a logic of their own; such logic will not always breed a preference for unionization, job problems notwithstanding. Likewise, continuing home-country ties generate a dual frame of reference, which in turn blunts the impact of those frustrations encountered in the United States. And as we noted above, the limited evidence available does suggest that recent immigrants are less likely than comparable natives to choose union membership, when offered the possibility.

Thus immigration is unlikely to add a silver lining to the dark clouds facing American labor. Granted, labor has been misled in recent times; its new leadership—should it last—provides some reason for hope. Yet the obstacles it confronts are so deep-seated that even a greatly improved leadership equipped with superior strategy may not suffice. As we've argued, the characteristics of the new immigrant workforce—its size, composition, and most important its recent arrival—strongly suggest that immigration adds to, rather than subtracts from, the many difficulties facing organized labor. While we admire the optimism that impels union organizers in the face of these odds, the argument and analysis in this chapter warrant pessimism, which seems very much the order of the day.

Appendix A

Logistic Regression Results Predicting Holding Union Jobs, United States, 1994–97 **(odds ratios for figure 2.1 in bold)**

Model A	**Odds ratio**	**Std. error**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**[95% conf.**	**interval]**
bef 1980	**1.201839**	0.0794123	2.782	0.005	1.055851	1.368012
1980–89	**0.7007825**	0.0661929	–3.764	0	0.5823478	0.8433037
1990–97	**0.5344614**	0.0728039	–4.599	0	0.409229	0.6980175
Model B						
bef 1980	**1.115299**	0.0824009	1.477	0.14	0.9649452	1.289081
1980–89	**0.6441107**	0.0659292	–4.298	0	0.5270285	0.7872033
1990–97	**0.4994239**	0.0709873	–4.885	0	0.3779905	0.6598691
blacks	1.599969	0.0753601	9.978	0	1.458878	1.754704
mexicans	0.8522537	0.0758867	–1.795	0.073	0.7157738	1.014757
other hispanics	1.475955	0.1317466	4.361	0	1.239062	1.758138
other	1.16258	0.0948038	1.847	0.065	0.9908562	1.364065
Model C						
bef 1980	**0.9692626**	0.0733386	–0.413	0.68	0.8356721	1.124209
1980–89	**0.6497235**	0.0674068	–4.156	0	0.5301747	0.7962293
1990–97	**0.5621713**	0.0809544	–4	0	0.4239289	0.7454942
blacks	1.777984	0.0859411	1.906	0	1.617275	1.954662
mexicans	1.051407	0.0967923	0.545	0.586	0.8778278	1.259309
other hispanics	1.742445	0.1593462	6.072	0	1.456521	2.084497
other	1.262371	0.1046999	2.809	0.005	1.072974	1.4852
age	1.066229	0.012217	5.597	0	1.042551	1.090445
female	0.6570613	0.0206463	–13.366	0	0.6178162	0.6987993
work experience	1.027302	0.0134818	2.052	0.04	1.001215	1.054068

	Odds ratio	Std. error	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
exper squared	0.9986955	0.0001151	-11.323	0	0.9984698	0.9989212
less than HS	0.8538642	0.0622357	-2.168	0.03	0.7401968	0.9849869
more than HS	0.8569842	0.0406179	-3.256	0.001	0.7809603	0.9404088
Model D						
bef 1980	**1.230827**	0.1000538	2.555	0.011	1.049549	1.443414
1980–89	**0.9605481**	0.1047883	-0.369	0.712	0.775639	1.189539
1990–97	**0.7440377**	0.1113939	-1.975	0.048	0.5548262	0.9977756
blacks	1.564817	0.0825558	8.487	0	1.411095	1.735285
mexicans	0.8654121	0.0846433	-1.478	0.139	0.7144462	1.048278
other hispanics	1.515685	0.1493756	4.22	0	1.249454	1.838644
other	1.020046	0.0902508	0.224	0.823	0.857646	1.213198
age	1.001278	0.0125183	0.102	0.919	0.9770408	1.026116
female	0.6951388	0.024655	-10.253	0	0.6484573	0.7451809
work experience	1.07014	0.0152119	4.769	0	1.040737	1.100374
exper squared	0.9989847	0.0001227	-8.268	0	0.9987442	0.9992253
less than HS	0.7576113	0.0594396	-3.538	0	0.649627	0.8835453
more than HS	0.8335047	0.0425263	-3.569	0	0.7541867	0.9211646
agr / min / fores	0.1108646	0.017489	-13.942	0	0.0813795	0.1510328
const / mfg	0.2782648	0.0126843	-28.062	0	0.2544821	0.30427
TCU	0.520164	0.0312589	-10.876	0	0.4623682	0.5851843
trade	0.0885022	0.0056713	-37.839	0	0.0780564	0.1003459
FIRE / services	0.0904891	0.0045899	-47.365	0	0.0819258	0.0999475
Model E						
bef 1980	**1.06378**	0.0886573	0.742	0.458	0.9034648	1.252543
1980–89	**0.76843**	0.0859561	-2.355	0.019	0.6171482	0.9567955
1990–97	**0.6422665**	0.0969293	-2.934	0.003	0.4778086	0.8633294
blacks	1.592599	0.0850411	8.715	0	1.434348	1.768311
mexicans	1.012552	0.104884	0.12	0.904	0.8265068	1.240475
other hispanics	1.39744	0.1412378	3.311	0.001	1.146313	1.703583
other	1.013749	0.0910982	0.152	0.879	0.8500396	1.208987
age	0.993819	0.0125426	-0.491	0.623	0.9695376	1.018709
female	0.6935151	0.0248086	-10.231	0	0.6465567	0.7438841
work experience	1.07867	0.0154765	5.278	0	1.048759	1.109434
exper squared	0.9989659	0.0001239	-8.339	0	0.998723	0.9992089
less than HS	0.7495692	0.0594657	-3.633	0	0.6416279	0.8756696
more than HS	0.8409902	0.0433575	-3.359	0.001	0.7601634	0.9304112
agr / min / fores	0.1168272	0.0184988	-13.56	0	0.0856568	0.1593403
const / mfg	0.2711065	0.0125008	-28.307	0	0.2476799	0.2967489
TCU	0.5037195	0.0307303	-11.24	0	0.4469508	0.5676985
trade	0.0857332	0.0055388	-38.024	0	0.0755366	0.0973062

	Odds ratio	Std. error	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
FIRE / services	0.0851743	0.0043843	-47.85	0	0.0770004	0.0942157
NY	1.459146	0.1354191	4.071	0	1.216469	1.750235
NJ	1.14397	0.1187679	1.296	0.195	0.9333455	1.402126
IL	0.8705907	0.0911953	-1.323	0.186	0.7090057	1.069002
FL	0.3791937	0.0446571	-8.234	0	0.3010345	0.4776457
TX	0.6213894	0.0471358	-6.272	0	0.5355444	0.7209949
other states	0.2715013	0.0324886	-10.896	0	0.214741	0.3432646

Appendix B

Logistic Regression Results Predicting Holding Union Jobs, California, 1994–97 **(odds ratios for figure 2.3 in bold)**

Model A	**Odds ratio**	**Std. error**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**[95% conf.**	**interval]**
bef 1980	**0.7644336**	0.1109301	–1.851	0.064	0.5751994	1.015924
1980–89	**0.2808074**	0.0569236	–6.265	0	0.1887374	0.4177909
1990–97	**0.1503715**	0.0635172	–4.485	0	0.0657077	0.3441239
Model B						
bef 1980	**0.7549722**	0.1257016	–1.688	0.091	0.5447627	1.046296
1980–89	**0.2756519**	0.0610945	–5.814	0	0.1785268	0.4256164
1990–97	**0.1477767**	0.0636305	–4.441	0	0.0635464	0.3436538
blacks	1.308275	0.2667965	1.318	0.188	0.8772306	1.951123
mexicans	1.039622	0.1522656	0.265	0.791	0.7802008	1.385302
other hispanics	1.083548	0.2698437	0.322	0.747	0.6650698	1.765342
other	1.047406	0.203712	0.238	0.812	0.7154235	1.53344
Model C						
bef 1980	**0.6955648**	0.122331	–2.064	0.039	0.4927587	0.9818403
1980–89	**0.3173513**	0.0720513	–5.055	0	0.2033686	0.4952185
1990–97	**0.1984953**	0.0866765	–3.703	0	0.0843447	0.4671351
blacks	1.39704	0.2911591	1.604	0.109	0.9285573	2.101885
mexicans	1.452269	0.2332618	2.323	0.02	1.060054	1.989602
other hispanics	1.306141	0.3319918	1.051	0.293	0.7936582	2.149544
other	1.025638	0.2062967	0.126	0.9	0.6914863	1.521265
age	1.029152	0.0357719	0.827	0.408	0.9613751	1.101707
female	0.6566181	0.0691256	–3.996	0	0.5341982	0.8070925

	Odds ratio	**Std. error**	**z**	**P>|z|**	**[95% conf.**	**interval]**
work experience	1.037087	0.0418562	0.902	0.367	0.9582112	1.122456
experience squared	0.9992317	0.0003928	–1.955	0.051	0.9984622	1.000002
less than HS	0.5526986	0.1464757	–2.237	0.025	0.3287788	0.9291225
more than HS	1.053317	0.1665284	0.329	0.742	0.7726542	1.43593
Model D						
bef 1980	**0.7615226**	0.1501429	–1.382	0.167	0.5174383	1.120745
1980–89	**0.4478394**	0.1086695	–3.311	0.001	0.2783402	0.7205577
1990–97	**0.2964742**	0.1344857	–2.68	0.007	0.1218618	0.7212841
blacks	1.21872	0.2987035	0.807	0.42	0.7538379	1.97029
mexicans	1.401794	0.2519948	1.879	0.06	0.9855242	1.99389
other hispanics	1.043667	0.2927806	0.152	0.879	0.6022458	1.808631
other	0.8697137	0.196842	–0.617	0.537	0.5581156	1.355278
age	0.9617607	0.0380726	–0.985	0.325	0.8899612	1.039353
female	0.5162449	0.0646946	–5.276	0	0.4038175	0.6599733
work experience	1.088059	0.0496427	1.85	0.064	0.9949845	1.18984
exper squared	0.9995898	0.0004368	–0.939	0.348	0.9987341	1.000446
less than HS	0.4725562	0.14026	–2.526	0.012	0.2641236	0.8454729
more than HS	0.9745917	0.1724209	–0.145	0.884	0.6890195	1.378523
agr / min / fores	0.0254489	0.0190634	–4.901	0	0.005862	0.1104824
const / mfg	0.0902857	0.0161818	–13.417	0	0.0635417	0.1282858
TCU	0.2406038	0.0514047	–6.668	0	0.1582866	0.3657301
trade	0.0719906	0.0142057	–13.334	0	0.0489003	0.105984
FIRE / services	0.0720755	0.011554	–16.407	0	0.052642	60.0986821
Model E						
bef 1980	**0.7376172**	0.1464471	–1.533	0.125	0.4998421	1.088502
1980–89	**0.4367066**	0.1068892	–3.385	0.001	0.2703012	0.7055561
1990–97	**0.2862236**	0.1298044	–2.758	0.006	0.1176738	0.6961955
blacks	1.150279	0.2824509	0.57	0.569	0.7108707	1.861297
mexicans	1.411128	0.2568898	1.892	0.059	0.9876628	2.016155
other hispanics	1.03212	0.2907066	0.112	0.911	0.5942658	1.792583
other	0.8177714	0.1873813	–0.878	0.38	0.5219039	1.281366
age	0.9524951	0.0379817	–1.221	0.222	0.8808871	1.029924
female	0.5209592	0.0654156	–5.193	0	0.4073057	0.6663264
work experience	1.098306	0.0503242	2.046	0.041	1.003972	1.201504
exper squared	0.9995841	0.0004365	–0.953	0.341	0.998729	1.00044
less than HS	0.4577067	0.1365863	–2.619	0.009	0.2550213	0.821482
more than HS	0.9693333	0.1723118	–0.175	0.861	0.6841649	1.373363
agr / min / fores	0.0282969	0.021266	–4.744	0	0.0064869	0.1234367
const / mfg	0.086731	0.0156443	–13.555	0	0.0609027	0.1235128

	Odds ratio	Std. error	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
TCU	0.2242095	0.0484532	–6.919	0	0.1467924	0.3424557
trade	0.0698902	0.0138633	–13.414	0	0.0473777	0.1031001
FIRE / services	0.0682211	0.0110895	–16.518	0	0.0496083	0.0938174
SF	1.25093	0.1928156	1.453	0.146	0.9247634	1.692136
other Metro	0.7667482	0.117202	–1.738	0.082	0.5682528	1.03458
non-Metro	0.4831946	0.2426792	–1.448	0.148	0.1805575	1.29309