

STUDIES OF WORLD MIGRATIONS

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A list of books in the series appears at the end of the book.

A CENTURY OF TRANSNATIONALISM

Immigrants and
Their Homeland Connections

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INTRODUCTION

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Immigrants were once known as “uprooted.” Later, they became seen as “transplanted,” reflecting a new scholarly appreciation of the ways in which social networks facilitated migration.¹ Today, the “discovery” of “transnationalism” has transformed migration studies again. Ubiquitously invoked to describe mobility present and past, the term has been used to show how international migration generates ideas, goods, and civil and political engagements spilling across national boundaries.

Though immensely influential, the transnational perspective has also generated great controversy, with questions related to change consistently yielding dispute. Initially, scholars asserted that the home country connections of contemporary international migrants were unprecedented, with many contending that transnationalism was a late-twentieth-century phenomenon fueled by new modes of communication and transportation. Historians instantly countered: the last age of mass migration entailed a similar transoceanic ebb and flow of people, goods, and ideas; likewise, many nationalist movements were born in exile, which is why a contemporary immigrant preoccupation with homeland politics represents nothing new. While that response elicited general agreement, debate over the novelty of transnationalism continued, without, however, fully meeting the challenge of thinking through long-term patterns. In many assessments of the historical record, the starting point entails an opposition between “now” and “then,” yet that contrast takes for granted what needs to be explained: we need to know when and why “now” began and “then” ended—crucial questions that have not seriously been posed. Moreover, the many migration experiences seem too great to fit into any one scheme: period boundaries are likely to take a variety of forms, depending on the precise connection between place of origin and place of destination. How then to describe and analyze change over time?

The nature of the core claims and the underlying theoretical framework have also triggered debate. To some extent, the very term “transnational” is unfortunate: it collapses state and nation, one referring to a political unit, the other to a social collectivity. The crossing of state boundaries fundamentally differentiates international from internal migrations: in the latter, migrants change places *within* a state; in the former, the migrants go *between* states. Moreover, while migrants’ cross-state connections sometimes extend “beyond the nation” (as implied by the Latin prefix *trans*), they usually do not. Instead, those ties often tend to take highly particularistic form, linking up a particular category of people “here” to some specific set of people “there.” The “home” to which the migrants prove attached is as likely—if not more so—to involve the village, region, or even ethnic minority of origin, as opposed to the sending state or the imagined nation to whom that state is presumed to belong. And for that reason, local memories of the place left behind may be more salient to the migrant than patriotic or sentimental attachments to the abstract entity of the nation never personally experienced.

Furthermore, the “transnational” concept conflates history and historiography, mixing the behavior of a panoply of actors—in our case, migrants, states of emigration and immigration, and nationals on both sides of the chain—with the interpretations and concepts offered by social scientists in their efforts to understand those activities.² As *history*, we understand “transnational” as referring to the cross-border feedbacks produced by international migrations, encompassing the circulation of ideas, information, resources, political and communal engagements, as well as the sending and receiving state responses that these patterns of circulation trigger. As *historiography*, the concept refers to a sensibility to this myriad of cross-border phenomena. The transnational literature is a way of seeing, one that enlarges the boundaries of inquiry to include both sending *and* receiving states and thus goes beyond the historiography and sociology of *immigration* with its single-minded focus on the state and society of reception.

As so defined, this book adopts a transnational optic; however, *transnational* does not necessarily imply *transnationalism*, as the latter entails a claim about the nature of the phenomena extending across borders and the ties between places of origin and destination. As articulated by Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc in their pathbreaking book, *Nations Unbound*, one particularly influential view sees the transnational as yielding and constituting transnationalism, with immigrants

developing and elaborating transnational practices that allow them to remain incorporated in their country of origin while simultaneously becoming incorporated in the United States.³

But whether the transnational leads to transnationalism—and if so, when and under what conditions—is precisely the question at issue. Some migrants may behave just as described in *Nations Unbound*, but not all do. In general, migrants vary in their effective capacity to retain cross-border ties across space as well as time. While international migrations yield subsequent chains of circulation between communities of destination and origin, those patterns of circulation also trigger reactions from both sending and receiving states; as states and emigrants respond to different motivations, opportunities, and constraints, the study of the transnational needs to extend beyond the activities of the migrants themselves. Moreover, emigrants’ spatial cross-border activities, whether those involving everyday activities such as travel and communication or more concerted efforts, such as those associated with homeland-oriented, emigrant politics, can be held back by states. Hence, migrants may be constrained from pursuing or implementing transnational activities, let alone *transnationalism* as defined above.

Migration is a transformative experience, in turn affecting the phenomena circulating after borders have first been crossed. Migration changes the migrants, giving them resources not previously possessed; consequently, their efforts to engage across borders have the potential to turn the broad range of cross-border interactions—whether involving homeland kin, communities, or states—into arenas of conflict; those strains sometimes yield splits, whether taking the form of divisions among co-ethnics “abroad” or cleavages between emigrants, on the one hand, and sending states and stay-behinds, on the other. And change over time, possibly resulting from specific events such as wars or more general shifts in international relations, can render transnational activities sensitive to short-, as well as long-term, fluctuations. Hence, the stability, intensity, and meaning of migrants’ cross-border activities cannot be taken for granted but rather belong at the heart of the analysis.

This book seeks to build on both the contributions and critiques of the transnational perspective in order to shed new light on the cross-border activities of migrants and states over the past century and more, emphasizing changing circumstances and changing practices over the *longue durée*. By bringing together a group of historically minded sociologists and sociologically minded historians, we look at migrants’ transnational practices under an expanded temporal framework—easily showing that they are not a turn-of-the-twenty-first-century phenomenon. In so doing, we also demonstrate that the pattern of historical change is far more complicated than the now-then contrasts that have thus far preoccupied scholarly discussions. The essays present ample evidence of both continuity and change; they also

show that change does not take a single linear form. Connections depend on immigrant practices, on home state policies, on settlement society conditions, on geopolitics and power relations between homeland and hostland. Consequently, the underlying influences may follow a variety of temporal sequences, with technology, the guiding “new” for many transnational theorists, possibly changing in a linear fashion but macro-political factors shifting in a more contingent, unpredictable way. Moreover, the phenomenon takes a dual form, involving, on the one hand, the extension of states across borders to connect with “their” emigrants and, on the other, the extension of emigrants across borders to connect with their place of origin.

Transnationalism in Historical Perspective

Transnationalism entered migration scholarship with a manifesto insisting that “our earlier conceptions of immigrant and migrant no longer suffice.”⁴ With these words, anthropologists Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton simultaneously introduced a new intellectual perspective and identified the salient characteristic that distinguished contemporary migrations from those gone by. Though forcefully stated, the insistence on the novelty of the phenomenon actually got short shrift in their founding document. As the authors saw it, the source of the migrants’ continuing dual orientation toward both home *and* host society stemmed from the ways in which the global restructuring of capitalism was producing dislocations on both ends of the chain, thus triggering emigration from the state of origin while impeding settlement in the state of destination. “Hence this vulnerability increased the likelihood that migrants would construct a transnational existence.”⁵ In this early text, the authors then quickly moved on to other matters, doing likewise in *Nations Unbound* (1994), their book-length effort to develop and then apply the transnational perspective.⁶

If the assertion about historical novelty was made in passing, historians immediately detected the argument that “in crucial respects . . . the present is not a replay of the past,”⁷ which in turn became a mantra as a variety of prominent immigration scholars quickly took up the cry. In a 1997 article on “Immigration Theory for a New Century,” sociologist Alejandro Portes, for example, contended that transnational activities “become a novel path of adaptation quite different from those found among immigrants at the turn of the century,” a “path reinforced by technologies that facilitate rapid displacement across long distances and instant communication” as well as by the impact of globalization.⁸ Other researchers associated with the transnational perspective, such as Peggy Levitt or Robert Smith, echoed that contention, likewise arguing that the transnational connections of the turn

of the twenty-first century took an altogether distinctive form.⁹ That view then became self-reinforcing as, for Alejandro Portes and his coauthors, the conviction that “the high intensity of exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis” were “truly original phenomena” that made transnationalism “a justifiable new topic of investigation.”¹⁰

Historians reacted in a variety of ways. Most frequently, they contended that the discipline had always been attentive to transnational phenomena, although not necessarily with the same terminology deployed by the anthropologists and sociologists. After all, the manifesto of modern immigration historiography, Frank Thistlethwaite’s celebrated 1960 address, had insisted that the migrations of the turn of the *last* century entailed transoceanic, back-and-forth traffic of such amplitude that only some portion of the phenomenon fell into the standard categories of settlement and acculturation.¹¹ And just as the sociologists and anthropologists were “discovering” transnationalism, a trio of books, published in the early 1990s by historians Dino Cinel, Bruno Ramirez, and Mark Wyman, focusing on immigrant associational life, long-distance nationalism, and return migration at the turn of the twentieth century, underlined the many commonalities between “now” and “then.”¹² Nonetheless, the very same historians of immigration who reacted skeptically to the *historical* proposition advanced by the scholars insisting on the novelty of transnationalism admitted that immigration *historiography* had not given the phenomenon the attention it deserved. Thus, historian David Gerber noted that the literature produced by such scholars as Cinel, Ramirez, and Wyman “has been compartmentalized to the extent that it has not influenced the larger narrative of immigration history.”¹³ As independently noted by the authors of two of the chapters to this book (David FitzGerald and Victor Pereira), as well as the historian coeditor,¹⁴ the historians of immigration had long been talking about the transnational, albeit unknowingly, just like Monsieur Jourdain in Molière’s *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, who learned to his surprise that he had always been speaking in prose.

In pointing to continuities in historical transnational activities, Gerber also tweaked the writings of the transnationalists for “missing the opportunity to see the continuities over long historical time of the unfolding of mobility and opportunity across the world stage” and thereby failing “to assert their influence over immigration historiography.”¹⁵ Whereas Gerber principally looked backward, essays by anthropologist Nancy Foner and sociologist Ewa Morawska looked across periods to directly question the contention that transnationalism distinguished the mass migrations of the turn of the twenty-first century from those of the turn of the twentieth century. Both

scholars sounded themes similar to the historians' critique. They underlined the many cross-border connections established by the earlier migrants from Europe, whether involving engagement with homeland politics, attention by homeland states, the sending of remittances, involvement in hometown associations, and return migration. Yet, each also insisted that "much is new about transnationalism,"¹⁶ similarly emphasizing the greater acceptance of multiple allegiances, the spread of dual nationality, and the greater socio-economic diversity of the immigrant population, to which Morawska added the presence of "a growing army of marginalized 'illegal' migrants."¹⁷

Yet for all their subtlety and attention to historical detail, all of these efforts took the temporal boundaries between transnationalism "now and then" for granted. Much of the contemporary literature continues to emphasize the ways in which the instantaneity of contemporary communications technologies brings here and there together in ways that could not have been true during the last era of mass migration. But if, indeed, technology is the key factor, one would need to define the critical technological shift, then identify when it struck, and then show that the timing triggered a decisive shift in either emigrants' mode of interacting with kin and communities at home or emigration states' engagements with nationals abroad.

Contemporary researchers emphasize the transformative effect of the web and the innovations, like Skype, that it has sprung.¹⁸ However, the first web browser was not invented until 1991, that is, *after* the transnational program was launched by Nina Glick Schiller and her collaborators in 1990, and all of their empirical material was based on research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Large numbers of migrants did not begin using the internet until well after that period, and widespread adoption of the mobile phone came later still. It seems unlikely that the fax, which became widely used in the 1980s, did much to tie together migrants in U.S. or European cities with their relatives at home in rural Mexico or North Africa. While one cannot find a clear correlation between a specific technological change and some aspect of transnational connectedness in the contemporary period, it is also the case that the technology of long-distance communication and travel has been in constant change throughout the migrations of the past two hundred years. In the early nineteenth century, it took months to cross the Atlantic; by 1910, it took only ten days. In the early nineteenth century, a letter sent from the United States to Europe could arrive months if not a year later; by 1910, receipt was almost certain and in a time interval not that different from today's mail. As migration is itself one of the drivers compressing time and space, it seems unlikely that some technological change generated a fundamental divide distinguishing "now" from "then."

In looking across the entire time spectrum connecting the two ages of mass migration, this book reminds the reader that the period *in-between* the conventional divides of "now" and "then" was one of ongoing population movements across boundaries, during which time migrants kept up connections with kin and communities left behind while emigration states sought both to maintain and shape those linkages. Rates of international migration changed at varying tempos across the Americas. In the United States, mass European immigration came to a halt in the 1920s, just when emigration from Mexico rapidly accelerated; indeed, as a share of the Mexican population living in Mexico, the immigrants in the United States hit a peak in the late 1920s that was not reached again until the late 1980s. Though the Great Depression stopped immigration from Mexico, that flow resumed with the *Bracero* program, beginning in 1942 and continuing until 1964. As described below by David FitzGerald, the interwar period was in many ways the high point of Mexico's interaction with its emigrants, with the postwar Bracero program also providing an ongoing framework for interaction between Mexican officials and migrants in the United States. Unlike the situation south of the 49th parallel, international migration to Canada approached a full stop only during the depression, continuing on at a high rate during the 1920s and then building up rapidly in the immediate aftermath of World War II, as Canada continued to search for population to fill up its huge landmass. In Brazil, as Mônica Raisa Schpun shows, 174,098 Japanese migrated to Brazil during the first half of the twentieth century, of whom 81 percent arrived during an eleven-year period between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s.

On the other side of the Atlantic, a French economy depleted by the huge losses in World War I attracted labor migrants from Italy and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1920s. Building on a tradition of bilateral treaties that had been established in the early 1900s, "guestworker" agreements were signed between France and various sending states: Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Labor migration resumed and even increased after World War II. Indeed, no sooner was a new regime installed in Rome than it began searching for employment outlets for the millions of Italians displaced by the war's destruction. As the doors to the United States remained firmly shut (notwithstanding the efforts among Italian Americans to reopen them),¹⁹ Italy's only option was the negotiation of guestworker agreements elsewhere, of which the very first was signed with Belgium in 1946. Agreements with additional countries soon followed, with other sending (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Yugoslavia, among others) and receiving (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland) countries following suit as the post-World War II

recovery bred a demand for low-skilled labor in Europe that could not be supplied by domestic sources. For those European countries that were still imperial powers, migration from their colonies provided an important source of labor. The arrival of the *Empire Windrush* at the port of Tilbury in 1948, with almost 500 Jamaican passengers, marked the beginning of a colonial migration to England from the West Indies but also from India and Pakistan that soon expanded to impressive proportions. Whereas Algerian migrants had already established a sizable presence in France prior to World War II, that flow also quickly burgeoned in the postwar period, notwithstanding the French state's simultaneous encouragement of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants. To a large extent, the source of much of Europe's late-twentieth-century foreign-origin population originated in these postwar, guestworker migrations.

Like the mass migrations at the turns of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the intermediary migration waves—Mexican migration of the 1920s, interwar intra-European labor migrations, and the guestworker migrations of the post-World War II period—did not inevitably lead to severed ties with people and communities at home. *Au contraire*. Migrants continued to send back remittances, to keep in touch (via the mail, but also via intermediaries), and to use their savings to build “dream houses” in home communities, to which they often never returned.²⁰ When formal agreements were signed between sending and receiving states, they gave the former privileged access to their nationals abroad, which the sending states exploited with varying degrees of success.²¹ On the one hand, the costs of servicing nationals abroad meant the expenditure of resources in higher-priced locales.²² On the other hand, as the migrants gained freedoms not always available at home, leading in many cases to the burgeoning of opposition parties abroad, this, in turn, often stimulated sending states to intensify efforts at monitoring and control.²³ For displaced colonials, migration indeed provided an environment more conducive to agitating for liberation at home, though in doing so they exposed themselves to surveillance and repression by the metropolitan police.

Finally, although contemporary analysts rightly point to the importance of high-skilled migration—a development motivating emigration states to find ways in which competencies, innovations, and relationships can be channeled back home, thus turning “brain drain” into “brain gain”—this too is a phenomenon for which significant historical precedents, though not necessarily parallels, can be found. In the early years of the new millennium, the increase in international student mobility far outpaced overall global international migration.²⁴ And yet at the turn of the twentieth century, a

significant flow brought students from southern and eastern Europe to French and German universities.²⁵ And while these intra-European movements largely involved circulation of elites, whose sojourns abroad were subsidized by family funds, imperial China, as discussed in Madeline Hsu's chapter in this book, contemporaneously launched a program of student migration designed to send Chinese students to the United States so that they would come home with the skills that China wanted.

In recounting this history, we do *not* seek to say that the more things change, the more they stay the same. On the contrary, in responding to the assumption that everything has changed and that “now” can be sharply distinguished from “then,” we are simply noting that *some* things have remained the same while others have not. Moreover, the close reader will note how many of the influential factors that may structure transnational ties have been in flux over the last century. The southern European dictatorial regimes from which refugees and guestworkers found sanctuary in northern and western Europe are no more; neither are the colonies, for which some of the colonial migrants sought liberation. And other sources of long-term temporal variation—most notably, the degree of international stability or conflict between origin and destination countries—have altered in unpredictable ways, leaving the capacity to maintain homeland connections as well as the types of ties possible unsettled. Moreover, time is but one of the relevant variables, as the particularities of the migrations and the places from which the migrants come and to which they arrive vary significantly even when the time period in question is more or less the same. The nature, duration, and acceptability of the homeland connections established by migrants heading from colonies to the metropole turn out to be very different from those whose displacements took them from an already independent national state. Likewise, the characteristics of the homeland—whether empire or nation-state, whether multiethnic or largely monoethnic—also have had a significant impact on transnational ties. Hence, in examining the relatively *longue durée* with which this book is concerned, we seek to go beyond the polarized debate triggered by the advent of the transnational perspective and instead identify both sources of continuity *and* variation.

Homeland and Hostland: Lessons from a Long-term Approach

While nothing stays the same and no migration proves identical with another, similarities abound. For our concerns the most important resemblances involve the recurring ties linking migrants to people and places in

the societies of origin and the ways in which sending states repeatedly seek to reinforce and shape those connections.

The prevalence of cross-border ties stems from the duality at the heart of the migratory phenomenon: the people moving across borders are both immigrants *and* emigrants, retaining ties to the people and places left behind even while putting down roots in the place where they live.²⁶ Migrants from poor societies and their relatives at home typically pursue entwined survival strategies: the migrants move to rich countries to secure resources that can be found only there and channel them home; in turn, the relatives still in place take care of the children, elderly parents, and properties that the migrants have left behind and to which the latter often want to return. The newcomers are likewise entwined in the place of destination, turning to one another for help in order to solve the everyday problems of migration: how to move from old home to new, how to find a job and settle down, and how to pick up the skills needed to manage in their new world. In the process, the migrants extend and embed their networks, creating a new community where the density of familiar faces, tongues, and institutions serves to reproduce the world left behind. As the home country society gets transplanted onto receiving states, *alien* territory gets turned into a *familiar* environment, while at the same time putting in place the infrastructure needed to keep up “here-there” connections and providing the means by which migrants can sustain identities as home state *nationals*, even while living on *foreign* soil. However, as *immigrants* searching for a better life, the new arrivals also adapt to the new environment and adopt the skills it demands. While over the long term these changes complicate their capacity to maintain cross-border connections, in the short to medium term they increase the emigrants’ capacity to help out their significant others still living in the home society. Migrants’ decisions to depart one country for another paradoxically implant an infrastructure that knits those two countries together. Individual migrants typically cross international borders while leaving many, if not most members of the core, familial network behind. Obligations to aging parents at home can keep remittances, letters, phone calls, and visits flowing well after roots in the host country have become deeply established.

This emphasis on the social processes of migration and the cross-border links that they forge nonetheless leaves out an important dimension, which has been under-theorized in the transnationalism literature but clearly emerges from many of the articles in this book: the political dimension. As we know, the inherently political character of population movements across boundaries²⁷ deeply affects both sending and receiving societies. The emigrants’ cross-border involvements are mainly social and highly

particularistic, directed primarily at their kin; nonetheless, their private actions undertaken from *abroad* have produced profoundly public consequences *at home*. The flow of migrant remittances traveling from rich to poor countries, now as in previous eras of mass migration, is not simply an individual, economic act but also ultimately a collective and political one.²⁸ Even more explicitly, having relocated to a different state, migrants gain the potential to exercise *home* country political influence never previously experienced; some then try to exercise that influence, doing so with varying levels of success. The receiving state’s borders thus do more than help create wealth for immigrants; they also keep *out* the tentacles of the sending state, providing the migrants with political protection against home state interests that might seek to control them as emigrants.²⁹ Moreover, those who acquire citizenship in the new country can gain additional political entitlements facilitating their capacity for political action to produce change at home. Hence, the new political environment often gives rise to social movements built in the place where the migrants *live* but designed to effect change in the place that they have *left*.³⁰

In turn, the movement of nationals to foreign soil generates sending state responses, an aspect of transnationalism that much of the transnational literature has ignored. To the extent that migration studies have long focused principally on the ways in which *receiving* states have reacted to *immigrants*, the attitudes and policies of *sending* states toward *emigrants* has often been neglected, although recent work has begun to explore the stances that states of emigration have taken toward citizens who leave.³¹ Since the nineteenth century, states have reached out across their borders to cultivate loyalty, foster the maintenance of cultural traditions, promote instruction in the homeland tongue, and keep the corrosive effects of settlement and acculturation abroad at bay. Early on, sending states realized the importance of making sure that human and financial resources generated by the emigrants could flow back to home soil. Facilitating the successful transmission of remittances from the country of immigration back to the country of emigration while discouraging the flow of subversive ideas in the same direction has indeed been a particularly persistent objective of the sending country. In pursuit of these cultural and economic goals, emigration states have repeatedly established an infrastructure—usually, through the consular network—designed to engage with the diaspora. That consular infrastructure has consistently provided a means for responding to the migrants’ repeated vulnerability to exploitation but also, as we will see, to the challenges posed by politically oriented emigrants, who can no longer be coerced but possibly influenced.

Thus, ties across borders, whether established by migrants or by sending states, recur wherever and whenever international migrations occur, a pat-

tern evident over the past 150 years, as the articles in this book show. But as those movements link particular sending places with specific sending states and take place under distinctive, ever-changing circumstances, these connections assume myriad forms. Moreover, maintaining these ties is not for either migrants or sending states to decide on their own. No less important are the views and behavior of receiving states and receiving state nationals, who prove sometimes more accepting, sometimes less accepting, of these linkages traversing boundaries. Thus, continuity is just one side of the phenomenon. Now turning to variation, we identify several domains in which transnational ties are particularly dependent upon changing circumstances, notably in the realm of political activity.

Emigrant Politics

The cross-border migrations discussed in this book have taken place in a particular context, that of populations moving into developed, democratic states. Too little attention has been given to the ways in which the combination of economic and political resources found in receiving states of this sort has given many migrants capacities never previously possessed. Once in the receiving state, migrants obtain newfound leverage, benefiting from both the wealth of the economic environment and from the freedom of a polity no longer controlled by the home government. For the politically oriented, the new home can thus provide the space for autonomous migrant social action, unfolding in the place of *destination* but oriented toward the place of *origin*.

More will be said about the nature of emigrant political activities in a moment, but we first need to remember that home country politics are rarely important for the mass of rank-and-file migrants. Almost all migrations are implicitly political: the migrants are voting with their feet, *against* the state of origin and *for* the state of destination—its economy, its institutional infrastructure (which makes its economy successful), and the public goods and public security it provides. Nonetheless, most have had little political experience before migration; after settling down in a new country, their lives unfold largely independent of political matters back home. Moreover, migrants who have left in search of material betterment may be less disposed from the outset to look to politics to provide a solution for their needs.

The experience of labor migrants discussed in this book—whether from Algeria, India, Italy, Portugal, or Mexico—exemplifies this pattern. Emanating largely from rural areas, these labor migrants were in turn typically oriented back toward a homeland understood in local, not national, terms. Thus, as we see in Victor Pereira's chapter, Portuguese emigrants have fierce

attachments to the particular communities from which they stem, but less interest in the broader Portuguese nation. Only under certain conditions do they lay claim to membership in that national community, most notably by invoking long-gone Portuguese greatness—e.g., Vasco da Gama—to foment loyalties toward an utterly nonpolitical pursuit: a football (soccer) team. Local attachments have been all the more important when the home state was a multiethnic polity dominated by a group from which the migrants were excluded. Thus, the migrants from Algeria settling in the Parisian industrial suburb of Nanterre discussed by Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard were Berbers from Kabylia, a minority in a home population dominated numerically and politically by Arabs. Though nonetheless engaged in the Algerian struggle for decolonization, their crucial ties were those linking Nanterre to the Souf, their area of origin in Algeria. For migrants of this sort, the firmest loyalties, reinforced by overlapping ties of neighboring and kinship, were to the home region, which functioned as a little homeland.

As shown in many of the cases discussed in this book, the motivation to come together in the country of immigration stemmed precisely from the intensity of the attachments to the people who stayed home in the local place left behind. Whether Mexicans in the United States or Indians in the UK—Thomas Lacroix speaks of “translocal” religious and caste ties—otherwise depoliticized migrants have proved recurrently willing to dip into their pockets in order to aid their families and finance development in the communities from which they have fled. Of course, success in bringing together migrants sharing a common hometown origin means putting aside other differences, whether those separating right from left, believers from secularists, proletarians from entrepreneurs. The need to keep those sources of dissonance to a minimum explains why hometown associations so often adhere to an *a*-political stance.³²

For the politicized minority, however, bilocalism comprises only one of the many different options of diaspora mobilization and often one of very limited appeal. Those emigrants for whom politics matter dearly can be classified into different types. On the one hand, a distinction may be made between political exiles and politicized exiles, the former carrying their politics and contestation with them, as with the Jewish revolutionaries from Russia discussed in Tony Michels's chapter, the latter gaining politicization abroad, as demonstrated by Houda Asal in her examination of the way in which an “Arab” political identity was constructed in Canada.

Yet another axis of variation concerns the political stance taken toward the country left behind. For emigrant activists, the outcome of migration may be the *exo-polity*, a political space formed by emigrants “refusing to

recognize the legitimacy of the regime in place in their country of origin or considering that their country or state of origin is under foreign occupation.”³³ Yet, even this antagonistic relationship opposing emigrants to emigration states may take different forms. A vocal minority of emigrants may engage in “state-seeking nationalism,” striving to build a new state at home. Depending on circumstances, some may be like the Sikh nationalists, discussed by Thomas Lacroix, wanting to carve a new state (in this case, an independent Khalistan) out of a multiethnic polity (in this case, India). Under other conditions—such as the Algerians described by Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard—the goal may entail severing a new state from a colonial empire. In still other cases, emigrant activists pursue “regime-changing nationalism,” trying to replace the government in place, whether from right to left, as among the Jewish revolutionaries from Russia *prior* to 1917, discussed in Tony Michels’s chapter, or from Communism to some other type of state *after* 1917. Yet another option entails “nationalizing nationalism,” to borrow the term coined by Rogers Brubaker,³⁴ where the objective is instead that of gaining ownership over an existing multiethnic state, either extruding the minority or compelling it to undergo forced assimilation, precisely the course of action pursued by the radical Hindu nationalists, whose activities are described in the chapter by Thomas Lacroix.

Other emigrants have more pacific political goals, most notably regaining home country membership, as in the many late-twentieth-century campaigns for expatriate voting rights. With the vote in hand, many expatriates then engage in campaigning, encouraging visits by homeland leaders and contributing funds to homeland parties. In some cases, as with the Portuguese discussed by Victor Pereira, special parliamentary seats have been created for legislators elected by the emigrants. Expatriate voting has elicited great interest from migration scholars, and often great enthusiasm; however, the rank and file often proves uninterested. As David FitzGerald recounts in his chapter, pressure from emigrants in the United States led the Mexican government to grant expatriate voting rights as of the 2006 presidential election. However, of the roughly 3 million eligible Mexican voters in the United States, only 33,000 cast a vote.

Emigrant Factionalism and Conflict

That migrants may choose among a variety of political paths reflects the new-found freedoms resulting from arrival in a receiving state that offer more scope for such activities than the often more repressive home states. Yet at the same time, the politicization of emigrants can also result in internal conflicts within the immigrant communities, thereby belying the notion that

migration brings “the emergence of veritable ‘transnational communities’ suspended, in effect, between two countries.”³⁵ Instead, entry into the new political jurisdiction of the receiving state can create the means whereby migrants mobilize in favor of diverging views of the homeland community they wish to support, transform, or create. Mônica Raisa Schpun’s chapter on the Japanese in Brazil describes the most dramatic such example appearing in the pages to follow. In the aftermath of World War II, having undergone years of intense repression, the Japanese Brazilians found themselves split into two factions, one insisting on the impossible—that Japan had won, not lost, the war—the other accepting Japan’s defeat. The former, which had engaged in sabotage during the war, turned its fury inward, assassinating members of the so-called “defeatist groups” and injuring scores of others. The wounds of this schism did heal however, and the majority of Japanese Brazilians followed a path of upward mobility during much of the postwar era, until the conjuncture of Brazil’s economic crisis and Japan’s economic boom produced yet another divergence, in the course of which some immigrant descendants stayed in Brazil and others returned to Japan, where they ironically learned how Brazilian they had become.

The World War II-era split in Brazil was a cleavage born in the receiving society. In some of the other cases discussed in this book, conflict instead diffuses *from* the home *to* the host context. A case in point is that of the Jewish radicals in the United States, recounted by Michels. Especially in the period before 1905, radical ideas and literature migrated from west to east. Jewish immigrants in the United States, able to express themselves more freely there, furnished their revolutionary counterparts still in Russia with a steady source of material support. Books and newspapers suppressed by the czarist police were printed in New York and sent to underground activists in Russia; dollars mainly flowed from west to east, supplemented by efforts to lobby U.S. officials in order to get them to intervene in defense of the Jewish victims of Russian persecution and pogroms. After 1905, however, ideas and literature also flowed from east to west. Then, with the consolidation of Bolshevik rule in the early 1920s, the question of whether to support or oppose the new regime provoked a virtual Jewish civil war *within* the Jewish American left. As with other fratricidal conflicts, the many things shared by the pro- and the anticommunist Jewish radicals produced intracommunal divisions of an especially deep and long-lasting nature.

Like the Jewish revolutionaries, Algerian immigrants found that the freedoms enjoyed by living in metropolitan France—no matter how tightly policed—provided resources and options that could be put to good use by the liberation movement at home. But that movement, too, was badly

divided. The internecine conflict between the first established movement (the *Mouvement national algérien*, MNA), led by Messali Hadj, and its ultimately successful rival, the *Front de Libération Nationale*, spilled over into deadly violence in Paris, as Blanc-Chaléard explains. The FLN's ability to invisibly control the community, combined with hostility to and from French authorities, left many immigrants vulnerable to intracommunal violence.

Somewhat similar events appear in Lacroix's chapter on Indian organizations in the UK. Though dominated by a Sikh leadership, the left-leaning *Indian Workers' Association* (IWA) initially acted as the dominant influence within the broader, post-World War II immigrant population originating in India. Downplaying internal ethnic differences, the IWA instead emphasized issues related to the common class origin of the immigrants from India in ways that converged with the conventional organization of British politics. Nonetheless, as the number of highly skilled Indians grew and the migrant population diversified away from its original, largely working-class base, new political cleavages emerged. From the 1980s on, many of the more skilled Indians residing abroad flocked to radical Hindu nationalist (*Hinduvta*) organizations. Simultaneously, the echoes of ethnic conflict in the Punjab led to radicalization and heightened nationalism among Sikhs abroad, seriously diminishing the Indian Workers' Association's influence.

Both Michels's and Lacroix's chapters point to another form of emigrant politics, one organized around a very different imagined community than that of the ethnically defined nation itself imagined in much of the transnational literature: the world of international proletarian fellowship. We should not forget that from the mid-nineteenth century through the third quarter of the twentieth century, a significant proportion of the international movers understood themselves to be "workers of the world." And they were also understood as such—as shown by the role of migrants in transmitting laborist, socialist, or anarchist ideas from one national setting to another, not to speak of their simultaneous or successive participation in several national movements.³⁶ As the solidarities generated by the migration process often provided the underpinning for labor movements of various kinds, labor internationalism and home-country allegiances continued to prove compatible well through the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, some immigrant radicals—notably the anarchists—abhorred nationalism and renounced any home-country allegiance. But for a broad variety of reasons, having to do with the commonalities and barriers of language, as well as the ways in which migrant social networks enveloped the radicals along with the rank and file, the labor internationalists were not rootless

cosmopolitans. Rather, to borrow the felicitous phrase of Sidney Tarrow, they comprised "embedded cosmopolitans," oriented toward a larger humanity yet part and parcel of immigrant populations delimited by language, national, and sometimes religious origins.³⁷

An appreciation of immigrant proletarian internationalism underscores an aspect of change over time that most students of transnationalism and cross-border immigrant politics have ignored: namely, the decline, indeed demise of this once vital current. Its last embers seem to appear in Lacroix's recounting of the history of the Indian Workers' Association, which reigned hegemonic during the years of labor migration but lost influence in the 1980s under the twin impact of home country nationalism and the emergence of a sizable second generation middle class. Nationalism seems to have largely replaced internationalism as the ideal informing emigrants' imagined community as community has trumped class as an organizing principle.

International Relations and the Question of Dual Loyalty

From the standpoint of receiving states, international migration produces the arrival of alien peoples from alien lands whose alien connections and attachments render them suspect. By contrast, sending states experience not just *emigration*, but the displacement of citizens to whom home governments retain obligations, regardless of residence abroad. However, as *immigrants*, the newcomers enjoy the option of gaining formal citizenship in the state on which they have converged. Consequently, international migration invariably generates issues of loyalty and formal membership on both sides of the chain. Reflecting the inherent duality of their situation, the people who are simultaneously immigrants *and* emigrants often prefer to have it both ways, as opposed to choosing either place of destination *or* place of origin. Eager to retain emigrant loyalty and access to the emigrants' resources, sending states have become more and more willing to go along, which is why they have increasingly found dual citizenship acceptable. Yet persistent foreign attachments can nonetheless render receiving state citizens suspicious of their new co-nationals; peering in from the other side, home country nationals likewise look skeptically at the new commitments of their compatriots abroad. As formal membership in the receiving state yields no guarantee of perceived loyalty to that state, migrants' persisting international connections prove vulnerable to broader events in the international arena.

Devotees of the social science literature are apt to learn that acceptance of dual citizenship provides at once evidence of the novelty of transnational connections as well as today's greater acceptance of persisting loyalties to home and host countries. But, as shown by Caroline Douki in her chapter

on Italy, a de facto “dual citizenship” is of much older vintage. As Italy concluded in the early twentieth century, it was far better to remain in close contact with citizens who took U.S. nationality in order to be able to facilitate if not encourage their return—and to allow them, in the meantime, to act on behalf of Italy. Indeed, one could argue that prohibition of dual citizenship has the potential for yielding two contrary effects, neither consistent with sending state goals. On the one hand, it can reinforce the *emigrants’* tendency to reject acquisition of receiving state citizenship, viewing it as a repudiation of the country of birth and the *national* family to which they still feel tied. However, as that decision entails retention of alien status, it also makes ongoing residence and thus continued remittance-sending capacity uncertain.³⁸ On the other hand, if forced to decide, the *immigrant* orientation may prevail, leading to the acquisition of receiving state citizenship at the expense of continued home country formal membership. By contrast, allowing dual citizenship can both retain the loyalty of settlers and turn them into ethnic lobbyists, benefits that many countries have discovered over the past quarter-century, as the enactment of dual citizenship laws in home countries has encouraged emigrants to the United States to obtain American citizenship without forgoing home membership. This has in turn often boosted the earnings of the newly naturalized, which, in turn, might increase their ability to send money home.³⁹

Of course, dual citizenship becomes a practical option only when both receiving *and* sending countries agree to relent on exclusivity; as of this writing, that pattern characterizes traditional settler states like Canada and the United States, as well as some of the European recipients of post-World War II migration, such as France. Yet such immigrant-receiving countries as Austria, Denmark, and Germany remain bulwarks for more exclusive citizenship practices.⁴⁰ Moreover, sending states can liberalize the rules concerning formal membership without necessarily extending *all* citizenship rights to nationals residing in foreign lands. Retaining emigrant loyalty is one thing, expanding opportunities for emigrant influence from abroad is another.

From the perspective of the receiving states, the international dimension is also a source of constraint. While hostland states may tolerate, even support migrant engagement with homelands abroad, acceptance is contingent on the degree of stability and tranquility of the broader international order. When international troubles arise—as they inevitably do—hostland states are apt to act in ways that restrain and possibly punish migrants insisting on maintaining a cross-border political connection. Schpun’s chapter on the Brazilian Japanese, for example, provides a powerful illustration of the oscillations of acceptance and the potentially devastating impact of

international conflict on transnational ties. Working in concert, Japan and Brazil had stimulated a migration that built up a large Japanese population in Brazil. And the Japanese Brazilians’ connections to Japan remained strong—thanks to schools and other structures established by the Japanese government with Brazil’s approval. Yet, beginning in the 1930s, a wave of extreme Brazilian nationalism put that thriving Japanese Brazilian community on the defensive. The advent of hostilities due to the war quickly made things worse, cutting off ties with the home country and prohibiting the public use of Japanese and virtually all Japanese language or culturally oriented activities. Yet after the war ended and international tranquility returned, cross-border ties eventually resumed.

The experience of the Syro-Lebanese in Canada discussed by Houda Asal also demonstrates how tensions abroad affected activities in the new home. For most of the twentieth century, Arab emigrants in Canada interacted intermittently with their home countries while militating for greater rights in Canada itself. After 1948, however, in agitating for an independent Palestine, many Arab-Canadians went against the grain of Canadian foreign policy, thus falling under the government’s suspicion and making them subject to close monitoring as well as attacks from the press. While solidarity with the Palestinian cause resonated powerfully with some Canadians—most notably Québécois nationalists—as seen from Ottawa, associations of this sort were grounds for viewing the immigrants from the Middle East with even greater doubt. Changing international and national politics both at “home” and abroad created the powerful backdrop for the ebb and flow of Arab mobilization in Canada.

Likewise, loyalties extending across borders created problems for Jewish radicals in the United States as U.S. policy toward Russia changed. As Michels points out, in early-twentieth-century America, opponents of czarist Russia were looked on favorably; the U.S. turned a blind eye to the revolutionaries’ gun-running and indeed joined in on their efforts to pressure the czar. But the tables turned drastically once some of the Jewish revolutionaries in the United States embraced the Soviet Union, at which point their association with a foreign, hostile power brought them under suspicion. Over time, those associations left the immigrant radicals increasingly vulnerable, a risk that culminated in a rash of ideologically motivated, Cold War deportations in the late 1940s and early 1950s.⁴¹

Emigration Policy

While host country attitudes to immigrants’ political activities merit further exploration, we turn also in this book to the sending states and their encouragement or discouragement of transnationalism, be it politically oriented or

not. As we have noted, the earlier debate over transnationalism in historical perspective focused, for the most part, on (the consistency of) the activities undertaken by the immigrants themselves; very little attention was paid to the role of sending states. The essays in this book show how, although certain continuities may be seen in the way in which home states have been interested in their emigrants, the mechanisms and modalities by which they connect with their citizens abroad have taken on distinctive form over time. As early as the mid- to late nineteenth century, mounting levels of emigration left sending states increasingly concerned about the loss of their departing citizens and the consequences that might ensue.⁴² Responses took the form of new understandings of nationhood: as opposed to the then prevailing conception, linking territory and nation such that the latter fills up and governs the former,⁴³ emigration gave rise to a new, deterritorialized conception, in which the nation is present wherever the nationals live, whether within “their” state or elsewhere.

Of the cases discussed in this book, the Italians were first to take this “deterritorialized” turn, not surprisingly, since those residing in the newly created state hardly thought of themselves as Italian, and the southerners who comprised the mass of the emigrants could rarely understand the official, Tuscan-derived “Italian.” Hence, securing the emigrants’ allegiance ranked high among Italy’s goals. Like others, Caroline Douki shows how Italy’s quest for emigrant loyalty involved an effort to inculcate Italianness—*italianità*—via activities oriented toward a deterritorialized vision of the nation understood as *italiani del mondo*.⁴⁴ Though unaware of the Italian example, Mexican state officials followed a similar course in the 1920s, dubbing the emigrants as the Mexico outside of Mexico (*México de afuera*), a theme reprised by the country’s leaders in the 1990s. Portuguese officials, aware of Italy’s emigrant-oriented initiatives, similarly incorporated emigration into the prevailing national narrative by the 1930s, insisting that Portugal existed wherever any Portuguese citizen was to be found. As Victor Pereira shows, that rhetoric made a virtue out of necessity—obscuring the migrants’ need to flee abroad in order to escape misery at home. Thus, well before the advent of “now,” a variety of emigration states found attractions in conceptions of a “deterritorialized nation” as a means of symbolically including nationals who had traversed state boundaries, but whose loyalty and resources they wanted to retain.

In her chapter, Douki makes the case that Italy had perhaps the most developed emigration policy of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, and that incitement to return was virtually a cornerstone of a sending-state-sponsored transnationalism. Emigration confronted turn-of-the-twentieth-

century Italy with a variety of challenges—all of which will be familiar to today’s sending states. Consequently, Italy went far beyond symbolism, developing mechanisms to retain its nationals’ loyalties (in part, so that, as naturalized citizens, they could then act as effective ethnic lobbyists) and to facilitate the secure transfer of money back across the Atlantic while putting into place policies that both aided vulnerable immigrants in the ports of embarkation and brought them back home for free if they became sick or injured. This panoply of policies amounted to a full-blown policy of “diaspora engagement,” to use the contemporary parlance.⁴⁵ Many of the initiatives begun by Italy at the turn of the twentieth century were put in place by other states in subsequent years. Shortly after Italy developed a large-scale consular infrastructure to connect to emigrants in North and South America, the Japanese government implemented an ambitious program of assistance to Japanese emigrants in Brazil; as Mônica Raisa Schpun explains, Japan’s emigration policy facilitated emigrant upward mobility. In the 1920s, Mexico took similar measures designed to assist, but also to retain influence over the emigrant population in the United States whose numbers had grown greatly after World War I (David FitzGerald). Like Italy, Portugal found that movement abroad left migrants exposed to the arbitrary exercise of receiving state power and to depredation from the profit-seeking migration industry;⁴⁶ hence, as Pereira shows, Portugal followed the Italian example detailed by Douki in implementing a variety of practices aimed at controlling ship conditions during the trans-Atlantic passage.

State efforts to connect with emigrants—from cultural policies to banking structures (to encourage remittances)—have been subject to ebb and flow, but the consular infrastructure—an understudied hub for transnational connections—has persistently been key. As part of its buildup of a contemporary consular infrastructure, Italy developed many cultural programs through its consulates designed to retain the allegiance of emigrants. The Mexican consulate too comprised a key institution in the transnational ties cultivated by the home state. However, consulates are resource-consuming operations, requiring poorer *emigration* countries to spend scarce resources in the high-cost locations of richer *immigration* states, where the ability to effectively engage with nationals abroad is often constrained by the yawning social gap between immigrants and diplomats.⁴⁷

Though recurrent, investment in consular services is not necessarily constant; nor does it grow in linear proportion to the expanding size of the emigrant population. Although Mexico developed an extensive infrastructure to deal with emigration in the 1920s and 1930s, it withdrew from consular engagement in the United States in the years after World War II. Even when

Mexican emigration began skyrocketing in the 1960s, reconnection with emigrants came only slowly, not taking full form until the late 1980s. Today, Mexico maintains a vast consular infrastructure, including 56 consulates scattered throughout the United States and Canada, following Mexican emigrants as they have dispersed, even to Alaska.

Yet, the consular connection has historically been a two-edged phenomenon, one entailing both protection and surveillance of nationals. The creation of an extraterritorial presence allows home states to better monitor and possibly control unwanted activities abroad. Thus, though living on American soil, Mexican immigrants were still subject to the coercive power of the Mexican state, which chose to cooperate with U.S. authorities in organizing the massive deportations of the early 1930s. Similarly, in the interwar period, Italy's priorities included monitoring nationals abroad, in addition to protecting them, particularly insofar as migration to France also provided sanctuary for opposition to the fascist regime, which led to further efforts to deepen the consular infrastructure with new mandates for overseeing emigrant welfare, mutual aid, and cultural and sports associations.⁴⁸ In some cases, the two sides can reach a *quid pro quo*, as Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard explains, with France and Algeria finding a common path to the restriction of migration; the first cutting down on numbers, the second gaining the authority to monitor departures. The new Algerian state also kept close tabs on its emigrants through the *Amicale des Algériens en Europe*, in principle a migrants' organization, in practice an extension of the Algerian state. Something similar transpired in Canada, where, as Houda Asal mentions, beyond having its diplomats attend ceremonies, banquets, and social meetings, the new Lebanese state, hesitant to do much for its nationals there, was wary of the emigrants' activism in support of the Palestinian cause. The consulate even at times used its privileged access to the migrants to act as an informer on behalf of the Canadian government. As Lacroix explains, India, trying to crack down on Sikh diaspora groups mobilizing for an independent Khalistan, convinced host states in the west to classify those groups as terrorist organizations and to restrict the entry of Sikhs seeking to immigrate as refugees fleeing violence in the Punjab.

Last, state emigration policy can take a variety of forms. In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, states did not simply neglect emigrants and their needs; they opposed emigration and tried to halt it, a position influenced by a persistent mercantilist understanding that viewed population as a resource that a country could not afford to lose. Restrictions on emigration globally faded in Europe during the late nineteenth century,⁴⁹ although not all countries followed the Italian example, described by Douki, in shifting

from constraint to engagement. A contrasting case is described by Pereira, in which the Portuguese state long used a variety of tools to impede emigration, often under the grounds that the would-be emigrants were being tricked into leaving and needed protection. Though the "exit revolution" of the late nineteenth century marks the long-term tendency, the mid-twentieth century saw a swing back in the other direction, as first the Soviet Union, and then the eastern bloc and other communist countries, sought to impede emigration, doing so with considerable success. While only North Korea still seeks to bottle up its people, the back and forth shifts in policies toward emigration yet again show that change has occurred in nonlinear ways.

In the Italian, Portuguese, and also Mexican cases, state policy toward emigrants evolved, shifting from a constraining to a reactive stance. For the most part, the cases discussed in this book highlight the reactive mode: first, the migrants act on their own; only later do states respond. While the migrants often leave against the preferences of both sending *and* receiving states, citizens' exit is both an expression of discontent and a blow to national self-image, and therefore an unpleasant reality that emigration states—like the postindependent India discussed by Lacroix—simply prefer to ignore. Furthermore, diaspora engagement policy is resource-consuming, but emigration state capacity is low. Eventually, however, as the number of emigrants grows, their impacts—whether ongoing (due to remittance-sending or political involvement) or future (due to possible detachment or possible engagement as ethnic lobbyists)—gain in importance and prove compelling, leading to engagement with nationals abroad.

Yet the essays in this book also offer testimony to an alternative, proactive option, one in which states organize the emigration itself *and* seek to maintain ties to emigrants after they have gone abroad, as illustrated by Mónica Raisa Schpun's chapter on Brazil and Madeline Hsu's chapter on the *Liuxuesheng*—educated emigrants from China. As Schpun explains, a confluence of factors—Japan's search to export populations displaced by its agrarian crisis; restriction on immigration to the United States; the ceasing of immigration from Europe, under the impact of World War I; and Brazil's preference for nonblack workers—led Japan and Brazil to mutually agree to a policy that would bring over 140,000 Japanese immigrants to Brazil in the space of a mere eleven years. Not only did Japan incentivize the migration; it provided the migrants with technical assistance designed to facilitate and hasten their economic adjustment as well as the funding, curricular material, and teachers needed to establish a parallel schooling system. As both a process of population movement and population settlement, this experience stands out for the degree to which it was structured

by emigration state policy from the outset. On the other hand, the Japanese migration to Brazil—like that of Italians to the Americas, Indians to the UK, Algerians and Portuguese to France—involved the transplantation of displaced peasants, starting out in the country of immigration at the very bottom of the ladder.

Labor migration may be the more common modality, but Hsu's chapter reminds us that emigration policy can also be focused at the high end. Like the guestworkers, the students sent abroad by China from the 1870s on through the Chinese revolution, were intended to go as sojourners, though in this case emigration was not motivated by a search for an escape valve or a source of remittances, but rather as a means of gaining knowledge and acquiring skills. If the Italian returns were largely self-motivated after years of successful savings or, on the contrary, the failure of establishment, the Chinese students were seen as obliged to return. Worries about brain drain could undercut the hopes of the sending country's aims, but the initial impetus came from the state itself. As Hsu shows, reaping the dividends of student migration was a difficult end to pursue, as it required the right mixture of acceptance and rejection in the receiving society. On the one hand, too much *acceptance* undermined China's highly instrumental goal of exposing students to just those skills that China wanted and no more: when they were embraced in the United States, Chinese students were likely either to remain there or to return to China excessively Americanized (and Christianized to boot). On the other hand, *rejection* was more common than acceptance, making it difficult for students to obtain the skills they needed and leaving China loath to pursue student emigration, given the ways in which anti-Chinese reactions in the United States generated hostility toward the United States in China. If China's own expectations of student migration provide the standard of success, then the experience can only be judged a failure. But, as Hsu points out, the influence exercised by returned foreign students may provide the more realistic criterion, in which case this early episode underlines the potential dividends of high-skilled emigration policy.

Looking backward, historicizing its very emergence, it is hard not to reflect on the fact that the transnational perspective was launched in a different period than today's. It is not simply that this once new approach gained currency before the dawning of the internet age. More importantly, it emerged at the end of what Eric Hobsbawm called the short twentieth century,⁵⁰ that fin-de-siècle period when the tensions that had split the globe seemed resolved, with a "new world order," as proclaimed by a U.S. president. In that context, with former foes appearing to becoming friends, it seemed entirely reasonable to assume that the immigrant and the emigrant orientation could peacefully and stably coexist. In a more pacific, cooperative world,

neither nationals "here" (the country of *immigration*) nor nationals "there" (the country of *emigration*) had much to fear from immigrants/emigrants maintaining ties in both places. In that light, the hypothesis that immigrants can gain incorporation in the countries where they reside and "at the very same time . . . build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they emigrated" seemed utterly compelling.⁵¹

But that was then. The "new world order" has since metamorphosed into a new world disorder, indeed so disorderly that one might wax nostalgic for the stability of the second half of Hobsbawm's short twentieth century. Not only has the distance traveled since the early 1990s turned what was then "new" into something "old"; it has shown how the very nature of the phenomenon recurrently but contingently changes the environment in which connections between home- and hostlands can be pursued and maintained.

As those connections are international, the very different levels of political stability found in the poorer, weaker states of emigration and the richer, stronger states of immigration predictably yield unpredictable feedbacks, producing period effects but also yielding cross-country variations in the nature of homeland-hostland connections at any given time.

Over the long term, as shown by the U.S.-Mexico case profiled by David FitzGerald, a shift from conflictual to stable, cooperative relations between sending and receiving countries can alter the conditions under which emigrants and emigration states interact, encouraging a variety of activities, whether emanating from a home state wanting to engage with emigrants or emigrants seeking involvement in the place left behind. At any given time, as shown by the contrast of the Portuguese and the Algerian cases profiled, respectively, by Victor Pereira and Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard, disparities in relationships between sending and receiving states can make for variations in the nature of cross-border connections. Algerians and Portuguese both moved to France as labor migrants, enduring similar conditions, at least at the earlier stages of the migrations. But tensions infused by Algeria's struggle for independence and later postcolonial strains with France fundamentally distinguished the context of reception and the relationship between Algeria and Algerians in France from that of the simultaneously arriving Portuguese, who comprised an "invisible" migration. Moreover, with continentwide cooperation having replaced strife, the Portuguese could move from one European Union country to another at will. By contrast, as Blanc-Chaléard's chapter shows, polarization on the two sides of the Mediterranean condemned the Algerians to a "poor man's transnationalism," with options for back-and-forth movement constantly constrained, whether during colonial or postcolonial periods. A shift from cooperative to conflictual relationships

between home and host states can prove disastrous, as shown by Mônica Raisa Schpun's chapter; but when conflict can be replaced by cooperation, as shown by Brazil and Japan in the years following World War II, the rupture in cross-border relations caused by international conflict can be repaired. Not all international issues can be so easily mended, of which the conflict over Israel/Palestine is a prime example. As Houda Asal's chapter shows, that conflict shadowed Arab Canadians from even before the formation of the state of Israel, consistently constraining the immigrants' efforts to engage in their place of residence on behalf of a (real or symbolic) place of origin. While Asal's chapter ends in the 1970s, it seems safe to say that the shadow cast by conflict in this part of the world has since only darkened, continuing to shape the conditions under which Arab Canadians pursue ties to this troubled part of the globe. One only need think of the population movements triggered by the troubles of today's times—Syrians, Iraqis, Somalis, Ukrainians, Rwandans, Tamils—let alone the repercussions of international conflicts on long-settled populations of immigrant origin—to realize that the inherently unsettled relations among states will consistently bear down on immigrant cross-border connections—albeit in ways that are hard to forecast with any degree of certainty.

Not only was the emergence of the transnational perspective specific to a time. It was also specific to a place, namely the United States, whose location and history led many researchers to focus mainly on intrahemispheric migrations. While those migrations are surely not of a piece, the broader geographical scope of this book nonetheless shows how they differ from migrations found elsewhere. Neocolonialism may characterize the relationship between the United States and Latin America; Puerto Rico aside, there are no U.S. colonies found in the western hemisphere. Hence, the strains and difficulties experienced by the Algerians discussed in Blanc-Chaléard's chapter—first as colonial migrants engaged in the liberation struggle from the metropole and later as residents of the former colonial power looked on suspiciously by the new ex-colonial state—made for a relationship between emigrants, hostland, and homeland of a type infused with colonial history. Furthermore, interethnic conflicts at home may yield fallout among emigrants abroad, as in the case of the Indian emigrants in the UK profiled by Thomas Lacroix. While the notion of state-seeking nationalism may link up the activities of contemporary emigrants to the Irish emigrants of the nineteenth century or the eastern European immigrants of the turn of the twentieth, it points to an axis of variation that can only be understood by looking beyond the western hemisphere boundaries that have often constrained the focus of U.S. migration scholars. Hence, we end with a plea, not just for more research, but for a wider frame of research

vision, one extending to a broader range of migration temporalities as well as a more encompassing, indeed possibly global, set of sending and receiving places.

States and Groups

We have organized the book around two foci: that of the states' attitudes toward their citizens abroad and that of immigrants' transnational practices over time, although the two are linked as all of the papers show.

Part One explores the ways in which home states themselves have had an impact on facilitating or impeding connections. Italy, Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and China have over time elaborated different emigration policies, some of which are destined to keeping citizens who live abroad within the national sphere. Caroline Douki focuses on returns as an understudied manifestation of transnationalism, postulating in particular that the Italian state's early "return policy" was a way of favoring such movement, actively encouraging its citizens abroad to remain connected transnational subjects. Victor Pereira reminds us of Portugal's particularly long history of emigration and how the Portuguese state at times discouraged and at others encouraged emigration; at the same time he notes that the Portuguese abroad have often clung less to the home state per se than to local or cultural symbols that become their "transnational" identity. The case of the Japanese in Brazil (Mônica Raisa Schpun) serves to show how foreign relations between the countries of origin and settlement can have dramatic consequences on the possible continuities but also ruptures in the transnational activities of immigrants. In taking a long view of political engagement of Mexicans in the United States, David FitzGerald shows the ways in which the Mexican state has, especially recently, sought to harness that energy; he argues that the long history of engagement on both sides of the Rio Grande in itself disproves the technologically driven theories of contemporary transnationalism. In the case of China, Madeline Hsu provides an example of an explicit policy encouraging student emigration followed by return migration in order to bring back transnational skills.

Part Two looks at how emigrants have mobilized socially, politically, and economically over the last century to keep in touch with their countries of origin. The figures of the Irish nationalist or the Italian republican in America mobilizing for their homeland are by now fairly well known. But here we examine the processes in which a variety of other communities have organized, from the political mobilization of Arabs in Canada (Houda Asal) to Jewish radical immigrants in the United States (Tony Michels) to Sikhs in Britain (Thomas Lacroix). From the informal activities of early settlers

to the growth of voluntary associations as communities grow, forms of mobilization change due to changing cohorts and growing numbers but also due to political events at home. Lacroix, Asal, and Michels thus argue that temporalities matter in understanding the oscillations of homeland-directed political activity over time. Transformations in home countries, international relations between home and place of settlement and changing policies in the country of settlement thus all help explain periods of quiescence and periods of more intense transnational political activities. Finally, Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard inquires into the impact of decolonization and its aftermath on the transnational practices of Algerian immigrants to France since the 1950s, from the continuity of yearly visits to the political and cultural ruptures of war or changing cultural norms.

By bringing together historians, sociologists, and a geographer from both sides of the Atlantic, and by focusing on the United States and Europe as sites of immigration and countries from China to India as places of origin, we make no pretense to a “total” history of transnational connections. However, we believe that the study of homeland connections over this long historical period is necessary both to bridge the disciplines and to deepen our understanding of the continuities *and* the changes that have characterized the international movements of people over the past century.

NOTES

1. Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
2. For further elaboration, see Nancy L. Green, “French History and the Transnational Turn,” *French Historical Studies* 5 (2014): 551–564.
3. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation States* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994) 1, 286.
4. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 645 (1992): 1.
5. *Ibid.*, 9.
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