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Race and Ethnicity

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Questions of race and ethnicity never are far around the corner in New York City. Whether it is electing a mayor, naming a schools chancellor, determining the size of the City Council, or more mundane matters, issues involving race and ethnicity come to the fore. New Yorkers' sensitivity to these matters is a sign that local intergroup relations are troubled. Indeed, in a recent poll, New Yorkers were more dissatisfied with "how the races get along" than with almost any other issue.[1]

Yet, the historian might ask, "Has it not always been so?" Ethnic conflict, sometimes of a murderous kind, runs like a red thread through the city's history. The anti-Catholic crusades of the 1850s and the draft riots during the Civil War are notorious illustrations of New Yorkers' long-standing propensity to attack each other over religious or racial differences. Is anything new?

This chapter argues that contemporary issues of race and ethnicity are historically distinct. The current period has three distinguishing characteristics. First, earlier divisions among groups of European origin (Jews, Italian Catholics, Irish Catholics, and others) have diminished substantially; New Yorkers who trace their origins to Europe are now a relatively homogeneous group. Second, and largely consistent with the past, native American blacks remain a

distinct and largely segregated group whose political attitudes differ from those of European-origin whites. Third, the city is now home to large numbers of people who are neither native blacks nor of European origin; they are the latest of the "new immigrants," from nations all over the globe. These heterogeneous individuals identify with numerous different ethnic groups, and typically hold economic positions and political attitudes that are distinguishable from those of both native blacks and European-origin whites.

These themes are elaborated in the pages that follow. The chapter begins with a brief summary of recent demographic trends. The next section examines the key concepts commonly used to analyze racial and ethnic differences and compares them with how people actually identify themselves. The third section examines economic differences among New Yorkers of varying backgrounds. The fourth section explores the political attitudes of different groups, and the conclusion examines the implications of the political and other differences among racial and ethnic groups.

MIGRATION AND THE CHANGED POPULATION

In 1989, the population of New York City was estimated to number about 7.3 million, a figure somewhat below that at the end of World War II. But the characteristics of the city's current residents differ significantly from those of their predecessors. The driving force in this post-war demographic transformation has been migration.

Three streams of migration have changed radically the city's population. First, whites moved in large numbers to the suburbs and other regions. This massive outflow persisted throughout the 1950-80 period, and abated only in the 1980s.

Second, blacks from the South and Puerto Ricans moved to New York in large numbers for about three decades following World War II. However, since the mid-1970s their flow has slowed, and both blacks and Puerto Ricans have declined in numbers in New York City. Between 1975 and 1980, it is estimated that about 139,000 native blacks left the city and about 42,000 moved in, causing a net

decline of 97,000. Similarly, in that period about 161,000 native Hispanics (mostly Puerto Ricans) left and 70,000 entered, causing a net decline of about 91,000.[2] Reliable data for the 1980s are not yet available, but it is not likely that migration of native blacks or of Puerto Ricans has been a major source of population growth in this decade.

Third, since 1965 foreign immigration has been a major source of population growth. The arrival of these new immigrants is the dominant demographic force in New York City today and for the foreseeable future.

THE NEW IMMIGRANTS

The new immigration to the United States began with the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965. It abolished the previous country-of-origin quotas, affirmed family connections as the principal basis for admission to permanent residence in the United States, and increased the total number of immigrants to be admitted.[3] This system, with some alterations, remains in place today.

The major, and entirely unanticipated, consequence of the Hart-Cellar Act was a dramatic increase in immigration from Asia. It has become the largest regional source of legal immigrants. In the same period, arrivals from Europe decreased sharply, and immigration from the Caribbean and Latin America increased markedly. The total size of the legal immigration flow also has increased dramatically. Between 1966 and 1970, an average of 374,000 newcomers entered the country each year; between 1982 and 1986, the annual inflow averaged 575,000.[4]

In addition to this legal immigration, substantial numbers of undocumented or illegal immigrants have settled in the United States. They either cross the border illegally or enter legally but overstay their legally permitted time.

How many undocumented immigrants live in the United States has been a matter of controversy for over two decades. Wildly disparate, often politically-inspired estimates have been made, with upper and lower bounds at 12 million and 2 million respectively. Robert Warren of the the Immigration Service and Jeffrey Passel of the Census Bureau jointly estimated that approximately 2 million undocumented persons were counted by the Census in 1980 and

that Mexicans comprised over one-half of that undocumennted population.[5] This figure excludes those not counted in the Census and additions to the population since 1980. Subsequent estimates indicate growth in the undocumented population of between 100,000 and 300,000 persons annually, with Mexicans and other Latin Americans predominant.[6] Allowing for this growth, for the presence of some immigrants not counted by the Census, and for the deaths and return immigration, yields an estimate of about 3.5 to 4.0 million in the late 1980s. This range is now widely accepted by experts in the field.[7]

The most important immigration legislation since the Hart-Cellar Act is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. It provided an amnesty for undocumented immigrants who had resided continuously in the United States since January 1, 1982 and imposed sanctions against the employers of illegal immigrants.[8] The law established a 12-month period, from May 4, 1987 to May 5, 1988, during which undocumented immigrants could apply for legalization. As of May 1989, close to 1.8 million applications by pre-1982 undocumented immigrants had been filed, indicating that many of the estimated 2.5 to 3.0 million eligible immigrants did not avail themselves of the legalization opportunity.[9]

NEW YORK'S NEW IMMIGRANTS

As in the past, no city has attracted as large a share of the new immigrant population as New York. Between 1966 and 1979, New York attracted over 1 million legal immigrants; the 1980 Census recorded 1,670,000 foreign-born New Yorkers, of whom 928,000 had arrived after 1965. (See Table 2.1.) Due to the virtual collapse of record-keeping procedures at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), no data are available for 1980 and 1981, but the figures for the years since 1982 indicate a rising number of legal immigrants entering the city. In 1987, the latest year for which data are available, over 92,000 legal immigrants came to New York City.

To these legal immigrants can be added an indeterminate number of illegal ones. Some analysts initially placed the number of undocumented immigrants in the city at 750,000 to 1 million.[10] Though widely repeated, these figures are a gross overestimate. In 1980 the Census actually counted 210,000 undocumented immigrants in the

TABLE 2.1
Immigration to the United States and New York City, 1966-87 (in thousands)

Years	United States	New York City	New York City Percentage of Total
1966	323.0	61.2	18.9%
1967	362.0	66.0	18.2
1968	454.4	75.4	16.6
1969	358.6	67.9	18.9
1970	373.3	74.6	20.0
1971	370.5	71.4	19.3
1972	384.7	76.0	19.8
1973	400.1	76.6	19.1
1974	394.9	73.2	18.5
1975	386.2	73.6	19.1
1976	500.5	90.7	18.1
1977	462.3	76.6	16.6
1978	601.4	88.0	14.6
1979	460.3	82.4	17.9
1980	560.6	NA	NA
1981	596.6	NA	NA
1982	594.1	85.0	14.3
1983	559.8	75.0	13.4
1984	543.9	87.4	16.1
1985	570.0	85.4	15.0
1986	601.7	89.8	14.9
1987	601.5	92.3	15.3

SOURCES: For 1966-1979 and 1982, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office); for 1983-1987, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Public Use Tapes.

NA—Not available.

New York region.[11] Assuming that the city's share of the region's undocumented population is the same as its share of the new legal immigrant population, the number of counted undocumented immigrants in the city is 188,000. Some undocumented immigrants undoubtedly were missed in the Census counts, but it seems implausible, given the immigrants' characteristics and, in particular, their high level of employment, that the undercount for the undocumented exceeds the 20 percent undercount for black males (the group most severely missed in Census enumerations).[12] Using this 20 percent estimate yields an uncounted illegal population in the city of just 27,000 and a total undocumented population in the city of

235,000. Even if the undocumented were undercounted by half, the undocumented population would total 376,000 or about one-half the initial estimates of some analysts.

The case for the lower estimate is reinforced by the results of the amnesty program. As of May 1989, New York City accounted for only about 125,000 applicants or less than 7 percent of the national total.[13] Either illegal immigrants in New York are far more reluctant to seek amnesty than their counterparts in the rest of the country or, more likely, the earlier estimates exaggerated the size of the undocumented population.

New York City's immigrants have two important distinguishing characteristics. First, they are highly heterogeneous. Of the five metropolitan areas receiving the largest number of immigrants, three are dominated by a single origin group: Mexicans comprise 47 percent of the immigrants to Los Angeles and 32 percent of the immigrants to Chicago; Cubans comprise 59 percent of the immigrants to Miami. San Francisco has more diversity, with the largest group (Filipinos) making up 19 percent of the new immigrants. But in New York; no single group accounts for more than 10 percent of the newcomers.[14]

Second, those immigrant groups that dominate the other major entrepots have a lower profile in New York. Barely 7,000 Mexicans lived in New York City in 1980; Filipinos and Cubans were more numerous, but each still comprised less than 3 percent of the city's newcomers. The most important source countries for New York City are the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Ecuador, with substantial numbers from other parts of the Caribbean. Almost a third of the city's immigrants were from China; Indians, Koreans, and Filipinos accounted for about 10 percent each.[15]

Since 1980, patterns of immigration to New York City have been remarkably stable. Newcomers from the Caribbean are the largest component, accounting for about 40 percent of the annual inflow, with Dominicans consistently the largest national group. Close to 25 percent of the post-1980 immigrants are from Asia, with China providing the most numerous, but by no means dominant, contingent.[16]

The major consequence of the new immigration is that New York City's population is more diverse than ever before. European-origin

whites continue to decrease in numbers, while foreign immigration increases the population of other origins. Estimates from the 1987 Housing and Vacancy Survey indicate that non-Hispanic whites comprised about 46 percent of the city's population in that year, down from about 52 percent in 1980. (See Table 2.2.) Consequently, "minorities" have become a numerical majority, but they are a collection of diverse subgroups.

TABLE 2.2
Characteristics of New York City Population, 1980, 1985 and 1987
(percentage distribution)

	1980	1985	1987
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
White, non-Hispanic	51.9	46.0	46.1
Black, non-Hispanic	24.0	24.9	24.0
Hispanic	19.9	24.7	23.3
Asian	3.2	4.4	4.4
Other	1.1	NA	2.2

SOURCES: The 1980 data are from 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample; the 1985 data are based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census Current Population Survey and are presented in John Kasarda, "The Regional and Urban Redistribution of People and Jobs in the United States," unpublished paper, 1986; the 1987 data are based on the Housing and Vacancy Survey as presented in Michael Stegman, *Housing and Vacancy Report, New York City, 1987* (New York: New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 1988), p. 5.

NA—Not available.

The changed and diverse character of the new immigrant population is illustrated in Table 2.3. From 1980 to 1988, the share of the city's adult, foreign-born population who were from Europe fell from 42 to 21 percent.[17] Over 38 percent of the 1988 immigrant population was from the Caribbean, 12 percent from Asia, 15 percent from South America, and 10 percent from Central America. The current most common source, the Caribbean, is itself extraordinarily variegated; the three most important Caribbean source countries (the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti) each have different languages and different cultures.

Thus, New York is now a "majority minority" city, but it is unlike most other large, older cities. In contrast to Chicago or Detroit, New York's minority population is extraordinarily heterogeneous. Consequently, the dichotomy inherent in the "minority/majority" distinction does not capture fully the variation in economic position, political orientation, and social integration among "minority" New Yorkers. The next section discusses how the diversity of New York's population complicates the categories used to analyze ethnic and racial differences; the following sections detail the differences among "minority" New Yorkers and the characteristics that distinguish them from the now numerically inferior "whites."

TABLE 2.3
Region of Birth of New York City Foreign-Born Adults, 1980 and 1988
(percentage distribution)

	1980	1988
Total	100.0%	100.0%
Europe	42.4	20.6
Asia	12.2	12.4
Africa	1.4	3.9
Caribbean	23.9	38.4
Central America	3.7	10.1
South Ameica	8.6	14.7
Other	7.8	0.0

SOURCES: The 1980 data are from the 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample; the 1988 data are from the City University New York Study. See note 17 for a description of the City University New York study.

ETHNICITY IN FLUX

The demographic perspective provided in the previous section, while valuable, can be misleading. The concepts used to distinguish among people may not coincide with the self-concepts and self-definitions of the groups observed. Consider the groups placed under the "minority" rubric. Those groups are categorized in starkly different ways: "blacks" are defined with respect to presumed physical similarities; "Hispanics" with respect to shared cultural heritage; "Asians" with respect to origins in a common land mass. And within each of these categories there is tremendous variation in

culture, language and national origin. Race, culture and geographical origins are each problematic concepts, and none coincides fully with the way New Yorkers identify themselves.

RACE

Racial divisions were initially claimed to be based on biological and physical differences among people, including skin color. The simultaneous emergence of science and the expansion of European imperialism provided the stimuli to classify the peoples of the world in terms of shared characteristics. Those systems of classifications, as well as the associated belief that the races were biological unities, have been discredited by evidence demonstrating the fundamental unity of the human species. Yet, the tendency to categorize people by race remains strong. Hence, race remains a meaningful concept if it is used as a "social construct" and not a biological one.

Because race is a social construct, it is likely to be constructed in different ways. Consider, for example, responses to the "race" question in the 1980 Census of Population. The Census form asked, "Are you ... ?" and then listed 15 possibilities - white, black, nine different Asian groups, three Native American groups, and a write-in space for "other." This is one, "official" version of contemporary definitions of race.

How well do the Census race categories match peoples' own definitions of their race? If we assume that a response to the opportunity to indicate an "other" race implies cognitive divergence with the Census categories, then fully 424,000 individuals or 8 percent of the 1980 New York City adult population did not identify with any of the "official" racial divisions.[18] Most of those using the "other" category (90 percent) were Hispanic. But self-assessment of racial identity varied widely among different Latin American and Caribbean nationals. (See Table 2.4.) Among Dominicans, over 58 percent designated themselves as belonging to a "Spanish" race; so did a significant proportion of those born in Puerto Rico, Ecuador and Mexico. However, the high proportion of Hispanics from all nations answering "white" suggests that the boundary between "white" and "Spanish" is subjective.

The City University of New York (CUNY) study provides another test of the salience and distinctiveness of racial categories. In contrast to the Census, the CUNY study was designed to elicit the respondents' self-categorizations. Hence, interviewers asked, "What race do you consider yourself?" If respondents asked for further clarification, interviewers were instructed to respond, "Whatever race means to you." Table 2.5 cross-tabulates the

TABLE 2.4
Race of Hispanic Immigrants in New York City by Country of Birth, 1980 (percentage distribution)

	Puerto Rican	Dominican	Cuban	Colombian	Ecuadorian	Mexican	Other Hispanic	Total
Spanish	47.8%	58.4%	17.8%	28.2%	40.2%	37.4%	23.8%	43.7%
White	45.1	27.5	69.2	67.5	54.2	55.8	61.1	47.2
Black	3.4	8.7	9.8	1.8	0.8	5.0	12.2	5.3
Amer Indian	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.2
Asian	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.4	0.2
Other	3.6	4.9	2.6	2.0	3.5	0.9	1.8	3.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.

TABLE 2.5
New York City Residents by Self-declared Race and by Census Category, 1988 (percentage distribution)

	Census Category			
Self-declared Race	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic Black	Hispanic	Asian
White	91.0%	0.0%	24.1%	2.2%
Black	0.0	97.4	6.2	2.8
Puerto Rican	0.0	0.0	14.2	0.0
Latino	0.0	0.0	34.1	0.0
Mixed Hispanic	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0
Indian/Mixed Indian	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0
Asian	0.0	0.0	0.0	44.1
Asian National Group (a)	0.0	0.0	0.0	36.9
Other (b)	9.9	2.6	9.4	14.0
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: City University New York study. See Note 17.

Notes: (a) Includes Chinese, Han, East Indian, and similar designations.
(b) Includes Italian, Nordic, Jewish, American, and all others.

response to the CUNY "race" question with categories compatible with more commonly used Census classifications. The two classification systems converge closely for black and white respondents, but not for Hispanic and Asian respondents. There is no majority Hispanic response; their self-designations have different bases, with "Puerto Rican" being a country-of-origin referent and "Latino" being a cultural referent. Furthermore, a sizable proportion provided answers that refer to mixed racial categories (trigueno, mestizo or mulatto) that do not fit into the American system of mutually exclusive categories. Asian responses also differ from the white and black pattern; more than one-third described their "race" in country-of-origin terms.

In sum, immigration has altered the meanings that New Yorkers attach to "race." The conventional definitions fit with the self-concepts of fewer New Yorkers.

ETHNICITY

If race is a concept of limited utility, ethnicity is an alternative. Ethnic groups are defined by a wide range of characteristics: place of origin, religion, culture, language, or shared historical experience. The term "ethnic group" also implies that members have some awareness of group membership and evidence some group cohesion in their behavior.[19] This aspect of ethnicity is particularly important for New Yorkers, since they may be categorized into groups with which they do not identify.

The CUNY study provides some relevant information. The survey asked, "When people ask about your ethnic identity, what—in your own words—do you answer?" Interviewers were instructed to answer queries for clarification with the response, "Your cultural or national background." Table 2.6 cross-classifies six categories of ethnicity response with the commonly used Census categories.

The data indicate that ethnic group awareness varies considerably among the Census groups. Most striking is the divergence between native blacks and all others: for native blacks, ethnicity *is* race; for others, ethnicity connotes another form of group membership. Even foreign-born blacks are as likely to define their ethnic identity in national origin as in race terms.

Over 90 percent of those whom the Census would identify as non-

Hispanic whites also describe themselves in those terms, but this same group divides itself among numerous, often poorly specified, ethnic identities. Among native "whites," less than a majority define their ethnic identity in national origin terms; substantial proportions

TABLE 2.6
New York City Residents by Ethnic Identity and Census Category, 1988 (percentage distribution)

	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Hispanic		
Ethnic Identity	Foreign Born	Native Born	Foreign Born	Native Born	Foreign Born	Native Born	Asian
Single National Origin Group	75.2%	47.0%	40.7%	7.9%	28.5%	52.1%	68.0%
Race or Cultural Group	2.0	4.8	39.3	63.0	39.9	19.7	14.4
Mixed Group	1.6	10.9	5.8	2.2	1.1	1.0	3.9
American	3.9	27.0	0.0	6.3	2.4	3.9	2.8
No Ethnic Identity	2.0	0.9	2.9	2.2	0.2	1.3	1.1
Other	14.2	6.6	7.6	14.0	25.6	18.9	8.8
Don't Know	1.2	2.8	3.6	4.4	2.4	3.1	1.1
Total[a]	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCE: City University New York study. See Note 17.

Note: (a) Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

use vague definitions such as "American" or "mixed." These responses suggest that self-defined race, rather than ethnicity, is the salient definition of group boundaries for these New Yorkers.

In contrast, among Hispanics the response patterns to the ethnicity and race questions are consistent: both evidence diffuse and uncertain boundaries for group identity. As with the race question, there is no majority response. Responses vary between native Hispanics, who are mainly Puerto Ricans, and immigrant Hispanics; the former are more likely to define ethnicity in national origin terms, and the latter are more likely to answer "Latino" or "Hispano."

MINORITY GROUP

The concept of "minority group" was defined by sociologist Louis Wirth as a "group of people distinguished by physical or cultural characteristics subject to different and unequal treatment by the

society in which they live and who regard themselves as victims of discrimination."[20] Under this definition, it is possible that a numerical majority of a population could qualify as a "minority group," although all sociologists do not agree on that point.

The relevant question for New York City is whether those who feel they belong to a group that is discriminated against also identify themselves as belonging to the *same* minority group. That is, does New York have one large minority group or many different minority groups who together comprise a large share of the population? As John Stone argues, "unless individuals regard themselves as members of the same minority, sharing both ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness, they are unlikely to fight for group rights or to strive to protect group interests."[21]

The CUNY study asked, "Do you consider yourself to be a member of a minority group?" Those who answered yes, then were queried, "Which one?" Fully 39 percent of New York residents considered themselves members of a minority group. A majority (60 percent) of native blacks identified themselves as members of a minority group; Jews were somewhat less likely (47 percent) to view themselves as members of a minority group. Fewer Hispanics (42 percent) viewed themselves this way, and about one-fifth the non-Jewish, non-Hispanic whites said they were part of a minority group.[22]

While large proportions of New Yorkers view themselves as in a minority group, they do not all place themselves in the same large minority group. Among those CUNY study respondents saying they were minority group members, less than one percent specified the group in a way that referred to the combination of blacks and Hispanics often referred to as "minorities." Rather, these respondents divided themselves among groups designated as "blacks" (32 percent), Hispanic (16 percent), Jewish (14 percent), and literally dozens of other self-defined minority groups. Thus, there is relatively little common group identity among those who view themselves as in a minority group.

In sum, the diverse population created by the new immigration is not easily understood or described in conventional categories. Given our history as a society extraordinarily sensitive to racial differences, it is not surprising that we try to understand the impact

of the new immigrants in racial terms. The difficulty is that race does not define group identity for Hispanic or Asian New Yorkers the way that it does for native "whites" and "blacks." Group identity for many new New Yorkers is in flux. Given the recency of their arrival, the kaleidoscope of groups encountered, and their unfamiliarity with American ethnic and racial categories, this is not surprising.

ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE

The new New Yorkers are diverse and hard to categorize, but it is still important to analyze their positions in the economy. How do the new immigrants compare with native whites and blacks in their economic experience?

To address this question, four sets of New Yorkers are compared using 1980 Census data on employment and income. The groups are native whites of European ancestry, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The first group is further divided among five specific countries of ancestry; each of the other three groups is divided among native and foreign born. The five different groups of native-born New Yorkers of European ancestry are English, Scottish, Irish, Italian, and Russian. These groups reflect the differences that historically distinguished European ethnic groups. The English, Scottish and Irish are associated with the "old immigration" of the mid-19th century; the Italians and Russians with the "new immigration" of the 1880-1920 period. These groups also are proxies for the major religious groups: the English and Scottish are mainly Protestants; the Italians and Irish are mainly Catholics; the Russians are mainly Jews. The native-born black and Hispanic groups also correspond to single ancestry groups: fully 90 percent of native blacks report no foreign ancestry; similarly, 70 percent of native Hispanics report Puerto Rican ancestry.[23]

THE DIVISION OF LABOR

Historically, different ethnic groups made their living in distinct ways. The 1900 Census, which provided detailed occupational data for the major immigrant groups, is rich in evidence of ethnic specialization: one-half of the city's barbers were from Italy; one-half of the

policemen and firemen were from Ireland; over one-third of the tailors were from Russia.[24]

Similar patterns are evident in the 1980 census. Table 2.7 shows an index of representation for each of the previously specified groups for each of the 30 largest industries in the city in 1980. Scores of 1 indicate parity; scores less than one indicate under-representation; scores more than one indicate over-representation.

Particularly high over-representation characterizes black immigrants in personal services (4.49) and nursing homes (4.24), and Asian immigrants in eating and drinking stores (4.22) and apparel manufacturing (3.82). But such industrial niches are not limited to recent immigrants. Although their specializations have changed considerably from those of the past, economic distinctions between the descendants of the "old" immigrants of the mid-19th century and of the "new" immigrants persist. Those of Russian ancestry are heavily over-represented in legal services, elementary schools, and advertising; those of Irish ancestry remain concentrated in "public order" (the police); those of English and Scottish ancestry are a heavy presence in printing, theaters, private colleges and advertising. Interestingly, there is no score above 2 among those of Italian ancestry, whose parents previously were clustered in many of the industries that are now concentrations of the newest immigrants.

Equally striking is the distinctiveness of the native black economic niche. Four of the five industries in which the native black index of representation exceeded 2, (the postal service, social services, transit, and hospitals) are in the public sector. Native black over-representation extended throughout the public sector. With the exception of personal services, all of the industries in which native blacks were over-represented were characterized by large, bureaucratic organizations in which affirmative action measures can be charted.

By contrast, industrial dispersion characterized native Hispanic employment. Their representation index did not exceed 2 in any industry. Although most public sector industries were above parity, native Hispanic representation was below that for native blacks. Hispanic immigrants were heavily represented in the manufacturing industries that historically were an important source of jobs for Puerto Ricans.

Overall, the data in Table 2.7 as well as other, more extensive

TABLE 2.7
Index of Group Representation in the Largest Industries in New York City, 1980

	Native-born of European Ancestry					Non-Hispanic Black		Asian		Hispanic	
	English	Irish	Italian	Scottish	Russian	Foreign	Native	Foreign	Native	Foreign	Native
Private Hospitals	0.75	1.15	0.66	0.93	0.69	2.64	1.22	1.79	0.64	0.75	1.04
Banking	1.11	1.40	1.38	1.07	0.46	1.47	0.92	0.98	1.69	0.76	0.78
Apparel Manufacturing	0.30	0.15	0.77	0.12	0.78	0.65	0.43	3.82	0.89	2.79	1.47
Eating & Drinking Stores	0.83	0.90	0.67	0.84	0.37	0.49	0.54	4.22	1.69	1.72	0.95
Public Elementary Schools	0.83	0.79	1.03	0.66	2.32	0.44	1.29	0.16	0.96	0.29	0.92
Printing & Publishing	2.01	1.19	0.98	2.33	1.57	0.64	0.70	0.40	0.96	0.71	0.84
Securities	1.51	1.41	1.31	1.60	0.91	0.64	0.45	0.45	0.97	0.43	0.41
Insurance	1.04	1.59	1.45	1.46	0.87	0.89	0.82	0.82	1.94	0.53	0.71
Construction	0.62	1.04	1.47	0.78	0.54	0.99	0.71	0.40	0.15	0.76	0.89
Public Hospitals	0.52	0.62	0.43	0.37	0.62	2.42	2.40	1.16	1.02	0.66	1.34
Real Estate	0.89	1.05	0.77	1.17	0.95	0.70	0.57	0.36	0.57	1.66	1.62
Department Stores	0.88	1.06	1.15	0.54	0.87	1.18	1.27	0.46	1.53	0.55	0.80
Public Order	0.75	2.37	1.45	0.95	0.59	0.33	1.61	0.13	1.10	0.22	0.88
Legal Services	1.97	1.43	0.93	2.05	2.88	0.30	0.41	0.22	1.15	0.21	0.44
Grocery Stores	0.51	0.81	1.40	0.56	0.41	0.61	0.83	1.20	0.39	1.32	1.74
Business Services	1.83	0.99	0.92	1.82	1.64	0.52	0.88	0.55	1.48	0.63	0.76
Telephone Services	0.83	2.05	1.21	1.37	0.28	1.16	1.70	0.36	0.83	0.30	0.76
Public Postal Service	0.48	0.78	1.21	0.90	0.89	0.50	2.31	0.16	1.31	0.30	1.23
Theaters	2.95	1.29	0.75	4.26	1.89	0.31	0.46	0.25	1.13	0.48	0.42
Public Transit	0.34	0.93	1.21	0.40	0.18	0.86	2.73	0.21	0.33	0.19	0.74
Private Colleges	2.47	1.35	0.53	2.14	1.55	0.55	0.68	0.93	1.49	0.50	0.64
Miscellaneous Manufacturing	0.40	0.29	0.64	0.43	0.86	1.01	0.71	0.57	0.35	2.72	1.79
Personal Services	0.45	0.26	0.09	0.34	0.01	4.49	2.15	0.84	0.18	1.76	0.43
Apparel Stores	0.69	0.48	0.98	0.68	1.33	0.77	0.72	0.84	0.55	0.95	0.90
General Government	0.74	0.97	0.98	0.69	1.23	0.91	1.82	0.47	1.31	0.36	1.18
Private Schools	1.48	2.38	1.18	0.83	1.12	0.52	0.48	0.19	0.19	0.33	0.44
Advertising	2.40	1.56	1.01	2.60	2.36	0.36	0.47	0.59	0.81	0.33	0.37
Public Social Services	1.13	0.74	0.41	0.52	1.30	1.52	3.06	0.10	0.84	0.63	1.14
Nursing Homes	0.63	0.90	0.46	0.52	0.58	4.24	1.45	1.06	0.00	0.86	0.70

SOURCE: 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.

Note: The Index of Representation for a group is that group's share of employment in the specific industry divided by that group's share of total employment in the city. The industries are listed by size; private hospitals employed 120,300, nursing homes employed 26,280.

evidence, point to a continuing high level of segregation in the labor market.[25] Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians each are concentrated in a few industries, and they are isolated from each other as well as from European-origin whites.

LEVEL AND SOURCES OF INCOME

In considering the income position of a group, two factors are most relevant—the amount of income and the sources of income. Significant differences are evident among the groups identified in each factor.

Amount of Income. Because the economic experiences of men and women vary significantly, it is important to separate the sexes when examining income data. Table 2.8 shows total income, and wage and salary income, for men and women in each of the groups selected for analysis.

TABLE 2.8
Total Income and Wage and Salary Income of Adult New York City Residents by Sex and Origin Group, 1980

	Males		Females	
	Total Income	Wage and Salary Income (a)	Total Income	Wage and Salary Income (a)
Native Born of European Ancestry				
English	$19,105	$18,743	$11,957	$12,562
Irish	15,738	16,137	9,705	10,814
Italians	15,212	15,903	7,927	9,157
Scots	18,267	17,330	11,770	12,029
Russians	21,832	20,712	12,183	12,342
Non-Hispanic Blacks				
Foreign Born	10,799	10,988	8,038	8,772
Native Born	10,061	11,321	7,345	9,242
Hispanics				
Foreign Born	10,305	10,609	6,369	7,132
Native Born	9,380	10,388	5,663	7,542
Asians				
Foreign Born	12,112	12,095	8,793	9,112
Native Born	12,893	13,394	10,255	10,956

SOURCE: 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample. Data are for persons age 18 and older.

Note: (a) Figure shown is only for those with some wage and salary income.

Among men, a clear pattern emerges. Those of European ancestry do notably better than all the other groups. While there is considerable variation in the total income of the highest (Russians at $21,832) and lowest (Italians at $15,212) of the European-ancestry groups, even the Italians are well above the highest income of the other groups (native born Asians at $12,893). Among the newer immigrant groups, foreign-born Asians do best ($12,112) and foreign-born Hispanics do worst ($10,305). Among both blacks and Hispanics, the native-born have lower total incomes than the foreign-born.

Among women, the patterns are less clear. Like men, the highest income groups are found among those of European ancestry and the lowest income group is Hispanics. But there are notable differences from the men. Italian-ancestry women do not do as well as the other European-ancestry groups, and they have total incomes below those of Asian and foreign-born black women. Also, native-born Asian women have incomes above those of both Italian and Irish-ancestry women.

Sources of Income. The most frequent and, typically, the largest source of income is earnings in the form of wages and salaries. The proportion of men with such income varied relatively little among the groups, from a low of 74 percent among native blacks to a high of 86 percent among foreign-born blacks. (See Table 2.9.) In contrast, there is substantial variation in the incidence of wage and salary income among females. While each of the European-ancestry groups of females were in a narrow range of 65-68 percent, as many as 84 percent of the foreign-born Asian women were working and as few as 48 percent of the native-born Hispanic women had this type of income.

Among the men, there is notable variation in the share with income from self-employment. Fully 15 percent of the Russian-ancestry and nearly 10 percent of the English-ancestry males had such income, but the figure was less than 3 percent for native-born blacks and Hispanics. Foreign-born Asians had a relatively high (9 percent) incidence of self-employment.

Among women, there is an important difference in the reliance on public assistance income. Fully 43 percent of native-born Hispanics had public assistance income, as did nearly 28 percent of the native-

born black females. Foreign-born Hispanics also received public assistance at a relatively high rate (20 percent). In contrast, Asian women relied on public assistance with about the same frequency as most of the European-ancestry females.

Finally, it is informative to consider the share of men with income from capital dividends, since this is a reliable proxy for wealth. The highest rates were evident among the European-ancestry groups, with such income most frequent among those of Russian ancestry. However, Asians also had a high percentage with such income. In contrast, blacks and Hispanics received income from capital dividends far less frequently.

TABLE 2.9
Percent of Adult New York City Residents with Selected Types of Income by Sex and Origin Group, 1980

	Males			Females	
	Wage and Salary	Self-Employment	Capital Dividends	Wage and Salary	Public Assistance
Native Born of European Ancestry					
English	77.3%	9.7%	44.3%	64.6%	7.8%
Irish	80.0	4.2	38.0	67.4	5.9
Italians	77.2	5.3	38.9	66.7	7.3
Scots	80.5	7.3	46.0	68.1	2.8
Russians	75.2	15.1	61.7	68.5	3.4
Non-Hispanic Blacks					
Foreign Born	86.2	3.4	13.3	80.3	9.9
Native Born	73.6	2.4	8.5	60.5	27.7
Hispanics					
Foreign Born	84.9	4.3	12.1	70.3	20.3
Native Born	77.2	2.6	9.4	47.9	43.3
Asians					
Foreign Born	83.0	8.6	36.5	84.1	4.6
Native Born	83.8	6.6	46.8	77.6	5.3

SOURCE: See Table 2.8.

Overall, the picture that emerges from these income data has three consistent elements. First, there is still variation in the experience of groups of European ancestry, but they are much alike in their favored position compared to other groups. Their incomes and

earnings, particularly among men, are consistently higher than those of other groups, and their relatively high rate of capital income suggest their accumulated wealth is typically greater. Second, Asians remain in a less favored position than those of European ancestry, but they fare better than blacks and Hispanics. Compared to the latter groups, Asians enjoy higher incomes, are wealthier, and are more likely to be self-employed. Third, blacks and Hispanics remain at the lower end of the economic ladder, with the native-born in each group doing most poorly. Thus, there is a wide gap between the economic position of New Yorkers of European ancestry and those who are black and Hispanic.

POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND POWER PERCEPTIONS

Do the differences in economic condition among groups of New Yorkers correspond to differences in political attitudes? That is, how do the city's multiple ethnic and national-origin groups differ in their political attitudes? In answering this question, it is useful to separate questions of policy orientation from perceptions of power. Policy orientations refer to individual stands on particular economic and social issues; more generally, this refers to standing on a liberal-conservative spectrum. Perceptions of power indicate how groups view each other and the degree of conflict or animosity between them.

POLICY ORIENTATIONS

Though New York City is widely viewed as a bastion of liberalism, New Yorkers profess themselves to be centrists at heart. The CUNY study asked people to place themselves on a political scale ranging from 1 (most liberal) to 5 (most conservative). The mean score was 2.9, almost the mid-point. Groups varied from scores of 2.69 for Asians (the most liberal) to 3.12 for non-Hispanic, white Catholics (the most conservative). Other groups on the conservative end of the spectrum included both native Hispanics (3.06) and foreign-born Hispanics (2.92); other relatively liberal groups included both foreign-born blacks (2.75) and native blacks (2.80), as well as all non-

Catholic, non-Hispanic whites (2.74), including white Jews (2.76). However, the differences are relatively narrow; in general, New Yorkers of all groups think of themselves as "middle of the road" in political orientation.

However, far more diversity emerges when New Yorkers are asked about specific policy preferences. Table 2.10 presents the share of New Yorkers agreeing with seven specific policy or political statements. The first two statements relate, respectively, to abortion and testing for AIDS; they are "social issues." The next two questions deal with government's role in society on more traditional "economic issues;" they deal with the federal government's responsibility for assuring full employment and local government's role in the housing industry. The remaining three questions deal either directly or indirectly with inter-group relations. Positions on spending for bilingual education reflect sympathies for immigrants, and particularly the Hispanic group; positions on police behavior reflect black-white tensions; positions on decentralization of local government are generally interpreted as reflecting confidence in and support for greater minority-group participation in local government.

The responses to these items point to four general conclusions. First, there is broad agreement among all groups of New Yorkers on an activist role for government. While blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are the strongest proponents of government intervention in employment and housing, over three-quarters of white respondents also agreed that government should ensure every person a job, and more than 85 percent agreed that local government should do more to increase low-income housing.

Second, this consensus breaks down on matters of inter-group relations; whites differ significantly from blacks and Hispanics. Though greater decentralization elicits considerable white support, that objective earned much stronger black, Hispanic, and Asian endorsement. Opinion is even more divided on support for bilingual education and perceptions of police favoritism of whites. Less than 45 percent of whites agree police favor whites, compared to 73 percent of native blacks, 64 percent of foreign-born blacks, 59 percent of foreign-born Hispanics and 56 percent of native Hispanics. Over half (53 percent) of whites favor more bilingual education, but the share among other groups is much higher.

TABLE 2.10
Percent of Adult New York City Residents Agreeing with Selected Policy Positions, 1988

	Non-Hispanic Whites			Non-Hispanic Blacks		Hispanics		Asians
	Total	Catholics	Jews	Native Born	Foreign Born	Native Born	Foreign Born	
Legal Abortions	78.8%	67.2%	88.2%	76.3%	69.8%	57.8%	48.2%	64.8%
Mandatory AIDS Testing	66.9	81.3	68.5	62.0	68.3	81.0	81.9	70.8
Full-Employment	77.1	79.9	78.5	87.3	82.5	93.8	87.5	91.2
Low Income Housing	87.1	90.0	85.9	96.4	96.7	97.2	96.1	89.9
More Bilingual Education	52.8	56.6	46.2	77.8	86.3	84.2	89.7	86.7
Police Favor Whites	44.7	40.0	46.1	72.5	63.9	55.5	58.5	48.6
More Government Decentralization	70.3	78.0	61.5	83.6	88.8	88.0	89.2	79.3

SOURCE: City University New York study. See Note 17 for description of survey sample; see Appendix A for exact wording of questions.

Third, New Yorkers divide in different ways on the social issues. Black (particularly native black) and white (particularly non-Catholic white) views are similar to each other, but markedly different than Hispanic views. Native blacks support legal abortion and mandatory AIDS testing at virtually the same level as whites. Hispanics and, to a lesser extent, Asians are more "conservative" on social issues in the sense they give less support to legal abortion and more to mandatory AIDS testing.

Fourth, among white New Yorkers there are few differences in views of inter-group relations. In particular, Jews no longer occupy a distinct position on the left. Jews' low levels of agreement with greater spending on bilingual education and more decentralization indicate that matters of inter-group relations elicit a more conservative response from Jews than other whites. (One explanation for this conservative shift is the aging of the Jewish population, a much under-appreciated fact.) The Catholic responses indicate that this group is no more conservative than other whites. In fact, Catholics are more inclined to support bilingual education and government decentralization than all other whites.

POWER AND PREJUDICE

Another way to gauge political differences among groups is to examine their views of the distribution of power. Perceptions of power, or lack thereof, are related to group conflict; the view that another group has too much power may be an indication of animosity, especially if the perception conflicts with the apparent facts. The social science liiterature is rich in studies that establish perceptions of power as externalizations of hostility.[26] Research on attitudes toward Jews, for example, indicates that those who perceive Jews as having too much power are likely to be anti-semitic.[27]

The CUNY study asked respondents whether a group had "too little power, the right amount of power, or too much power" in New York City. Given people's inclination to pick a middle category, the answers "too much" or "too little" power have the most significance. Table 2.11 shows the proportion of respondents answering "too much power" with respect to selected groups.

Power and Economic Groups. There are considerable similarities in the views of different groups about several economic interest

groups. High proportions of all New Yorkers feel organized crime has too much power; a substantial majority feel that way about the mass media. Roughly one-half of all groups of New Yorkers (except Asians) feel corporations have too much power. About 45 percent of black and white New Yorkers feel banks have too much power, but this view is held by larger proportions of Hispanics and a smaller proportion of Asians. Real estate developers are felt to have too much power more often by whites than by other groups.

The clearest contrasts involve the perceived power of labor unions and landlords. Whites are more positively inclined toward landlords and more negatively inclined toward labor unions than are blacks and Hispanics. And among whites, Jews are not distinguished by strong support for labor unions or by strong sympathy for landlords. Asians do not differ significantly from whites in assessing the power of labor unions and landlords; and they are less likely than whites to believe business has too much power. The distinctiveness of the

TABLE 2.11
Percent of Adult New York City Residents Believing Selected Groups Have Too Much Power, 1988

	Non-Hispanic Whites			Non-Hispanic Blacks		Hispanics		Asians
	Total	Catholics	Jews	Native Born	Foreign Born	Native Born	Foreign Born	
Economic Groups								
Business Corporations	49.9%	53.1%	44.2%	47.6%	48.0%	54.2%	50.2%	29.3%
Labor Unions	41.3	39.4	41.3	22.9	22.8	24.7	23.6	39.8
News Media	62.1	67.4	57.6	61.3	58.8	51.1	51.0	57.5
Real Estate Developers	63.9	62.6	62.1	53.4	49.5	49.1	51.3	35.4
Banks	45.3	47.4	36.0	44.8	43.0	52.7	56.4	27.1
Landlords	47.0	44.1	50.5	64.3	66.1	55.7	54.4	37.6
Organized Crime	83.6	81.4	84.5	78.1	80.9	71.4	76.8	76.3
Origin Groups								
Asians	11.1	16.0	7.5	14.3	17.3	29.0	29.9	11.0
Blacks	12.5	12.4	14.5	1.4	1.1	11.2	12.3	10.5
Hispanics	4.9	6.3	4.2	8.1	6.5	9.2	9.6	12.7
Jews	22.5	31.3	4.9	51.4	53.1	60.4	60.8	44.7
Whites	25.1	22.6	19.8	53.9	52.7	51.1	53.7	30.4

SOURCE: City University New York study. See Note 17.

Asian response probably is related to the importance of business to their economic niche.

Power and Ethnic Groups. Three important points emerge from the survey of views of the power of various ethnic groups. First, no group perceives blacks or Hispanics as having too much power. This should be taken as a positive sign, suggesting that few whites hold exaggerated perceptions of black or Hispanic power, which in turn reflect irrational biases against these groups.

Second, and far less positive, is the sharp contrast between whites and other groups over the power of whites. A majority of blacks and Hispanics feel whites have too much power, while only about one-quarter of whites agree with that view. Thus, the political power of whites seems to be an issue over which the attitudes of whites and others are divided.

Third, Jews are widely viewed as having too much power. More than 60 percent of Hispanics, 50 percent of blacks, and nearly 45 percent of Asians share this view. In addition, a significant minority of non-Jewish whites hold this view. It is appropriate to interpret this as a sign of continuing anti-semitism among many non-Jewish whites as well as among many in the other groups.

Overall, this analysis of political attitudes provides both continuities and contrasts with the previous analysis of the changing basis of group identities. The earlier analysis pointed to groups which identify themselves as whites (rather than as separate European national-origin groups), as blacks (particularly for native-born blacks), or as one of numerous, distinct ethnic groups. The political opinion data reinforce the finding of a relatively homogeneous group of European-origin whites. That is, the views of white Catholics and Jews are similar (except for the perceived power of Jews). However, the previously noted diversity among the Hispanic and black populations is not reflected in their political opinions. There is more uniformity in the political views of Hispanic and black New Yorkers than in their racial and ethnic group identities.

CONCLUSION

While the findings on political attitudes suggest the future politics of New York City will involve European-origin whites facing a strong coalition of blacks and Hispanics, this is not likely to be the reality in this century. Immigration complicates the organization and mobilization of group interests. Because immigrants remain outside the political arena, black and Hispanic numerical strength cannot be translated directly into electoral strength.

As noted earlier, New York's immigrants are overwhelmingly new arrivals; most came after the immigration laws were revised in 1965. As Table 2.12 shows, most of these new immigrants have not become citizens. Only 36 percent of the black immigrants and 38 percent of the Hispanic immigrants in the United States longer than five years have become citizens.

TABLE 2.12
Percent of Adult Immigrants Naturalized by Ethnic Group and Years of Residence, 1988

	Non-Hispanic White	Non-Hispanic Black	Hispanic	Asian
All Foreign-born with 5 or More Years of Residence	80.3%	36.0%	38.2%	47.8%
5 to 9 Years Residence	40.0	17.1	15.4	29.3
10 to 14 Years Residence	92.3	43.1	32.1	77.0
15 to 19 Years Residence	66.7	46.7	36.1	66.7
20 to 24 Years Residence	53.8	57.6	59.1	50.1
25 or More Years Residence	92.6	41.7	59.6	87.5

SOURCE: City University New York study. See Note 17.

Citizenship rates rise with length of residence, but the rates also vary among ethnic groups, even after controlling for date of immigration. As Table 2.12 shows, naturalization rates for black and Hispanic immigrants lag behind those for white and Asian immigrants, even among those with 25 years or more of residence.

The causes of this disparity in naturalization rates are not clear, but the same pattern holds for the nation's total foreign-born population as for immigrants in New York City. While the naturalization of Asian immigrants has been rising steadily, naturalization among Western Hemisphere immigrants, including the countries that contribute heavily to the New York City flow, have remained stagnant.[28]

Since the local situation closely mirrors the national pattern, the underlying causes probably are not peculiar to New York City. It is not clear to what extent the root cause of low naturalization rates

stems from strong ties to home societies and to what extent from weak linkages to integrative institutions in the United States, but in any case it seems unlikely that the barriers to naturalization among black and Hispanic immigrants will be overcome quickly in New York City.

Low naturalization rates have three important consequences for inter-group relations in New York City. First, an asymmetry between population size and electoral strength will continue to characterize local politics. The voting constituencies of black and Hispanic political leaders will be much smaller than the populations that they seek to represent. Second, because of their high naturalization rates, Asians may exercise more political influence than their numbers would suggest. Third, the delayed entry of immigrant blacks and Hispanics into the political system will maintain the political ascendancy of native black political leaders and their organizations. This will help perpetuate the city's traditional black-white cleavages as the dominant theme of local politics for at least the next decade.

Although the near future will resemble the past, demographic forces are changing the character of political life in New York City. While race often seems to overwhelm other distinctions, this will not remain so. Black, Hispanic, and Asian New Yorkers differ in group identity, economic position, and political organization. New York has become a "majority minority" city only if these diverse groups are seen as a single minority group—which they clearly are not. In reality, New York is a city with no majority and many minorities. And it is the multitude of group identities, not the singleness of a "minority" group, that will characterize politics and inter-group relations in the years to come.

NOTES

1. When asked about their satisfaction with "the way people of different races get along in this city," 55 percent of a random sample of 1,935 New Yorkers polled in 1988 by the City University answered "not satisfied;" 6 percent answered "very satisfied." Only the poor performance of the subways and the lack of safety on the streets were sources of greater dissatisfaction. See Note 17 below for a more complete description of this survey. These findings are consistent with a recent *New York Times* survey showing that 61 percent of New Yorkers feel that "race relations in New York today are generally bad." See Josh Barbanel, "New Yorkers Pessimistic on Race Relations, Poll Shows," *New York Times*, June 23, 1989, p. B1.

2. The estimates are author's calculations based on unpublished tabulations by the New York City Planning Commission of the 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.

3. See David Reimers, *Still the Golden Door* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

4. Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), Table 1.

5. Robert Warren and Jeffrey Passel, "A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census," *Demography*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1988), pp. 275-93.

6. Jeffrey Passel and Karen A. Woodrow, "Change in the Undocumented Population in the United States, 1979-1983," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1987), pp. 1304-34; Karen A. Woodrow, Jeffrey Passel, and Robert Warren, "Preliminary Estimates of Undocumented Migration to the United States, 1980-1986: Analysis of the June 1986 Current Population Survey," Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Statistical Association, San Francisco, 1987.

7. Frank Bean and Marta Tienda, *The Hispanic Population of the United States* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), pp. 117-121.

8. There are other groups for whom the legalization criteria and deadlines differ from the pre-1982 group. The most numerous are undocumented immigrants who can show that they worked in agriculture for at least 90 days during 1984, 1985, and 1986. See Doris Meisner and Demetrios Papademetriou, *The Legalization Countdown: A Third Quarter Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988).

9. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Provisional Legalization Application Statistics* (Washington, D.C.: Immigration and Naturalization Service, May 1989). The estimated size of the eligible immigrant population is from Meisner and Papademetriou, *op. cit.*, p. 81A.

10. Elizabeth Bogen, *Immigration in New York* (New York: Praeger, 1987).

11. Jeffrey Passel, "Estimates of Undocumented Aliens in the 1980 Census for SMSAs," Memorandum to Roger Herriot, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985.

12. Jeffrey Passel, J.S. Siegel, and J.G. Robinson, "Coverage of the National Population by Age, Sex, and Race in the 1980 Census: Preliminary Estimates by Demographic Analysis," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

13. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, *Provisional Legalization Application Statistics*, *op. cit.*

14. These figures are based on the author's calculations from the 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample. The base for the calculations is immigrants during the 1965-80 period.

15. Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1980 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics: New York*, Vol. 1, Chapter C, Table 116.

16. Calculated from Immigration and Naturalization Service, Public Use Tapes.

17. The 1980 figure is from the 1980 decennial census. The 1988 figure is from the City University New York study. This study consisted of telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,935 New York City residents age 18 or older. The interviews were conducted in the spring and summer of 1988. Tabulations for the survey have not yet been published; the data presented in this chapter from the survey are based on the author's calculations using the raw survey tapes.

18. 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.
19. William Petersen, "Concepts of Ethnicity," in Stephen Thernstrom, ed. *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 234-242.
20. Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups," in Ralph Linton, ed., *The Science of Man in the World Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 347.
21. John Stone, *Racial Conflict in Contemporary Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 43.
22. Data from the City University New York study. See Note 17.
23. Author's calculations from 1980 Census of Population, Public Use Microdata Sample.
24. Calculated from 1900 Census of Population, *Occupations at the Twelfth Census (Special Reports)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904), Table 43, pp. 634-641. Data are for men only.
25. Additional analyses by the author (not shown here) using the 1980 census to calculate indices of dissimilarity confirm this point. See also Thomas Bailey, "Employment Opportunities for Blacks," in this volume.
26. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Prejudice," in Thomas F. Pettigrew et al., *Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 1-29. The classic treatment remains Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1980).
27. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Blacks and Jews: How Much Bias?" *Public Opinion*, Vol. 10 (July/August), 1987.
28. For example, in 1978, exactly 65,418 Asian immigrants naturalized; in 1987, the comparable figure was 113,392. Each year between 1978 and 1987, with the exceptions of 1979 and 1987, saw an increase in the number of Asians obtaining citizenship. By contrast, in 1978, exactly 29,315 Caribbean immigrants were naturalized; in 1987, the number was 21,751. Throughout the 1978 to 1987 period, an average of 26,000 Caribbean immigrants obtained citizenship each year. Data are from *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, annual editions.

Appendix A

Wording of Selected Questions in the City University New York Study

Abortion: A pregnant woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion if she wants it for any reason (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

AIDS test: Do you think people with a high risk of AIDS should be made to take the AIDS test? (Yes, made to take test, No, Not sure).

Job: The government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

Low-income housing: New York City government ought to be giving more attention to building low-income housing (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

Bilingual education: City government should spend more money on bilingual education in our schools (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

Police: The police in New York City generally favor whites over blacks (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

Decentralization: City government should be further decentralized to get more influence to the neighborhood (strongly agree, somewhat agree, disagree).

Responses of "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree" are counted as "agree" in Table 2.10