ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS

Chapter 1 | Origins and Destinations

IMMIGRANTS ARE REMAKING America, from bottom to top. At the bottom stand the workers doing the difficult, dangerous, and dirty work that most native-born shun, whether picking crops, cleaning toilets, or slaughtering and carving up the animals that appear on the American dinner table. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one finds the immigrant overachievers, who, as inventors, corporate moguls, financiers, or Nobel Prize winners, often leave the native-born population far behind.

The mass arrival of the foreign-born can be transformational, and nowhere is the legacy of immigrants more lasting than in their descendants, starting with their children—the second generation. This second generation is the inevitable by-product of immigration itself: since the young are the people most likely to leave their old home in search of a better future elsewhere, immigrants reach their new home at precisely the age when family formation usually begins. Consequently, their arrival yields large numbers of children born in the host society yet socialized by parents who were raised in a different environment, one with expectations and orientations typically foreign to the place that their children experience as their native world. In beginning again, the parents start out in a new, strange country that must be learned, triggering a process of adaptation that even when successful is almost always error-prone and transmits the signal—to the immigrants themselves, to their children, and to the outsiders around them—that perhaps profoundly, perhaps ineffably, they remain out of place. Moreover, moving in a world where no one is free to cross state borders simply as he or she wishes, all immigrant parents commence anew as aliens, lacking the full rights enjoyed by the citizens of their adopted country and often enough discovering that the route to joining the citizenry is arduous, long, and sometimes impossible to successfully traverse.

1

This common background provides the scaffolding from which the children of immigrants are launched into the world. Despite these salient features shared by almost all immigrant offspring, they nonetheless do not turn out the same. Even as they contribute to the greater diversity of the societies that their parents decided to join, these immigrant offspring are themselves incredibly diverse, standing out from their fellow second-generation counterparts on myriad dimensions.

That simple straightforward observation motivates this book: we seek to understand the origins of the many differences among today's second generation, looking for sources stemming from countries of origin, immigrant groups' experience in the United States, and the characteristics of immigrant households and individuals. We provide new questions to guide our exploration, introduce a novel perspective for framing our inquiry, import a methodology used elsewhere in the social sciences but rarely applied to these issues, and engage with the scholars who have gone before us so as to provide a systematic assessment of the many hypotheses generated by the past quarter century of research.

THE QUESTION

The central question animating this book is purposefully broad and aims to demonstrate the utility of our methodology and our perspective across a variety of domains: *What are the primary individual- and group-level determinants of second-generation variation in school, work, ethnic attachment, and political life?*

The foreign-born in the United States truly represent the world, providing a cross-section of the globe's economic and cultural diversity. Today's newcomers arrive from both the planet's poorest states and its richest, from not only deeply religious societies, such as those in Central America or the Philippines, but also the most dramatically secular, such as the former Soviet Union and China. That diversity is fully reflected in the immigrant home, making for a set of socialization experiences that are far more variegated than those among the children of native-born Americans. And yet, while parents' foreign origins affect the destinies of their offspring, those progeny themselves follow a life course that unfolds in a setting very different from that experienced by their parents. That new context tends to diminish the yawning social and economic gaps among the foreign-born, largely because the wealth and institutional framework of the society of arrival improves conditions for even the least fortunate of those residents who started out abroad. Since society-wide investments in public goods in the United States greatly outdistance the levels attained in the poorer

countries of emigration, and since the everyday environment provides a higher level of security and stability than the parents could have found at the point of origin, the children of immigrant farm and factory workers typically follow career and educational pathways that increasingly resemble those of their counterparts from wealthier nations as well as the native-born.

Movement toward convergence with the standard of the society of arrival provides the telltale sign that assimilation, as defined by the textbooks, is well under way. Thanks to that same tendency, the distance between high and low immigrant origin achievers somewhat diminishes from first to second generation. Nonetheless, a very significant gulf remains. On average, for example, the children of Chinese immigrants in Los Angeles complete sixteen years of schooling, as opposed to thirteen among their Mexican-origin counterparts. Likewise, the offspring of Filipino migrants are far more likely to work as professionals or managers than their Salvadoran-origin peers. These intergroup disparities catch the eye of both amateur and professional students of migration and ethnicity, yet represent only one axis of variation in second-generation experiences and trajectories. Despite everything that might separate the offspring of immigrants originating in one country from those of another immigrant group, the gaps separating persons who share the same national roots turn out to be no less important—and are sometimes even more important. Of course, in this respect, the children of immigrants are just like their counterparts among the children of natives: U.S.-born parents are not all cut from the same mold, and more importantly, as parents do not all possess the same resources, some are more equipped to help their children than others. But the children of immigrants are all the offspring of people who grew up in foreign places and who had to somehow adapt to a country that was initially unfamiliar and not their own; thus, on this count, the children of immigrants are *not* just like their counterparts among the children of natives.

Parents' common international experiences—their exposure to different economic and social conditions in their home country, their continuing ties to significant others there, and their lengthy, perhaps permanent, experience as aliens living among citizens in a foreign land—shape their lives in a variety of ways. Even so, the course of parental adaptation does not follow a single path: as some quickly abandon homeland loyalties and practices while others instead hold fast to them, their children are given different models to follow that might—or might not—prove of use. Immigrant parents further depart from their native-born counterparts in that they belong to family networks that stretch across national boundaries.

As previously noted, migration is a selective process that leads some—typically young adults—to depart and others—often children and parents—to stay in place. Because that very selectivity internationalizes kinship ties, the children of immigrants often grow up in households with a foreign connection that may serve as either a recipient of help or a focus of concern, activities that could then have an influence on the resources available to immigrant offspring and the orientations that they adopt.

As the reader will soon see, we follow the scholars in our field by searching for the roots of intergroup variation; however, we depart from the researchers who have gone before us in that determining the source of intragroup variation ranks equally high on our agenda. At the intergroup level, we seek to understand how population-wide disparities in the contexts of emigration and immigration yield population-wide disparities among immigrant offspring, whether seen through their achievements or their behavior. By contrast, our quest at the intragroup level requires that we assess how differences in parental starting points and parental responses to the constraints and opportunities offered by the new environment produce new lines of distinction among their offspring. Once we delineate the sources of inter- and intragroup differences, as well as the outcomes affected by those differences, we then strive to discover whether differences among immigrant nationalities or differences within those same groups have the greater effect on today's second generation.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE

With few exceptions, as scholars examine the unfolding of the destinies of the second generation after migration, they do so with their backs to the receiving-country border. By contrast, we adopt an international perspective that keeps both the origin and destination country in view as we contend that the influences related to both the spanning and the delimiting of national political boundaries comprise the salient traits distinguishing the children of immigrants from all others. We underscore the shared conditions linked to place of origin that produce interethnic differences while also highlighting the household-level at-entry characteristics and subsequent life-course decisions that produce intraethnic, family-level variation. As we proceed, we bring together place of origin and place of destination, as well as identities rooted in the former and those that develop in the latter. The trajectories recounted and analyzed in the chapters that follow involve the encounter with multiple boundaries—territorial, political, and social—and the various social and political spaces within which the adult children of immigrants pursue their lives.

Figure 1.1   Schematic Summary of the Explanatory Approach

Source: Authors' compilation.

Taken together, our explanatory model includes determinants of second-generation difference that we map in a two-dimensional space, visualized in figure 1.1. On the vertical axis, we consider the *level* of influence: what are the most important characteristics of the immigrants themselves, and of the national-origin groups to which they belong, in determining a range of socioeconomic, political, and cultural outcomes? On the upper half of this axis, which we conceptualize as the contexts of emigration and immigration, lie group-level traits: the salient attributes prevalent in the sending country and in the coethnic community in the United States. The lower half includes individual factors central to the perspective advanced in these pages. Consequently, we abstract other relevant

variables—all to be discussed at later points of the book—to single out only those influences that uniquely shape the experience of immigrants and their descendants, namely, their social ties to the country of origin and their family-level experiences of alien status.

On the horizontal axis of figure 1.1, we consider the *location* of influence: unlike the children of U.S.-born parents, the children of immigrants are likely to be shaped by both group- and individual-level factors that operate on *both* sides of the U.S. border. At the top right stands the context of destination factors that arise within the United States; at the top left is the context of the origin factors deriving from the parents' home countries. In the bottom half, denoting the individual-level characteristics, are individual- and family-level traits that extend across places: the international locations of significant others and the ensuing cross-border engagements, as well as the legal status at arrival, which reflects decisions made by both immigrants and states when the former are still living in the origin country.

The relative importance of these influences varies depending on the outcome under consideration. In the next section, we provide a brief general overview of these characteristics and the ways in which they are expected to impinge upon the children of immigrants.

Intergroup Differences: Contexts of Emigration and Immigration

The lives of immigrants are deeply shaped by influences that derive from the country of emigration and separate their experiences from those of all others in the country of immigration whose lives unfold entirely within the boundaries of the state where they were born and subsequently remained. First comes the simple fact that immigrants start out from someplace else: born and educated in another country, immigrants were socialized in a political, cultural, and economic system different from the one they encounter after migration. Upon their arrival in the receiving country, the lessons they learned and the orientations they absorbed in that earlier context, in tandem with their individual-level resources, then influence their understanding of their new environment and their reactions to its demands. As such, group-level variation early in immigrant parents' life course deeply affects variation in outcomes later in their lives. As those variations extend to how parents go on to raise their children, we expect that socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of the context in their home countries will influence the outcomes realized by that second generation.

Thus, unlike their U.S.-born and U.S.-bred counterparts, immigrant parents are socialized abroad, albeit in national contexts that systematically

differ from each other. Upon arrival, immigrant parents and children also encounter contrasting contexts of immigration that can either constrain or facilitate their pursuit of the good life in their new home. Those contexts involve conditions that immigrants share with their conationals and that vary across groups: in the resources potentially available from coethnics, which we define as "ethnic capital"; in the degree of societal acceptance, which we conceptualize as location in the American system of "skin-color stratification"; and in exposure to the differential effects of migration policies, which we conceptualize as "migration-status disparities."

Only the last of these contextual features is distinctive to international migrants, who, unlike ethnically or racially distinctive groups of U.S. nationals, begin their American lives as foreigners starting out with at best limited rights to continued residence and social membership. International migration, unlike internal migration, involves traversing territorial borders that are gated so as to separate the relatively few who are wanted or tolerated from the far more numerous who are seen as undesirable or unacceptable. In today's globalized economy, however, the demand for migrant workers—whether of the high- or low-skilled sort—almost always supersedes the levels of permanent migration that receiving-country nationals are prepared to accept. In their efforts to reconcile the conflicting pressures of business demand for labor and consistently negative popular views of immigration, states implement migration control policies that yield a proliferation of legal statuses, ranging from the tolerated but unauthorized, at the most disadvantaged end, to those lucky enough to eventually cross the internal border of citizenship, at the most advantaged end.

For several reasons, the prevailing legal status varies from one nationality to another, furnishing an influence on intergroup differences that stems not from the place of origin but from the receiving society. From the outset, the incidence within a nationality of more protected status (refugee) or more vulnerable status (asylum seeker or unauthorized resident) affects both societal perception and the overall level of resources on which coethnics can draw if and when they turn to one another for support. Members of groups most likely to enter with rights of permanent settlement are put on the quickest path to citizenship, while groups among whom unauthorized migration is common or even prevails count many fewer members who are even eligible for citizenship; hence, group-level differences in legal status and citizenship prevalence widen over time. Although any individual immigrant may enjoy a legal status more or less advantageous than that of the median member of his or her group, that median status will still affect population-wide resources and standing, thereby yielding impacts at the individual level, with further consequences for the ways in which immigrant parents' resources affect second-generation outcomes. Thus,

regardless of individual attributes, the contexts of emigration and immigration yield long-lasting effects on the experiences of the foreign-born as well as their descendants.

Intragroup Differences: Cross-Border Connections and Civic Stratification

Every immigrant is also an emigrant, simultaneously getting oriented to the place of reception while retaining ties to the people and places left behind. That duality between immigration and emigration results from the political and social logic of international migration. Since migration is selective, as we have already noted, it inevitably produces international families by pulling kinship networks apart. Over time the core network often shifts location, but rarely completely, with the inertia experienced by the elderly causing others to stay in place. In today's world, moreover, the internationalization of families reflects the additional impact of receiving states' intensifying efforts to police national boundaries. Because gaining entrance into the developed world is so hard, the people who emigrate are those who can get through or across obstacles, inevitably leaving at home those who cannot traverse the political barriers to mobility.

Thus, in departing from one country and moving to another, migrants ironically and unintentionally tie those two countries together. The migrants and their descendants reside on the *immigration*-country side of the territorial border. Yet their continuing connections to the *emigration*-country side extend their social ties across that same frontier. And because those social ties connect to significant others, they remain meaningful, yielding influence even on experiences undergone in the country of reception.

Homeland ties are pervasive, motivating both immigrant parents and offspring to expend resources and time to keep up with and possibly support the relatives and communities left behind. However, the quotidian experience of those connections varies across groups and families, with implications for their transmission from one generation to the next. On the one hand, immigrant agency matters. Immigrant parents decide whether to cut homeland ties or instead continue to remit, to call, to visit, to engage in homeland politics, or some combination of these. These efforts then serve as a model for children to follow, who then have to decide whether to follow the parental example or not. On the other hand, the maintenance of cross-border ties depends on a complex set of factors related to the location of core family members, the options and appeal of family reunification, and the communication efforts of those left behind, all of which are largely beyond the control of immigrant parents or their second-generation children. Hence,

differences in the persistence of the homeland tie and its importance range widely among the adult children of immigrants, with consequences for outcomes unfolding in the country where they actually reside.

After crossing the territorial boundary, every newcomer starts as an alien confronting a series of other internal, often invisible, but vitally important boundaries, each one of which demarcates a zone corresponding to a distinctive set of rights. The first stages of a migrant's life—and more often than not, the entirety of the migrant's experience in the new country—take place in that conceptual space between the external territorial boundary and the internal boundary demarcating citizens from aliens. Consequently, immigration yields additional migrations, this time not spatial but rather political as the migrants move from one status to another. Unlike the move that brought them to the United States, impelled by their own initiative and their willingness to sacrifice for a better life, migrants have limited control over their ability to cross status boundaries. Moreover, the resources that helped them get from there to here—whether their willingness to assume risk or their ability to gain help from relatives and friends already present in the United States—prove much less useful when politicians and state officials are the people determining who can cross over status boundaries and under what conditions.

Presence in that liminal zone between citizenship and the territorial boundary does not prevent migrants to the United States from enjoying many of the advantages of life there. Yet, as long as they persist in that space, they are still foreigners, lacking the standing of "new Americans," with consequences that ramify widely and take myriad form. International migration inherently generates civic stratification as the newcomers are sorted into different statuses, each with a distinctive set of entitlements, depending on the legal circumstances under which they gained entry into their new environment.[1] Since upon-arrival rights differ, so too do the resources that immigrant parents can mobilize for the benefit of their families and transmit to their children. Those starting out furthest from the inner circle of citizenship enjoy the fewest protections, experience the greatest vulnerability to territorial expulsion, and need to leap over multiple hurdles before citizenship becomes an option. By contrast, for those beginning with rights of permanent residence, citizenship can be accessed without excessive difficulty, allowing status advantages to cumulate over time. Of course, since, for the eligible, citizenship acquisition is optional, choice comes into play, widening disparities among persons who started out with the same options. These first-generation discrepancies in legal status and citizenship all have second-generation effects, but their impacts work through different channels, depending on whether the offspring were themselves born abroad, and thus experience

compared to the children of immigrants from other countries: as an example, we hypothesize that immigrants and their offspring with roots in poorer societies may maintain stronger links to the homeland than those who come from richer societies. At the same time, we also suspect that even within the national group disposed toward tighter homeland connections, the children of parents who frequently travel back to the homeland may remain more closely tied to the sending country than those whose parents never or rarely return home. Multilevel models allow us to simultaneously test for country of origin and individual-level differences such as these. Moreover, by using multilevel models, we gain the capacity to distinguish how much of the variation in second-generation outcomes can be linked to each level separately. In other words, how well does the analysis explain differences *between groups*—those with tighter or looser homeland connections—and how successfully does it perform in explaining those same differences *between individuals*? Gaining traction over these two dimensions generates significant intellectual rewards, as the scholarship with which we will engage attacks sources of both inter- and intragroup differences. And yet, as the reader will soon see, it does so without explicitly identifying the focal level of interest and never seeks to assess the relative importance of one level as compared to the other.

The strengths of multilevel analysis are threefold. First, the unit of analysis in the second level of a multilevel analysis becomes the national origin itself. But whereas nationality is just a name—a nominal variable lacking in rank order—we can unpack theoretically relevant characteristics pertaining to both the place of origin and the population of immigrants who started out from there and turn them into measurable variables, the consequences of which can then be assessed. The growing national-origin diversity of America's foreign-origin population, which encompasses far too many national-origin groups to meaningfully compare one at a time, makes this property especially important. Thus, looking at a large number of groups, we can compare outcomes—whether involving schooling or the acquisition of citizenship or political participation—across groups among whom advantageous legal statuses are prevalent versus those among whom less-advantaged statuses, such as lack of authorized presence, are more common. And if we can identify relevant aspects of the home-country context, we can also assess the impact of differences in the prevalence of one legal status or another, controlling for those very same home-country attributes. As we will shortly explain, these two shared, contextual features—one related to the context of immigration and the other to the context of emigration—belong at the center of any effort to understand the sources of intergroup difference, as they involve the distinctive and enduring characteristics of population movements across

state boundaries. And since those dimensions can also be measured—in ways that we shall soon describe—they can be converted into variables, which in turn provide the means for determining just when differences in context matter and, when they do, with what impact.

Second, multilevel models allow us to simultaneously measure the effect of individual- or family-level variation while controlling for contextual factors. They also enable us to separate the individual- and group-level influences of the same concept—for instance, educational attainment. We know that the children of highly educated parents achieve higher levels of education themselves; we also expect that, regardless of parental resources, the children belonging to immigrant populations with higher average levels of education will attain higher levels of schooling. Simultaneously modelling both parental and group-level resources in a multilevel framework allows us to separate the variation explained by a characteristic at the group and individual level. For instance, we can assess how much variation in educational attainment is explained by the average education level of the group, holding constant the education of the parent. We can also examine how much variation is explained by the educational resources of the parent while holding constant the education level of the group.

Finally, multilevel models enable us to test for interactions across levels. Keeping with the example, does parental education matter more or less in determining second-generation schooling for immigrants from coethnic communities with high levels of education, or among those immigrants from communities where the average level of education is low? On the one hand, we might anticipate that parental education will matter more when the coethnic community has fewer resources and thus less to give; on the other hand, parental education may matter more in contexts where the presence of other highly educated coethnics generates pathways by which foreigners can translate their educational knowledge into the new U.S. environment. In chapter 5, our modeling strategy enables us to properly assess the cross-level hypotheses that are a central part of existing explanations of second-generation variation.

We note that we are not the first to employ multilevel analysis to plumb the sources of difference among the second generation; indeed, European scholars have led the way, though that research has examined neither a similar set of group-level influences nor individual-level influences.[3] But following the example from the other side of the Atlantic allows us to significantly improve on previous U.S.-centered scholarship, for which the search for the sources of national-origin disparities has typically defined the overriding intellectual goal. The most innovative of recent U.S. approaches explicitly sought to move away from the old-fashioned group-by-group comparisons that almost always ended up producing

an ethnoracial Olympics—this one excels, that one lags behind.[4] Instead, those investigations aspired to shed light on the way in which differences in a shared variable—a context that cumulated advantages for some groups and disadvantages for others—affected a broad range of second-generation outcomes. Unfortunately, practice diverged from theory as researchers, failing to isolate the relevant attributes of the shared context, fell back on group-specific comparisons—comparing the children of the Chinese to the children of the Mexicans, for instance, which in turn led back to generalizations about entire populations.

To be sure, these current efforts are careful to avoid anything that might smack of a cultural explanation, contending that differences between groups arise in the context of reception that immigrants encounter at arrival. Yet such scholarship is stymied by its research design, which seeks answers by pursuing pairwise group comparisons: A versus B. However, while the members of immigrant-origin group A may indeed fare differently from the members of immigrant-origin group B, the one-by-one comparison precludes the possibility of explanation: since so many attributes distinguish A from B—whether those related to the point of departure or of reception or those related to the circumstances of emigration or those involving the resources harvested before departing—the comparison of two cases leaves the grounds for adjudicating among the varying sources of influence inherently wanting. And regardless of the specific attributes that distinguish A from B, those traits are unlikely to be unique to these two groups alone; rather, if particular sets of attributes truly matter, they should be present to varying degrees across a wider set of populations. But to distinguish the relevant features, one has to abstract from the singularities associated with a particular group and identify the variables that are likely to count among immigrants coming from a broad set of countries. Doing so is all the more important now that the number of immigrant populations in the United States has multiplied: at the turn of the twentieth century, one might reasonably have asked why Jews were different from Italians, who were in turn different from Poles. However, because the immigrants and immigrant offspring of the early twenty-first century come from an ever-growing number of countries located around the globe, that exercise defies completion, necessitating the multilevel model used in this book.

Unlike other researchers, we focus only on the adult children of immigrants and do not extend the lens to later-generation members of the native population. The rationale for our self-limiting approach stems from considerations of both an intellectual and practical nature. Intellectually, we seek to understand the impact of the distinctively international influences of population movements across borders. Although we have yet to show how much those international influences matter, we can assure the reader that

the demonstration will appear again and again in the pages to follow. But there is every reason to assume that the impacts of those influences will be greatly attenuated among the children of the children of immigrants, who will all be born American citizens, will be raised by parents who are all de facto Americans and mainly de jure Americans as well, and will grow up with the country of origin as an increasingly distal presence in their lives. Yet even if international factors are of much diminished importance, it follows that the differences found among second-generation adults will leave at least some imprint on the third generation. And though even further decay of international influence is likely among the great-grandchildren of immigrants, they too are likely to bear slight, but detectable, signs of it.

Demonstrating both decay and persistence among these later generations requires the appropriate data, however, whether for second-generation parents or for first-generation grandparents, and that information is nowhere available. Alternatively, one could take the standard approach, which assumes that among the native-born children of the native-born or native-raised, neither generation nor contexts of immigration and emigration nor any of the other traits associated with a foreign origin yields differences that matter. But in that standard approach, the very factors that lie at the source of heterogeneity among the second generation disappear in the comparison to a generationally undifferentiated population of the native-born children of the native-born. Since the contrast group then becomes one in which there is no variation in the relevant factors—*all* parents are citizens, *all* speak English at home, *none* retain ties to the country of origin, and indeed, country of origin cannot even be traced—the capacity to assess the impact of disparities in parental legal status, language used in the parental household, ties to home-country relatives, or home-country culture is lost.

SECOND-GENERATION DESTINIES: THE NEED FOR A SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT

The following pages implement the agenda sketched out here, while maintaining dialogue with the work of the insightful scholars who have gone before us and the influential books that they have written. The destiny of today's second generation has ranked high on the immigration research agenda for roughly twenty-five years, an interest first triggered by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou's pathbreaking 1993 article on "segmented assimilation."[5] There, Portes and Zhou announced that the offspring of the new immigrants of the turn of the twenty-first century would cleave from the pattern of the past, following not one but several trajectories of adaptation. In this view, success would attend some groups, while others

would be more likely to encounter a dead end; moreover, for members of the materially less advantaged groups, the road to progress would be unlocked by retaining home-country loyalties and values, in contrast to what the conventional wisdom had long maintained.

That article did not just excite the field: it served as the manifesto for an empirical research project launched in San Diego and Miami by Alejandro Portes, working in harness with Rubén Rumbaut; that work eventuated in the award-winning book *Legacies*, published in 2001.[6] Not surprisingly, so controversial an approach quickly prompted reactions, of which the most influential was probably Richard Alba and Victor Nee's book *Remaking the American Mainstream*.[7] A work of synthesis, not original research—and thus unlike *Legacies*—that book sought to update assimilation theory for the twenty-first century; naturally enough, responding to the claims of segmented assimilation ranked high among these authors' objectives. Whereas Portes and his collaborators emphasized the importance of group membership, Alba and Nee instead focused on the individual. For these proponents of "neo-assimilation" theory, the key driver of assimilation lay in the ways in which the individual search for the better life simultaneously weakened group attachments and increased the capacity to transmit resources, thereby bettering the life of the next generation, notwithstanding any prejudice or discrimination that might be encountered along the way.

Thus, these competing perspectives projected two very discrepant second-generation futures, one more pessimistic, one more optimistic. Their differing forecasts also corresponded to a divergence in views regarding the central axis of variation: did it lie *between* groups, as contended by segmented assimilation, or among individuals *within* groups, as argued by neo-assimilation theory? In breaking open the debate, these critical contributions provided the ammunition for the next round of empirical assessments, this time based on new data collection efforts conducted in the leading urban centers of immigrant America—New York and Los Angeles. In a curious way, the researchers who studied the New Yorkers—Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway—provided an account that echoed both segmented assimilation and neo-assimilation theory.[8] Like Portes and his collaborators, they organized their inquiry around the structuring power of groups. And yet like Alba and Nee, they perceived the advent of the second generation as pointing in a positive direction, in contrast to the gloomier view adopted by segmented assimilation theory. As Kasinitz and his coauthors saw it, second-generation New Yorkers were "inheriting the city" and benefiting from second-generation advantages linked to immigrant selectivity, the immigrants' optimism, the hybrid culture produced by the multiethnic

metropolis, and the institutional legacy left by past immigrations, which would facilitate the immigrant offspring's efforts to get ahead.

Whereas this perspective born on the East Coast emphasized the advantages shared by today's immigrant offspring, the scholars who focused on the southern California scene highlighted the disparities in second-generation resources and experiences, albeit while advancing very different perspectives and using contrasting methodologies. In *Parents Without Papers*, Frank Bean, Susan Brown, and James Bachmeier brought the obstacles to second-generation progress front and center: advancing a "membership exclusion" model, these scholars underscored the ways in which differences in parental legal status—and in particular, undocumented status—shaped second-generation trajectories.[9] Though the book's subtitle—*The Progress and Pitfalls of Mexican American Integration*—pointed toward an account of intergroup differences, as a study of a single group it could only illuminate the sources of *intragroup* differences. And by emphasizing the weight of differences among individuals belonging to the same population, *Parents Without Papers* implicitly worked with the same perspective as neo-assimilation theory, albeit while introducing a variable left out of Alba and Nee's account.

By contrast, Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou sought to understand the intergroup differences lying behind the "Asian American Achievement Paradox," a puzzle that provided the title for their book.[10] Though their raw material came from qualitative interviews drawn from a selected subsample of the same large-scale survey that informed *Parents Without Papers*, Lee and Zhou chose not to engage with the "societal exclusion" model. Instead, they sought to explain the factors propelling the rapid integration of Chinese and Vietnamese immigrant offspring, contending that a complex of factors—the hyperselection of immigrant parents; their import, not of home-country values, but of specific institutions; a "success frame" endorsed by students and parents; and a "stereotype promise" maintained by teachers—led to extraordinary achievement in the narrow span of two generations, even among those immigrant offspring raised by unskilled parents lacking in English-language facility. Thus, whereas *Parents Without Papers* highlights the ways in which legal-status *disparities* among immigrant parents stemming from the same country led to educational and occupational *differences* among their children, *The Asian American Achievement Paradox* roots the *commonalities* among Chinese and Vietnamese immigrant offspring—in this case, their success—in the *shared* attributes and behaviors of their parents.

These thumbnail sketches will be elaborated at greater length in the next chapter, but for the moment they suffice to demonstrate the lively nature of the debate fostered by a quarter century of scholarship on the

second generation. However, the picture we have traced here also shows that the authors of these influential works are not truly in dialogue with one another. For instance, a central divide among these works involves the emphasis that some put on the differences *between* groups versus the focus in others on the differences among individuals *within* the same group. Yet, as no major work has thus far sought to disentangle the factors that make for intergroup disparities from those that produce intragroup differences, scholars are often talking past one another. Similarly, researchers have not yet sought to systematically weigh the relative importance of variations between national-origin groups as opposed to those found within a group of people originating in the same place, nor have they assessed how the sources of difference may vary from one dimension of social life to another.

Moreover, each successive work, while building on the contribution of a predecessor, generates a new set of hypotheses, but without fully scrutinizing claims put forward at an earlier stage in the debate. Consequently, the field is long overdue for a systematic assessment of the many plausible, indeed deeply insightful, hypotheses generated by these earlier efforts to understand the experiences of today's second generation. Since that assessment hinges on a clear delineation of the issues in question, we carefully sift through the accumulated literature to spotlight the specific claims in contention and then subject those claims to the thoroughgoing test that they deserve.

THE PATH AHEAD

It is with this background in mind that we have written the pages to follow. We begin the first part of the book, "Perspectives," with a chapter that engages with the works just mentioned in a way that specifies the hypotheses advanced in each book, brings out the fundamental contrasts among these authors, and identifies the gaps remaining in this existing scholarship. Chapter 3 details our own approach, which we refer to as the "international perspective." We explain how the distinctive characteristics of international migrations—population movements across state boundaries occurring in the face of migration control systems designed to sift, select, and exclude—yield fields of influence that span international borders. We also describe how international migration creates *internal* borders that separate newcomers from native-born citizens as well as immigrants of different legal statuses. These influences specific to the immigrant experience distinguish the socioeconomic and political trajectories of the second generation from those of native-born minorities, simultaneously shaping intergroup differences while producing new forms of variation among

immigrant offspring with origins in the same place. We then present our plan for putting that approach into action. We introduce objective indicators of the characteristics of the contexts of emigration and immigration that are theorized to underlie national-origin differences. We then build these attributes into a two-level model containing family-level predictors of second-generation outcomes at one level, nested within countries of origin at a second level.

The rest of the book falls into two further parts. Part II, "Transmission," engages with the theme that dominates the writings in this field: namely, the acquisition of the education, skills, and resources needed to fulfill the "American dream" to which so many of the immigrants and their descendants aspire. The focus of the two chapters in Part II will be familiar, but not so the mode of analysis. Chapter 4 contrasts our approach to the practices prevailing in the field, demonstrating the shortcomings of nationality-based comparisons and showing how our two-level approach can distinguish specific contextual effects that lie behind intergroup differences in educational and occupational attainment. In these pages, we tackle the enduring question of how best to understand intergroup differences in socioeconomic attainment by considering the impact of those shared contextual factors deriving from the context of immigration—a long-standing issue in migration scholarship—as well as those that stem from the context of emigration, which migration researchers have tended to neglect.

The following chapter drills down in greater detail, showing that second-generation schooling and occupational experiences reflect the influence of the migration process both as linked to shared, group-wide contexts of immigration and emigration and as connected to factors operating at the individual and household levels. Chapter 5 explores the sources of intragroup differences, systematically testing the hypotheses advanced in the literature discussed in chapter 2 as well as the perspective that we elaborate in chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 show that a consideration of contexts of emigration alters our understanding of second-generation socioeconomic attainment. Moreover, these two chapters demonstrate the value of a more disaggregated approach that opens up the black box of nationality so as to identify the specific characteristics shared among persons of common national background that are relevant to educational and occupational attainment.

The third part of the book, "Transformations," looks at the processes and impacts of boundary-crossing and boundary-straddling as well as the consequences of the time spent in that liminal social space between the boundaries of the territory and the citizenry. Chapter 6 examines the acquisition of citizenship, unraveling the features that lead some foreign-born immigrant offspring to cross the internal boundary of citizenship status

while making it impermeable to others. Chapter 7 then considers political participation, a particularly strategic research site, as it gives us leverage for understanding a question that is increasingly important as the noncitizen population grows: how can noncitizens engage in citizenship, if not necessarily in the same way as status citizens?

Whereas earlier chapters treated parental and familial cross-border connections as determinants of different outcomes, chapter 8 addresses ties to the parental country of origin as outcomes in their own right and tries to explain the factors accounting for the prevalence and persistence of cross-border connections in the second generation. Looking at ethnicity, chapter 9 examines how and with whom these immigrant offspring choose to affiliate, from whom they opt to differentiate themselves, and how these patterns are affected by their distinctive backgrounds. This chapter also considers language change, detailing the shifts in language competence and preference and accounting for the sources of language retention and loss.

We conclude with a final chapter reviewing the lessons learned as this book has progressed, drawing out implications for the next generation of research and for the new America unfolding before our eyes.

SOURCES

This book mainly draws on two exceptionally valuable, indeed unique, sources of data: the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) survey, conducted in 1998 and 1999, and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey, conducted in 2004. These two ventures were both funded by the Russell Sage Foundation (which has also supported the writing of this book and the research on which it is based), as part of the foundation's long-term investment in the data and intellectual resources needed to understand contemporary immigration and its consequences. As the outgrowth of a single ongoing effort, these two surveys overlap in significant ways: they sought to answer similar questions, and hence both queried respondents in similar, sometimes identical, ways. Moreover, they adopted similar methodologies, namely, telephone surveys of young adult immigrant offspring ages eighteen to thirty-two in the greater New York area and ages twenty to forty in the LA metropolitan area.

In design and choice of locale, these two surveys also illustrate the promise and perils of research on this topic. In 2004, when the IIMMLA was fielded, 13 percent of the adult civilian population had at least one foreign-born parent. Although that percentage translates into a huge population, from a research standpoint, the people in that population remain

relatively hard to find with an instrument like a survey. Making the highly improbable assumption that every person contacted would agree to an interview, one would have to call nearly eight thousand people in order to get a sample of just one thousand. Moreover, the geography of second-generation America makes the numbers still more unfavorable: while 13 percent of persons may be the offspring of an immigrant, that population is strongly concentrated in a handful of states, so generating a nationally representative sample of one thousand members of the second generation would require screening calls far beyond that eight-thousand-person threshold.

For these very practical reasons, the researchers responsible for these studies wisely decided to focus their efforts on the two metropolitan capitals of immigrant America, Los Angeles and New York, where the second-generation population has expanded to truly impressive numbers. Of course, that sensible choice also entailed a cost, namely, that the lessons learned from these surveys cannot be fully generalized to the national second-generation population. On the other hand, because a disproportionate share of that population resides in these two places and very sizable fractions live in similar large metropolitan areas, such as Miami, San Francisco, and Chicago, information gathered in Los Angeles and New York is likely to tell us much of what we need to know about today's emerging second generation.

Nonetheless, zooming in on New York and Los Angeles presents challenges if the goal is to capture the diversity of today's second generation. For instance, a representative survey of one thousand immigrant offspring living in Los Angeles would generate a nicely sized subsample of Mexican-origin respondents, but far too few persons of Korean, Chinese, or Filipino background for accurate subgroup analysis. And given the greater national-origin spread of New York's immigrant population, a representative survey of immigrant offspring would probably yield so much ethnic heterogeneity that subgroup analysis would be almost impossible. Consequently, both surveys engaged in quota sampling of second- and 1.5-generation groups. In total, the ISGMNY interviewed 3,415 young adults in New York City and its surrounding suburbs. The survey targeted second-generation Chinese, Dominicans, former Soviet Jews, West Indians, and Latin Americans from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, and it also included comparison groups of native-born blacks, Puerto Ricans, and non-Hispanic whites. The IIMMLA conducted 4,655 interviews in the Los Angeles metropolitan area—comprising Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties. Like the ISGMNY, the IIMMLA engaged in quota sampling, including Mexicans, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Koreans, Chinese, Central Americans from Guatemala and

El Salvador, and a catchall category of "all other" as well as three native-parentage comparison groups comprising third- and later-generation Mexican Americans, non-Hispanic whites, and blacks. The IIMMLA thus provides 3,309 respondents with at least one foreign-born parent, and the ISGMNY 2,430.

Though quota sampling is an imperative for the reasons noted, it has both virtues and vices. On the one hand, it generates national-origin sub-samples large enough for reliable analysis; on the other hand, the result is less heterogeneity in national origin than might have been yielded by a representative survey. Fortunately, both surveys generated a good deal of national-origin heterogeneity, and more than one might have expected based on the limited number of groups for which the survey researchers aimed. Most valuable has been the IIMMLA "all other" category for some immigrant offspring respondents. This target yielded over six hundred respondents with immediate or parental backgrounds from Canada, a variety of European countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France), and numerous Latin American countries (most notably, Costa Rica, Cuba, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Other such categorizations were less clearly of a miscellaneous nature but nonetheless involved targets more properly thought of as categories than as groups. In seeking to interview a certain quota of West Indians, for example, the New York researchers captured persons originating in a variety of different countries of origin (Jamaica, Trinidad, the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, and so on). Other respondents categorized alike in the sampling strategy were nonetheless diverse in their national origins: the Chinese respondents came from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, and the Soviet Jews originated in Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. Greater national-origin variance is of course a source of greater analytic leverage. And as we will explain in chapter 3, the capacity to make many fine-grained national-origin distinctions helps shed significant light on the ways in which contexts of emigration affect outcomes in the society of reception.

Both the IIMMLA and ISGMNY are cross-sectional surveys that provide a snapshot of this population at one point in time. As survey researchers know, the liability of the cross-sectional approach lies in the difficulties it poses to the drawing of causal inferences. For example, in this field we are often interested in the relationship between some behavior that is thought of as "ethnic"—such as retaining fluency in the tongue of one's own or one's parent's country of origin—and some other outcome, such as obtaining U.S. citizenship. But with cross-sectional data, it is hard to determine whether it was the preference for maintaining mother-tongue fluency that led someone to refrain from obtaining U.S. citizenship, or whether concern about the symbolic importance of citizenship acquisition led that person

to make the effort to retain mother-tongue fluency. Thus, with information of this sort, the best we can say is that there is an association between language and citizenship (at this point, an utterly unfounded hypothesis), but not that one causes the other.

We have looked to chronology to gain leverage on causality: that a preceded b does not mean that a caused b, but it certainly precludes the possibility that causality could have gone the other way around. When some of the chronologically prior events of interest to us were not precipitated by the people whom we are analyzing but by someone else, we rule out reverse causality. As we examine, for example, the influence of place of birth—whether in the United States or abroad—we recognize that the relevant decision was made by parents, not children; hence, we need not worry that a child's preference for being born in the United States or elsewhere influenced some later outcome. Since the large majority of the foreign-born persons found in these surveys arrived in the United States at a very young age (75 percent arrived by age ten), we can also preclude the possibility that their preference for life in the United States might have provided the motivation for their migration. In the analyses to follow, we are particularly interested in the influences transmitted from parents to children, whether related to the parents' immigration experiences and statuses, aspects of their socioeconomic characteristics, or the household practices to which our respondents were exposed as children. Given this concern, we have tended to rely more on the IIMMLA than the ISGMNY, as the former provides greater in-depth information on events occurring prior to adulthood as well as parental attributes of importance. Moreover, the IIMMLA collected particularly detailed information on both parents' and, for the foreign-born members of the sample, respondents' legal status at the time of entry into the United States as well as at the time of the survey. With this information in hand, we can then begin to understand how the distinctively political nature of international migration influences second-generation trajectories, which is another reason why the chapters to follow make special use of the IIMMLA.

We are greatly indebted to the social scientists who designed and implemented these pathbreaking surveys: Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, and Mary Waters, who fielded the ISGMNY; and Rubén Rumbaut, Frank Bean, Leo Chavez, Jennifer Lee, Susan Brown, Louis DeSipio, and Min Zhou, who were responsible for the IIMMLA. Compounding our debt to these scholars has been our reliance on the issues that they deemed important and the questions that they decided to ask, which, by and large, have proved exceptionally wise, as we believe readers will come to agree as they read the pages to follow.

Chapter 3 | The International Perspective

THIS BOOK PRESENTS an expanded model of the approaches reviewed in the previous chapters, seeking to incorporate the strengths of those approaches while addressing their weaknesses. Our model centers on four understudied concepts: two at the first level of intragroup difference, and two at the second level of intergroup difference. We include both sending-country characteristics (the context of emigration) and group-level legal status prevalence as second-level predictors of second-generation outcomes and as potential confounders and moderators in observed relationships that unfold within the receiving country. Then we predict intragroup variation in cross-border ties in the second generation that not only are outcomes of interest in their own right but may explain intragroup differences in status attainment and in political and social outcomes. Finally, we acknowledge the influence of first-level variation in both parental and own legal status and citizenship on second-generation outcomes.

When modeling the impact of these variables on outcomes of interest, we rely on temporal ordering to better capture causal effects. Having been socialized in the country of origin, parents depart home, leaving part of the kin network behind. They then learn to make their way in a new environment, forming families and raising children who subsequently progress through school and later begin independent lives, creating new families and embarking on careers of their own. Each prior event in the chain affects the next, though in highly contingent, indeterminate ways. Parental education, the context of emigration, and the reception context at the point of parental entry affect the resources available to immigrant children and the experiences they undergo in the households in which they are raised. These at-entry conditions retain their influence over subsequent developments, but in more distal ways, with more proximate effects exercised by the circumstances confronted by children in their parents' household as

49

they grow into maturity. Some conditions are shared by immigrant parents of a common origin—the prevailing culture of the society of origin, the home country's polity, the warmth (or chill) of the receiving-society welcome, and the overall selectivity of the migration.

Alongside the shared at-entry conditions producing *intergroup* differences, however, are those that create family-level variation *within* groups—most importantly, parents' socioeconomic level and legal status and their connections to kin, both those in the new home and those in the old one. At the group level, the contextual characteristics facing immigrants either constrain or enable the trajectories of their children; similarly, entry into the United States initiates a process of status attainment for immigrant parents that shapes the trajectories of both their children and the children of U.S. natives in similar, though not identical, ways. These parameters of constraint nonetheless leave considerable room for individual agency and choice. In particular, parent and child life course decisions related to maintaining or severing ethnic ties—such as whether to retain or abandon the home-country language, or whether to seek a coethnic spouse or cross ethnic lines—furnish a further source of *intragroup* differences in social boundaries, possibly moderating the impact of at-entry conditions on intergroup disparities.

The international perspective we introduce here is both expansive and comprehensive; however, advancing such a broad conceptual framework poses the added challenge of operationalization in the analysis stage. Proponents of the prevailing approaches—whether neo-assimilation or segmented assimilation—have relied on nationality as an indicator for developing between-group comparisons. Yet nationality is a name, not a variable. To be sure, nationality may be deployed as if it were a variable, but in that case the distinctions made between one nationality and another are purely nominal, as nationality itself offers no basis for ranking. That deficiency might matter less for a two-group comparison, especially if the nationalities differ significantly on either some pre-migration or postmigration attribute. Yet, since nationality inherently conflates aspects related to *emigration* and *immigration,* such carefully controlled comparisons are the exception, not the rule. The problem is only exacerbated when the migrations become more diverse, not only in terms of a growing number of source countries but also with respect to the increasingly differing circumstances under which migrants enter the country. Consequently, we offer a different approach, one that uses variables instead of names and that disaggregates the theoretically relevant, different features of nationality.

In the remainder of this chapter, we elaborate on the key variables that initiate and then propel the process outlined in the previous paragraphs,

focusing on the core elements of the international perspective that we advance to explain second-generation outcomes: the context of emigration, legal status, and cross-border ties. These elements constitute the main contributions of this book. Rather than provide a new theory of assimilation or integration, we show that consideration of the specifically international aspects of population movements across boundaries yields effects not just before and during but also *after* migration. We explicitly model influences stemming from both the source and destination countries, as well as the ties between them, to shed new light on the experience of the children of immigrants and on the trajectories they follow.

CONTEXTS OF EMIGRATION

Prevailing approaches, as we saw in the previous chapter, take migrants' arrival in the country of destination as the point of analytic departure. Yet the adult immigrants who were the parents of the children we study did not arrive in the United States as blank slates, indistinguishable except for their context of reception. Rather, they came from specific places, with specific cultural, political, and economic conditions. No one can be thought of as a perfect representative of the norms and values of their country of origin.[1] All immigrants, however, will have been socialized in a context that was not of their choosing, and thus we can conceptualize the characteristics of the country of origin—the context of *emigration*—as an exogenous influence on the lives of immigrants. Although this influence may vary in its strength, it is a rare person who can completely escape the forces of socialization in her country of birth. In much the same manner, children do not choose their parents, and thus children's socialization is heavily influenced by the behavior and expectations of their parents, who themselves grew up and were socialized in an environment very different from that encountered by their children. To some extent, parents are likely to impart the same lessons they learned as youngsters, without necessarily knowing how well the lessons they absorbed in the origin country are likely to apply to the world in which their children will mature. Consequently, we expect associations between origin-country conditions and second-generation outcomes for two main reasons.

First, the largest benefits to migration accrue to those leaving poor countries in order to capture the higher wages, greater safety, and superior amenities to be found in rich ones. Thus, the socioeconomic differences between countries that send the most immigrants and the countries that generally receive them tend to be large. In moving from the developing to the developed world, migrant parents arrive with models of behavior and interpersonal relations that fit conditions at the point of departure,

but that may be at variance with the models prevailing in the place where they settle, and which their children rapidly absorb. Even though we know that immigrants from more socially traditional countries, such as Poland, tend to be more liberal in their values and orientations than the average nonmigrant, they generally are far less liberal on issues such as homosexual rights or gender equality than the average receiving-country native in wealthier western Europe.[2]

Given potentially large differences between conditions in sending and receiving countries, it is unlikely that the parenting and home environments of the children of immigrants of different origins and the native-born can realistically be assumed to be similar. To be sure, not all foreign-born parents will maintain mind-sets that are equally foreign: those with more education, greater dominant-language capacity, and higher incomes are likely to have had more exposure to their native-born counterparts and therefore to be somewhat more similar to them. By contrast, the imprint of the home-society culture is likely to linger longer and to be transmitted with greater force by those immigrants who, for reasons of skill, language, or legal status, live and work in ethnically encapsulated worlds. It may also be the case that the cultural norms of the context of emigration are actually beneficial—a hypothesis central to both *Inheriting the City* and *The Asian American Achievement Paradox*. Moreover, parenting generally begins relatively early in an immigrant's sojourn; typically immigrant children are being raised at a time when the receiving society still seems strange to their family and the imprint of the home society remains powerful. And of course, socialization for many of the foreign-born immigrant offspring studied in this book began outside U.S. boundaries and hence before U.S. tastes and models of behavior had begun to influence their parents.

The second reason why we expect to find associations between origin-country conditions and second-generation outcomes is that national histories affect the origin-country orientations that migrants may take with them. Though countries may currently share similar levels of economic development, history yields substantial cultural differences related to earlier influences, whether distal or relatively proximate, or whether based in prior religious traditions or political regimes. For instance, eastern European and East Asian countries with Communist histories were secularized much more rapidly than other sending countries, and one result is that immigrants from these countries tend to be less traditional than the average U.S. citizen, as reflected in lower rates of religiosity, higher rates of female labor force participation, and higher academic performance after adjustments for economic standing.[3] On the other hand, immigrant-sending countries with Catholic backgrounds, such as those in Latin America, and highly observant Muslim societies in Africa and the Middle East display stronger gender

differences and greater adherence to traditional patriarchal structures than might be expected from their economic standing alone. Similarly, experiences with democracy and transparent governance only imperfectly vary with economic well-being. Once again, many of the former satellite nations of eastern Europe stand out for their histories of repression and foreign control, with lasting impacts on levels of trust and political participation.[4] By contrast, many immigrants from Central America, whether official refugees or not, fled countries characterized by civil unrest, high levels of political repression, and corrupt, unrepresentative regimes, and hence they are also likely to bring different experiences of political participation and attitudes toward official authorities.

Acknowledging the likelihood of such heterogeneity, popular culture and political discourse commonly link sending-country orientations and values to different outcomes among the children of immigrants within the receiving country. The attribution of the higher attainments of Asian Americans to "superior" cultural traits is perhaps the most common example, as evidenced in the writings of popular and controversial authors such as Amy Chua.[5] More insidious and less open, but perhaps just as influential, is the reverse attribution, as when poorer outcomes — for instance, those among Mexican Americans — are linked to cultural deficiencies. Mainstream social scientists have reacted skeptically, correctly viewing this popular discourse surrounding immigrant culture and second-generation outcomes as rooted in political agendas. Yet, as we saw in chapter 2, scholarship on the second generation repeatedly, though usually implicitly, invokes the importance and influence of the context of emigration in explaining mobility patterns that deviate from the general norm. Rarely, however, does the scholarship identify the explicit characteristics of sending countries that are likely to explain differences across different origin groups.

Hence, the task before us is to develop a wider account of origin contexts, one that can travel across myriad source and destination countries and that can explain how disparities in origin characteristics systematically yield differences among members of the second generation. Such a systematic account of origin effects on second-generation outcomes requires standardized information on a large number of sending countries that displays the necessary variation in sending-country characteristics anticipated to affect second-generation outcomes. Prior research has often been unable to identify a sufficiently large number of source countries and the necessary variation; even when the appropriate data are available, deciding which measures to use in order to capture the impact of sending-country cultural background is difficult. Scholars have used indicators ranging from the level of globalization to the religious background of the origin country, to

the degree of democratic expression as shown by indices such as the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of Political Stability and Absence of Violence.[6] Of course, some characteristics of the sending country—for instance, its political stability—should be more likely to influence political participation or naturalization, whereas other indicators—such as mean level of education—should be more closely linked to the academic performance of the second generation.[7] Ideally, we would wish for a parsimonious yet comprehensive measure of sending-country culture that would exert an impact across a variety of domains.

In this book, we conceive of origin-country variations in culture as origin-country variations in *values*. Cultural values can be loosely defined as identifying those objects, conditions, or characteristics that members of a society consider important, or valuable. We expect the strong heterogeneity in the economic standing and religious and political traditions of the many sending countries to the United States to result in important differences in the values that immigrants bring with them and later impart to their children. For instance, immigrants to the United States tend to come from countries where physical well-being is less taken for granted, and hence objects, conditions, and characteristics that ensure survival are expected to be more strongly valued among these immigrants. Economic scarcity promotes a value system that privileges internal solidarity and discourages autonomy and self-expression.[8] Where the household remains a unit of production, as in rural communities, individual existence outside the household is tenuous; the household's survival itself requires respect for parents, loyalty to the family, and responsiveness to its needs. In developing countries, even those living in urban areas exhibit family patterns rooted in agrarian structures, since parents and children may still work alongside one another in small units of production. Thus, immigrants from more survival-oriented societies are likely to model stronger familial interdependence and reciprocity than the average U.S. parent. The outcomes are potentially advantageous, as when children study hard and excel at schooling as part of an "immigrant bargain" with their parents.[9] They could also be disadvantageous, however, as when parents' expectations of financial support from children detract from the time the children can invest in education, or when parents pull children out from schooling altogether.

Similarly, the children of immigrants from countries that place more—or less—value on religion and other forms of traditional authority may experience a different form of socialization than U.S. natives, with lasting effects on their social, political, and economic outcomes. The United States is somewhat of a religious outlier among highly developed countries in that, unlike more secular European receiving societies, immigrant religiosity has traditionally served as a "bridging" mechanism to the mainstream.[10]

This may not be the case, however, with other traditional values: with its early expansion of mandatory primary and secondary schooling alongside intense investment in higher education and, most recently, its fervor for technological change, the United States has shifted away from traditional forms of respect for the elderly and long-established authorities. Consequently, the children of immigrants from more traditional cultures may experience greater emotional difference from their parents and frequently clash with them, with repercussions for the transmission of ethnic attachments as well as for socioeconomic achievements.[11]

In short, we anticipate that immigrants will bring with them more than just a set of unique toolkits specific to a single outcome such as educational attainment; rather, we conceptualize the broader context of emigration as a key source of differences in the values that orient the lives of immigrant parents and therefore as an influence that shapes the lives of their U.S.-raised children, across a wide variety of domains. To provide a framework for conceptualizing such differences in cultural values, we draw on two measures from the World Values Survey (WVS), a massive data-gathering effort of harmonized measures of cultural indicators from around the world. In particular, we rely on the most influential discovery deriving from decades of research with the WVS: the existence of a high degree of correlation in a wide range of values and orientations at the country level. As it turns out, a large portion of the world's variation in values across a variety of dimensions (see the appendix for demonstrations) can be mapped across only two dimensions, which can be concisely described as orientations toward self-expression and free thought, on the one hand, and toward rational and secular values, on the other. These two underlying value dimensions are captured by two scales derived by Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators from the World Values Survey and widely used as summary measures of both individual-level and macro-level value orientations.

The scale measuring orientations toward the traditional versus the secular-rational reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. Strongly linked to this dimension are a range of values associated with deference to authority—whether that of God, the government, or the father—the importance of child-parent ties, and standards based in traditional family values. Traditional societies value religion and authority, and they condemn euthanasia, divorce, and abortion; secular-rational societies take the opposite view.

The second scale measures a country's location on the continuum between survival and self-expression values. This second major dimension is linked to the transition from industrial to postindustrial societies and includes items on democratic self-expression (for example, signing a

petition) and the level of priority given to economic and physical safety relative to self-expression and quality of life. Self-expression-valuing societies include developed countries where there is less familial interdependence and emphasis is given to individual choice, autonomy, attention to the environment, and increased tolerance for diversity.

Together, these two dimensions explain 71 percent of the variation in the ten variables used by Inglehart and his collaborators to construct them (see appendix) and are highly correlated with a variety of other values, making them ideal summary measures. The country-level variation in these two scales is summarized in Inglehart and Welzel's global "Cultural Map," which displays ninety-seven countries in two-dimensional space, the x axis representing the movement of societies from more traditional toward more rational and the y axis movement from more survival-oriented toward more self-expressive.[12] Figure 3.1 reproduces that map, with points for all of the countries represented in Inglehart and Welzel's work; the major U.S.-sending countries present in our data are drawn as circles scaled according to the number of respondents in our data. Circles without shading are countries where data from the WVS are not available and we rely on multiple imputation (for more information on the imputation process, see the appendix).

As displayed in figure 3.1, self-expression tends to rise with secular-rationalism, largely because both orientations are driven by economic development. However, for a variety of historical reasons, most societies fall at some distance off the diagonal, as exemplified by both the United States and many of the most prominent immigrant-sending countries. In the United States, economic development has generated a relatively strong (though by no means the strongest) predisposition toward self-expression, yet a much lower level of secularism than that experienced in most other countries of the developed world, which are clustered in the upper right-hand quadrant. Indeed, the United States is a "deviant case, having a much more traditional value system than any other postindustrial society except Ireland."[13] This "exceptionalism" has been noted by other political scientists and sociologists, who observe that the United States is characterized by a greater level of political conservatism that emphasizes a minimal state and voluntary rather than state organization, coupled with weak working-class organization and strong approval for laissez-faire capitalism.[14] The persistence of religious beliefs and traditional attitudes toward inequality in the United States aligns it with many Latin American countries on the traditional versus secular-rational scale, even as it falls along the same lines as many western European countries in values toward self-expression.

Historically specific factors have similarly produced great variance among the societies of *emigration:* both Confucianism and communism

These summary scales provide a parsimonious measure of sending-country values and cultural orientations, which are continuous, quantifiable, and substantiated through decades of research. They also offer insights not immediately apparent from readings of the traditional "Asian advantage" or "Latino disadvantage" literatures. For instance, Anthony Ocampo argues that Filipinos can be understood as the "Latinos" of Asia, as they tend to show patterns of acculturation, social assimilation, and socioeconomic outcomes more similar to those of Latinos than of other Asian Americans.[15] When we examine the map in figure 3.1, we can see that the Philippines falls squarely within the cluster of Latin American countries in terms of its self-expression and secular orientations, and thus at the opposite end of the value space occupied by the majority of other Asian sending countries. Similarly, we see a strong variation in the value space of European immigrant-origin groups, with those from former Soviet-controlled states more strongly clustered among Asian countries and those (relatively few) from western Europe occupying the upper right quadrant, comprising the only countries with levels of self-expression similar to (or greater than) those prevailing in the United States.

As already mentioned, we know that migration is selective, across value dimensions as well as demographic and socioeconomic dimensions: the value orientations of those people who opt to emigrate may differ from the orientations of those who choose to stay. On the other hand, the differences between countries, as shown in figure 3.1 (and discussed at greater length in the appendix), are indeed very large; similarly, the within-country differences—for example, by education—are typically a good deal smaller than the between-country disparities.

We anticipate that this variation in value orientations in the countries of socialization of immigrant parents will influence a range of outcomes, especially, but not only, educational attainment. Greater orientations toward secularism and rationalism are strongly associated with the average level of educational attainment of a sending society, with more educated societies espousing more secular values. In figure 3.2, we plot the relationship between the score on the traditional versus secular-rational scale and the score on the survival versus self-expression scale against the average years of educational attainment for each of the immigrant-origin countries in our sample.[16] As the figure shows, the relationship between secular-rational values and the average level of education for the countries present in our surveys is very strong—and weaker, but still present, for survival versus self-expression values.

Moreover, this value domain still more strongly links specifically to "scholarly culture," as measured by the number of books in the parental household. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that the number of books

Figure 3.2   Relationship Between Value Orientation Scales and Number of Books in Household, Average Years of Education, and Polity III Scores

in the parental household is independently associated with educational attainment, even controlling for parental education levels: this relationship consistently holds across countries at different levels of economic development, across time, and also across children of different backgrounds.[17] Higher average levels of educational attainment and scholarly culture at the sending-society level, moreover, are independently associated with second-generation educational outcomes, even after individual-level controls.[18] Hence, we anticipate that the traditional versus secular-rational scale will be associated with socioeconomic outcomes in the second generation. Particularly given the fact that secular-rational values are stronger among the more highly educated *within* the United States (as well as in other countries), we anticipate that higher socioeconomic achievement will be associated with origins in more secular societies as opposed to those more oriented toward tradition.[19]

Although a stronger orientation toward secular-rational values may promote educational attainment, these values may not actually predict *convergence* with the values prevailing among the "mainstream" in the United States. On the one hand, immigrants from societies that are more secular-oriented may prove more supportive of educational achievement for their children. On the other hand, their lower adherence to traditional values may permanently distance them from the mainstream in their political alignments, in their feelings of being at home in the United States, or in their ability to form friendships and partnerships with U.S. natives. As shown in the WVS data, while espousing self-expressive values, the United States is much less secular and more traditional in value orientation than many of the immigrant-sending countries. Friendship and partnership formation are predicated on homophily — preferences for shared understandings and values. If the children of immigrants from more secular countries find themselves surrounded by U.S. natives espousing more traditional beliefs, the expected positive association between structural and social assimilation may not materialize.

While immigrant-sending countries may lie on both the more traditional and the more secular-rational ends of the spectrum, the survival versus self-expression dimension more clearly defines the axis of variation separating countries of emigration from countries of immigration. The largest benefits to migration accrue to those migrating from poorer to richer countries, and thus most immigrants to the United States come from countries that are materially less secure and frequently offer fewer political liberties. Many of the Latin American and Asian sending countries populating the left-hand side of figure 3.1 have had recent experience with authoritarian governments and civil unrest. This negative correlation between democracy and state functioning and survival orientations can be seen in figure 3.2,

which plots the traditional versus secular-rational and survival versus self-expression scale orientations of the countries in our sample against their Polity scores—a measure of regime authority on a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). As the figure shows, there is no relationship between traditional orientations and political regime. However, the figure clearly displays the expected positive relationship between open and democratic political institutions and self-expression, as well as a movement away from survival orientations as political systems become more transparent and fair. Many countries of emigration are characterized by an absence of political expression and low levels of material well-being; such conditions encourage strong orientations toward kin and local collectivities in order to ensure survival.

Conditions in the developed societies of immigration, by contrast, breed a propensity for self-expression. In a sense, the gap between survival and self-expression orientations sums up the difference between immigrant parents and immigrant children: the former were raised in societies emphasizing interdependence, whereas the latter grow up in a society promoting individualism. In the survival-oriented societies often found in the developing world, the household is a unit of production in which parents supervise children whose work role comes to reproduce that of an earlier generation; by design, the household in self-expression societies is instead a short-term way-station. States in the developed world prohibit child labor, mandate secondary schooling, and make postsecondary schooling increasingly normative. In so doing, developed states effectively discourage children from contributing to the household economy, all the while providing them with the competencies that will free them from dependence on their parents, namely, those derived from formal education—which, in turn, facilitates the geographic mobility that further weakens family ties.

A survival background may therefore be at odds with the expectations of the society that immigrants and their children encounter, one in which everything around them—schools, media, peers—encourages individualism and self-expression, orientations facilitated by the easy availability of consumer goods, even to the most modest. On the one hand, this mismatch may prove protective. Some forms of autonomy, such as those emphasized in schools, may foster independence in ways that converge with parents' goals, whereas others, such as those sometimes found in the street, encourage detachment in ways that conflict with parental objectives. Since the challenge is to encourage children to achieve independence without breaking ties to parents and kin, a parental strategy of combining education and *educación*—that is to say, formal schooling and skill acquisition *in tandem with* a moral orientation emphasizing greater respect for parents and familial unity—may prove protective.[20] Similarly, the traits

emphasized by Lee and Zhou in their account of the Asian Academic achievement paradox—most notably, children's adherence to the "success frame" cultivated by their Chinese and Vietnamese parents—can be read as testimony to the survival orientation that these parents imported with them at the time of migration.[21] On the other hand, a survival orientation might hold back second-generation progress. For instance, expectations for material support from children may encourage work early in adolescence or discourage moves to pursue opportunities further afield; these expectations, in turn, may restrict the high school options of the children of more survival-oriented immigrants to poorer-quality schools close to immigrant neighborhoods or later discourage their pursuit of higher education at top-tier universities in distant states. Nevertheless, although origins in survival-oriented societies can cut both ways, overall we anticipate that such origins will be an asset, reinforcing cohesion among immigrant families vulnerable to the strains resulting from both material difficulties and the orientation toward self-expression that prevails around them.

CONTEXTS OF IMMIGRATION

The contexts of emigration represent one salient axis of intergroup variation; no less important are the contexts of immigration encountered upon arrival. These shared, population-wide conditions take three forms: the migration-status disparities produced by policies of migration control; the resources that migrants can find among their coethnics (conceptualized in this book as "ethnic capital"); and migrants' susceptibility to discrimination by the majority (which we conceptualize as "skin-color stratification"). However, as these latter two axes of variation can be experienced by any population, whether migrant or not, they fall outside the distinctively international influences lying at the heart of the perspective we advance. Hence, we return to the conceptualization and operationalization of ethnic capital and skin-color stratification in the next chapter.

In contrast, population-wide migration-status disparities arise from the main feature distinguishing internal from international migrations: the controls regulating both the flows across state boundaries and the rights of migrants after crossing into the territory of the receiving state. Since migration policies are questions of state, they are shaped by the interests of the country of immigration and its relationship to the state of emigration, with the result that some groups arrive under systematically more favorable conditions than others. Although these policies reflect the interplay of domestic interests—whether seeking enlarged migration or preferring greater restriction—they are inherently international in nature, which is why the ramifications for relationships to particular states yield profound

influences on policy. Prior colonial relationships and military engage-
ments recurrently create the conditions for facilitated legal entry, yet stra-
tegic interests can close doors as well as open them, depending on whether
the regime in the source country is friend or foe. U.S. migration policy can
also aim for the "soft power" that comes from training a country's elites,
leading to the targeted development of international student recruitment.
Finally, gates prove easier to open in times of peace than in periods of ten-
sion, which explains why international conflict leads to tightened scrutiny,
with security concerns far more focused on some origins than others.[22]

Yet at the same time that migration policy can be wielded to further
political or economic advantage, U.S. political actors are constrained by
global forces that lie outside their control. Migration policies are embed-
ded within a broader control structure that seeks to accommodate the far
larger and ever-growing people flows produced by globalization. These
movements involve the crossing of borders of tourists, intracompany trans-
ferees, students, and temporary workers, all of whom mainly arrive for
sojourns of very limited duration, though sometimes they end up settling
for good. Because these flows are generated by the ever-tighter economic
links among states, they cannot be stopped—they can only be managed
and regulated.[23] But the capacity for relatively unrestricted temporary
entry varies across the globe: the residents of the world's richer countries,
who are perceived as unlikely to settle elsewhere without authorization,
gain access with little fuss, whereas those traveling from poorer places
need visas, which are allocated only to those whom authorities deem likely
to return home as planned.[24]

Consequently, country-specific flows vary in the prevalence of legal sta-
tuses, with consequences for conationals, regardless of the circumstances
of their own entry. Although persons fleeing political persecution may
all leave their home countries for the same reason, not all are admitted
as refugees, since recognizing the political roots of their flight would
embarrass the home country regime—a welcome outcome when the
regime is unfriendly, but unwelcome when it is friendly. Consequently,
the Vietnamese, Cubans, and former Soviet nationals arriving in the
United States in search of safe haven received material and organizational
assistance in getting started, while also enjoying the fruits of legal res-
idence. Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing civil wars, by contrast,
found their ability to get started and then to make subsequent progress
impeded because the safe haven they sought was available only at the price
of unauthorized presence.[25] Not only does policy produce intergroup dif-
ferences at the very outset—altering population-wide standing and the
availability of resources—but it leads those differences to cumulate. Thus,
authorized immigrants work legally, whereas unauthorized immigrants

are more likely to work "off the books"; the former are put on a path to full citizenship status right from the beginning, whereas the latter suffer long-term confinement to unauthorized status; authorized immigrants, especially after crossing the internal border of citizenship, can benefit from legal opportunities for family reunification, whereas the unauthorized can help bring relatives across the border only by hiring smugglers. For all these reasons, population-wide gaps in the rewards generated by country-specific differences in the distribution of statuses are likely to grow. And though a more-advantaged immigrant stream almost always includes some unauthorized residents and authorized residents will be found in the midst of streams primarily comprising the unauthorized, the impacts of the median status are likely to filter down to the individual level, expanding access to resources in one case and diminishing them in the other.

For illustrations of migration-control disparities and the uneven distribution of legal statuses across national-origin groups, consider the following examples from the 1980s, a decisive decade for the great majority of the immigrant-origin Angelenos and New Yorkers we study in this book, as those years provided the temporal frame for their childhood and/or adolescence. For undocumented immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s, enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) changed their status from unauthorized to legal, allowing for quick family reunification and putting citizenship within reach. Nevertheless, earlier differences in the prevalence of undocumented immigration led to greater impacts of legalization on some groups compared to others. For example, the Salvadorans who obtained legal status under IRCA's regular legalization provisions comprised 30 percent of all Salvadorans living in the United States in 1990; Mexicans and Guatemalans regularizing under the same program comprised, respectively, 29 and 23 percent of all those in their immigrant group living in the United States as of 1990, having migrated during the same period. By contrast, Chinese, Indians, and Koreans regularizing under IRCA comprised 1.6, 0.8, and 0.3 percent, respectively, of those in their immigrant group living in the United States as of 1990. Likewise, the 1980 Refugee Act, marking the official advent of U.S. refugee policy, was designed in such a way as to depoliticize the criteria used to determine eligibility for refugee status. Yet, compared to the prevalence of unauthorized status, the prevalence of refugee status varied even more widely. Thus, almost all Laotians and Cambodians who arrived in the United States during the 1980s (97 percent each) came as refugees, as did 80 percent of the Russians (ex-Soviets) and 62 percent of the Cubans. By contrast, though Nicaraguans and Salvadorans also fled violence and persecution, only 12 percent of Nicaraguans and not quite 1 percent of Salvadorans arriving in the United States during the same period were admitted as

refugees. Moreover, not a single Mexican immigrant was granted refugee status during this period.

In light of these differences in status prevalence, we therefore operationalize migration-status disparities as the percentage of immigrants who fall under these two polarized statuses: the percentage undocumented as proxied by IRCA regularizations, and the percentage of new arrivals with refugee status during the formative years of the second generation's childhoods in the 1980s. Whereas individual legal status is likely to matter across all populations, group-level impacts reflect the wide national-origin variation in legal status prevalence. In particular, we hypothesize that negative impacts can be expected where undocumented immigration is widespread, as its stigma may attach, at least in part, to all group members, whether unauthorized or not. Insofar as that stigma impedes individual social mobility, it may also yield a cumulative impact, attenuating individuals' capacity to mobilize resources through ethnic social networks, whether the resources are those relevant to searching for jobs, sharing a business context, or participating in community institutions. By reinforcing exclusion from the polity, widespread undocumented status can also diminish the salience of politics in social circles, increasing overall political detachment and reducing the circulation of political information among ethnic networks that comprise both citizens and undocumented immigrants.

By contrast, refugee policy both facilitates the entry of selected groups fleeing persecution and assists their subsequent integration. Not only do refugees arrive with permanent legal residence, which gives them access to many benefits from the day of arrival, but they benefit from a variety of programs designed to facilitate their adjustment, including occupational training, English-language instruction, and support for community organizations. Of course, the *pre*-migration experience may have been traumatic, especially for refugees from war zones, such as those in Southeast Asia, Iraq, or Somalia, though probably less so for those coming from stable, if repressive, societies like Cuba and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the initial refugee wave is particularly vulnerable; those first refugees often arrive without a base of coethnics to provide help and orientation. By contrast, the later arrivals benefit both from their own refugee status and from the advantages that this same status generated for the earlier group of newcomers. Furthermore, whereas standard modes of entry—whether as legal "non-immigrants" (tourists, students, businesspeople), legal permanent residents, or unauthorized immigrants—result from individual migrants' decisions, the decision to resettle refugees is made by the state that accepts these immigrants. Thus, among refugee groups, legal status is determined *prior* to migration and is typically applied to entire populations.

Table 3.1   The Status Prevalence Scale

Status Prevalence Scale	Percentage Legalized Under IRCA	Percentage Refugee
1 (most negative)	20% or more	None
2	1–20%	Less than 1%
3	1–20%	1–20%
4	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
5	Less than 1%	1–20%
6 (most positive)	None	20% or more

Source: IIMMLA and ISGMNY data sets; United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1980–1989.

To reflect both the facilitative and constraining aspects of disparities in migration status, we constructed a "status prevalence scale," which relies on secondary data on the society-wide prevalence of different legal statuses at the time of respondents' childhoods. Because the respondents sampled by ISGMNY and IIMMLA were born between 1964 and 1984 to parents who immigrated to the United States after 1964, the measurement of governmental reception needs to be temporally relevant, that is, likely to have been in place not only at an early period in the respondents' lives but also prior to the survey. The scale of status prevalence derives from two indicators: (1) the number of persons from any given country legalized under the regular amnesty program of 1986 as a fraction of the total U.S. population from that country in 1990; and (2) the number of persons admitted as refugees from a country between 1980 and 1989 as a fraction of all persons admitted to the United States from that country during the same period. We compute these proportions using data from the statistical yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the 1990 census.

We then distinguish six levels of prevalence. Level 1, the most negative, includes immigrant nationalities with a large proportion of undocumented individuals, for which the number of persons legalized in the 1986 amnesty programs was equal to or greater than 20 percent of the nationality's 1990 population and for which *no* persons were admitted as refugees during the 1980s. At the other extreme, level 6 includes nationalities with a large refugee component, for which the number of persons admitted as refugees during the 1980s was equal to or greater than 20 percent of the nationality's 1990 population and for which *no* persons were legalized in the 1986 program. For definitions of all levels, see table 3.1.

CROSS-BORDER TIES

In bringing the origin country into view, the international perspective adopted in this book highlights the existence of social ties that span the boundary between the sending and receiving countries. By opting for life in another country, migrants pull one society onto the territory of another state, unintentionally and unconsciously making "here," the society of destination, overlap with "there," the society of origin. This zone of intersocietal convergence—labeled the "transnational social field" by the scholars of transnationalism—arises from the migrants' own survival strategy. The newcomers turn to one another for help in solving the everyday problems of migration: how to move from the old home to the new one; how to find a job and settle down; how to pick up the skills needed to manage in their new world. Consequently, as already described, migrants extend and embed their networks across borders, creating a new community where familiar faces, tongues, and institutions reproduce the world left behind.

Yet intersocietal convergence also results from the inherent selectivity of migration. Not everyone who might want to leave can depart; nor does everyone who can leave home wish to do so. Consequently, migrations rearrange households, making them extend across space. "An unwanted and unavoidable by-product of the entire process of international migration," geographic separation often marks the relationship between immigrants and their elderly parents or extended families; given improvements in infant mortality and child welfare in many sending countries, contemporary immigrants are also now more likely to leave behind their children than did their predecessors of the last great era of migration.[26] Reunification with children often occurs when the earnings capacity of the migrating parent or couple improves, although some children left behind are separated from their parents for the entirety of their childhood. Thus, new permutations have been added to the classic pattern of young men departing, leaving wives and children behind. In some cases both parents leave together, in others emigration is more likely to involve mothers than fathers, and in still others migration may divide both couples and children. But couples then reunify more frequently than do children with their family, and sometimes one parent even returns home after the children have moved to the destination country.[27]

Familial separation also reflects the workings of the controls that exclude the many who would benefit from migration, since those who can find a way through or around systems of migration control depart first, leaving other family members with little choice but to stay behind and wait for the protracted and uncertain process of family reunification to unfold. To be

sure, immigration laws do offer opportunities for later migration by kin left back home, but the very same laws facilitating family reunification also separate families. In the United States, those contrasting consequences derive from the ways in which policy discriminates in favor of citizens and against those with less-favored status: citizens have numerous legal avenues for family reunification, while permanent residents have far fewer options and the undocumented none at all.[28]

In separating households, migrations motivate both migrants and stay-at-homes to find ways of maintaining social bonds and fulfilling familial obligations across space. Consequently, the foreign-born often live social lives that span borders, sending money back home, communicating with friends and relatives who have remained behind, and traveling to their communities of origin when legal status and funds allow. International migration thus entails internationalized families, with the upshot that many second-generation members grow up in a thick web of cross-border ties. Some of those ties, such as letters and phone calls, can be maintained at relatively low cost; others—making long visits to the parental homeland, for instance, or intentionally maintaining foreign-language capacity in the parental home—may require a significant investment of family time and resources. Since these ties are present from early childhood—if not actually in place at the time immigrant offspring are born—they can act as an independent variable, shaping the lives of immigrant children both when they reside with their parents and after they leave the parental home.

We conceptualize cross-border ties as entailing two separate areas of inquiry: first, the cross-border ties of immigrant *parents* acting as an *independent* variable that influences a broad range of second-generation social and economic outcomes; and second, the cross-border ties of immigrant *offspring* functioning as a *dependent* variable relevant to debates surrounding the intergenerational transmission of transnationalism as well as its relationship to other domains of integration, such as ethnic attachment, education and labor market outcomes, and political participation.

We attempt to isolate parental behaviors and characteristics during second-generation respondents' childhood and adolescence from the cross-border connections they maintained at the time of the survey. Although both of the surveys contain relevant information on cross-border ties (see table 3.2), the IIMMLA more clearly differentiates those in childhood from those in adulthood; hence, our analyses of cross-border ties principally rely on the IIMMLA. Of these early experiences, perhaps the most important are extended visits to the parental home country. Although undergone by only a minority of second-generation members, "roots" tourism and visits to their parents' hometowns—or even longer-term stays in the home country for school or work—can have a formative impact on the

Table 3.2 Indicators of Cross-Border Activities in the IIMMLA and ISGMNY Surveys

	IIMMLA	ISGMNY
Activities during childhood		
Parents educated in the United States	x	x
Parents sent remittances (childhood)	x	
Visits during respondent's childhood	x	
Parent did not return to origin country	x	
Parent returned to origin country	x	
Parent returned to origin country and respondent joined parent	x	
Home-country language spoken in parental home	x	x
Cross-border families		
All relatives in United States / no relatives in origin country	x	
Parents in United States and relatives in origin country	x	
Parent in origin country	x	
Parents from different national origins / mixed parentage	x	x
Respondent activities		
Respondent visits	x	x
Respondent ever spent six months or more in parental home country		x
Parents send remittances (currently)		x
Ability in parental language	x	x
Respondent remits	x	x
Homeland-oriented organizations	x	
Respondent feels at home in parental home country	x	
Interest in parental home-country politics	x	
Ethnic identity	x	

Source: IIMMLA and ISGMNY data sets.

lives of these second-generation youth; as shown by other research, many of them report having had experiences of freedom and connection and a chance to deepen relationships with extended family.[29] Extended visits to the parental homeland undertaken at a young age can embed language fluency, while those undertaken in adolescence may cement interest in homeland matters, with both language competence and interest spurring deeper homeland engagements in adulthood.

A related question is whether cross-border connections can persist after immigrant offspring leave the parental household and set up on their own and, if so, how those ties are transmitted. Among the first generation, cross-border ties are ubiquitous; arising from bonds of affection and from

relationships developed over the course of their childhood and adoles-
cence in the origin country, those ties also provide the resources needed to
resolve a host of practical problems in both the host and home societies.
But whereas immigrants effectively create intersocietal convergence
between their country of origin and the country of destination, the children
of immigrants experience intersocietal *divergence* as their lives unfold in
the society of reception, where their core commitments are also to be
found. Consequently, immigrant offspring's homeland ties are unlikely
to retain the affective importance and practical functions prized by their
parents. Though generally tending toward decline, cross-border ties retain
their strength for *some* second-generation members, in part because core
family members remain abroad and in part as a legacy of the social learn-
ing absorbed in the parental household. Cross-border kinship ties in the
first generation motivate second-generation interactions across borders
while promoting an understanding that obligations and commitments to
home-community relatives, even if remote, matter. Not only do children
model their later behavior on the parental patterns observed at home, but
parents also transmit a range of civic and political values and attachments
that are retained by their children long after they have attained adulthood
and independence.[30] Consequently, the cross-border ties experienced in
the parental household can encourage the maintenance of home-country
language and cultural competencies during adulthood; access to the cultural
and linguistic toolkit produced through engagement in an international-
ized family network could position immigrant offspring to participate in
an ethnic economy or transnational politics.

On the other hand, maintaining close, long-distance ties requires
resources, which some immigrant families can access better than others.
Despite distance-shrinking technologies, cross-border engagement remains
costly; thus, only a minority of immigrant parents are able to keep up a
constant pattern of travel and satisfying long-distance communication.
In addition to family-level resources—in the form of finances and legal
status—immigrant families also differ in their incentive to maintain cross-
border ties. As noted, the internationalization of kinship ties tends to dimin-
ish with time, with the result that the children of longer-settled immigrant
parents are likely to find that a critical mass of relatives has gravitated to
the United States. Moreover, immigrant parents who arrived at younger
ages and finished their schooling in the United States are likely to be more
firmly rooted there, and their longer residence will have offered them
greater exposure to a more diverse set of friends and, later, potential part-
ners. Parents of differing national origins lack the capacity to transmit
home-country attachments and orientations possessed by parents who
originate from the same place. Similarly, parents who differ in nativity

status—one foreign-born and the other U.S.-born—produce a generation that lies somewhere in between the second and third generations, as indicated by their common designation as the "second-and-a-half" (2.5) generation; for this group, foreign influences are likely to be of less salience right from the start. Thus, we expect that the children of parents from two different nationalities and, still more, the children of one foreign-born and one U.S.-born parent will have weaker homeland attachments than those who grew up in an endogamous household.

Even those immigrant parents who are most determined to transmit their language, norms, and values to their children encounter great challenges when that next generation grows up in the United States. The process of absorbing the tastes, preferences, behaviors, and rewarded skills of the national society in which the migrants have settled—that is, what the literature calls "acculturation"—can yield further detachment in the second generation, as exemplified by changes in their linguistic practices and preferences. Although the children of two immigrant parents are likely to be exposed to the mother tongue at home, in all other domains they commonly use English, which they then come to prefer, relegating the mother tongue to kitchen-level proficiency.[31] The shift from the immigrant language to the dominant tongue reduces host-society social boundaries between the foreign-born and native-born, but simultaneously *increases* the cross-border social boundary between stay-at-homes in the country of emigration and immigrants and their foreign-born offspring residing in the country of immigration. Thus, second-generation members who lose the ability to speak the home-country language fluently are unlikely to be able to maintain close cross-border ties.

In sum, while nearly all immigrants experience intersocietal convergence at the point of migration, the type and intensity of cross-border engagement varies greatly, with implications for the second generation amplifying as their roots in the country of destination deepen. Though the children of immigrants generally have much lower rates of contact with the home country than their immigrant parents, the second-generation patterns of home-country connectedness are *not* of a piece. Most importantly, some second-generation immigrant children remain members of kin networks that are more internationalized than others; those differences, as well as differences in the specific identity of kin still living beyond U.S. boundaries, make for *intragroup* and *intragenerational* disparities in the salience of second-generation cross-border ties. Likewise, earlier parental decisions—whether or not to send remittances, to return home for extended visits, or to make the native language the dominant tongue at home—generate later second-generation differences in both the motivation and the capacity to maintain intersocietal convergence. Yet even as the parental choice to

sustain homeland connections creates resources, those choices were themselves related to first-generation disparities, both in the economic resources needed to keep up with kin abroad and, most importantly, the capacity to legally travel back and forth across territorial borders. Thus, influences from a variety of channels transform the common first-generation experience of intersocietal convergence into a source of great second-generation heterogeneity—an outcome that in turn can influence immigrant children's political and ethnic attachments, as well as their socioeconomic attainments, as they reach adulthood.

CIVIC STRATIFICATION: LEGAL STATUS AND CITIZENSHIP

Measures forbidding discrimination seek to ensure that all citizens are treated equally. Yet, by its nature, citizenship metes out unequal treatment to noncitizens.[32] Only citizens can leave and reenter their home territory when they wish; only citizens enjoy the unconditional lifelong right of territorial residence; and only citizens decide when and under what conditions noncitizens can obtain membership status. Hence, exclusion from citizenship is an inherent aspect of migration control. Moreover, since gaining inclusion is not for the migrant to decide by him- or herself, the same search for the good life that impels social assimilation does not suffice for civic integration, with the result that a person who in most respects acts as a citizen may be unable, absent that status, to fully do so.[33]

Although every alien encounters the boundary of citizenship, not every alien begins in the same condition: the process of international migration creates at entry intragroup differences in legal status even among immigrants of the same national origins, with corresponding implications for their subsequent transitions to citizenship and formal equality with other nationals. The result takes the form of civic stratification—a set of formal cleavages among foreign-origin persons who may share common national or ethnic origins but differ in legal standing.[34] Hence, unlike the *formal equality* among citizens, *formal inequality* prevails among noncitizens. Some statutorily enjoy most citizenship rights, occupying the conceptual space close to the boundary delimited by citizenship status; others are conceptually located just inside the territorial boundary, where they have a far more precarious hold on any civic status at all.

Much like cross-border ties, civic stratification can be conceptualized as both an independent and a dependent variable. As an independent variable, the initial status at arrival strongly affects the family environment in which immigrant offspring grow up, whether directly, as in the case of the

1.5 generation, who arrive as children and young adults, or indirectly, as with the U.S.-born children of immigrant parents, all of whom started their lives in the United States as aliens. For undocumented or temporary aliens located at the outer edge of the conceptual territorial space, rights are few, residence is unstable, and the trajectory to citizenship is likely to involve a series of transitions across formal status boundaries—for instance, from (potentially multiple) temporary visas to permanent resident to citizen. The rights regime is more expansive for those who begin as legal permanent residents, though with no guarantee of attaining either lifelong residence or movement across the threshold of formal membership, their status is never fully certain. Traversing the boundary of citizenship is a matter of deliberate action, requiring investment and forethought, not the automatic, almost unconscious behavior that leads to language learning or the acquisition of a skill that might put a better job within reach. Given this less favorable cost-benefit ratio, naturalization rates among many immigrant groups remain low, with the result that many immigrant offspring—though far from all—are raised by parents who are excluded from formal political participation and the full set of social rights. Consequently, differences in parents' at-entry status, disparities in any subsequent opportunities to obtain full membership, and any divergent reactions to those opportunities furnish the channels by which parental variations in civic stratification yield intragroup differences among their children.

The accidents of children's birth can also directly yield intragroup heterogeneity. Since in the United States citizenship is a birthright, those immigrant offspring who start off having won the citizenship lottery begin with an advantage that their 1.5-generation counterparts have to attain. Although the accident of birth outside the United States does not inherently put members of the 1.5 generation on a different track than that followed by their second-generation peers, just when and whether the acquisition of U.S. citizenship repairs the legal consequences of foreign birth is likely to matter.

Frequently unobserved but critically important sources of intragroup difference, legal status and citizenship receive attention throughout the pages of this book. We make particular use of measures unique to the IIMMLA data that enable us to examine the impact of parental legal status at arrival on a variety of second-generation outcomes. IIMMLA data allow us to differentiate the children of immigrants with parents who arrived with temporary permits, those who arrived as permanent residents, and those in a residual category that, through the process of elimination, we assume contains primarily those who entered with undocumented status. Along with information needed to distinguish between parents who have naturalized from those who remain without U.S. citizenship, these data

are used as independent variables. In addition, the foreign-born Angelenos surveyed by the IIMMLA who eventually naturalized were asked to provide the date when they acquired U.S. citizenship, information that allows us not only to analyze the determinants of both the acquisition and the timing of citizenship but also to examine the ways in which the duration of exclusion from the polity, due to alien status, affects a variety of social and political outcomes. Moreover, in analyses using both the IIMMLA and ISGMNY, we further distinguish foreign-born children of immigrants who had naturalized from those who remained outside the polity. In so doing, we can separately analyze the impact of social boundaries alongside legal boundaries—the specific result of traversing international borders.

We anticipate that the most immediate impact of civic stratification is likely to be felt by members of the 1.5 generation, who lack the birthright citizenship of their U.S.-born peers and instead are dependent on their parents' legal status and naturalization decisions. For these immigrant offspring, the cost-benefit calculus tilts strongly in the direction of naturalization. As products of receiving-society schools, they have already been socialized for citizenship; moreover, their younger age and the lower likelihood that they will ever return to the country of origin for good are factors that allow the costs of naturalization to be amortized over much, if not all, of a long lifetime. However, since the naturalization of the 1.5 generation is often a family affair, an incentive structure that provides parents with weak motivation to naturalize—and makes it impossible for unauthorized parents to do so—is likely to impinge on the naturalization even of their U.S.-raised children.

Yet formal membership is but one aspect of citizenship, and it does not perfectly align with the full practice of citizenship in either the rights, participative, or identity dimensions. It is true that all U.S.-raised children experience the many efforts designed to socialize children for national membership, whether learning to sing the National Anthem, to love the national flag, or to aspire to "good citizenship" of the type valued by schools. Yet national identity is likely to be particularly salient for those immigrant offspring who are not only de facto Americans but also de jure Americans, whose status is prized among their family members and who internalize the greater rights and sense of entitlements that status citizenship entails.[35] And even among the de jure Americans, the citizen children of parents who remain foreign nationals are less likely than their peers raised by naturalized parents to experience a household environment that reinforces identification with the people and polity of the country of immigration.

Citizenship as a formal status—and the practice of citizenship rights through political participation—may therefore significantly influence

identity, ethnic attachments, and orientations. Technically, all individuals residing in the receiving country, regardless of legal standing, "have a right to have rights," the basic fundament of citizenship as famously described by Hannah Arendt.[36] But to be meaningful, the right to have rights needs to be exercised, an activity particularly difficult for aliens of undocumented status, as rights-claiming entails exposure when staying in the shadows might be the safer strategy. Thus, the influence of the formal status of one's parents and one's self is likely to be felt even in domains of civic participation where citizenship is not required, such as protesting or lobbying or meeting with a local official.

On the other hand, citizenship as eligibility for social rights and legal protections can also confer significant practical benefits. For instance, status citizens are protected by laws against discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity, and, increasingly, sexual preference. As Alba and Nee note, it is those protections that make the choice for mobility over ethnic attachment rational, as each progressive investment yields both progress and additional opportunities to change.[37] Measures forbidding discrimination seek equality among status citizens, short-circuiting the processes that historically turned status citizens into second-class citizens. But no such concern extends to noncitizens; were the latter to be treated just like citizens, citizenship would have no meaning at all. Hence, discrimination against noncitizens, as well as discrimination that varies by precise legal status, is inevitable.

These disadvantages extend to all members of the household. Legally ineligible to work and sometimes even to drive, undocumented immigrants have limited job options; increasingly prevalent demands for proper identity documents place them under an ever-lower ceiling, leaving many in the informal sector, working only in jobs that can be accessed by foot or public transportation. Those conditions in turn constrain their housing options, producing overcrowding, which in turn yields negative consequences for children's development by depriving them of a place for study, increasing stress, and even affecting physical and mental processes by raising blood pressure and retarding cognitive development.[38]

Of course, confinement to the shadows of undocumented status rarely lasts forever; noncitizen children typically have more rights than their adult parents, and those rights, combined with longer exposure, increase their access to citizenship. Birthright citizenship ensures that no child born in the United States begins in the zone of legal liminality. Nonetheless, the disabilities associated with alienage can be transmitted from one generation to the next; to the extent that alienage either coincides with or aggravates other disadvantages, such as undocumented status, its legacy is likely to last longer. For the immigrant offspring of interest to us—those

born between 1965 and 1984—these legacy effects are likely to have been modest, as their parents arrived during a period of blurrier boundaries between citizens and aliens. Furthermore, the advent of an amnesty for undocumented immigrants in 1986 limited the duration of confinement to the zone of legal liminality. Since then, however, the barriers to passage from unauthorized to authorized legal status have hardened. Subsequent efforts at legalization have repeatedly stalled, with the result that today's undocumented population of over ten million is increasingly long-settled. Simultaneously suffering from diminished rights and greater vulnerability to deportation, the children of contemporary undocumented immigrants, compared to the immigrant offspring studied in this book, are likely to experience legacy effects far deeper and more severe.

Summary

In this chapter thus far, we have sought to develop a perspective that takes into account the distinctly international elements shaping the lives of the second generation and that distinguishes between the features yielding intergroup differences and those that generate intragroup differences. Convention characterizes immigrant offspring as mainly belonging to America's minority population, yet the children of immigrants and the children of native-born minorities are separated by their backgrounds and experiences. The children of immigrants are socialized by foreign-born parents raised in a very different environment than native-born parents, bringing with them very different outlooks and orientations. In turn, this context of emigration exerts an important, and generally unobserved, influence on the household setting of the second generation. Moreover, unlike the U.S.-born, who enjoy freedom of mobility and can enter and leave the United States when they wish, immigrants arrive as foreigners who are only legally present when authorized, though the unauthorized may be tacitly accepted. Migration control policies—a constituent aspect of the state system—are used to sift entries, sort arrivals into various official categories involving unequal rights and entitlements, and put some new-comers on a path to citizenship while blocking others from ever attaining full acceptance. These migration-control disparities yield nationality-level differences in the distribution of more- or less-advantaged statuses, which in turn yield group-wide effects, regardless of an individual's own legal or citizenship status.

In addition to homeland influences that immigrant parents bring with them when moving, they also extend social ties across territorial bound-aries. Growing up as part of internationalized families, the children of immigrants are raised in a zone of intersocietal convergence where ideas, finances, and social contacts flow across national borders, in contrast to

the children of the native-born, whose lives generally unfold in a world circumscribed by the territorial borders of the United States. The children of immigrants, by definition, also are universally raised by parents who have spent at least some time as aliens in the receiving country, only some of whom succeeded in traversing the difficult barriers separating them from citizenship. Hence, unlike the U.S.-born children of native-born parents, the U.S.-born children of immigrants, even though status citizens at birth, were raised by parents who began outside the polity. And while the foreign-born but U.S.-raised may be de facto Americans, sharing the identity, lifestyles, and behaviors of their U.S.-born counterparts, the obstacles entailed in entering the polity make the status of de jure Americans far more elusive. Delineating these distinctively international elements—those that cross state borders (values and orientations), those that span state borders (internationalized family networks), and those that produce formal boundaries after the territorial border has been traversed (civic stratification and migration-status disparities)—and demonstrating how they shape the lives of today's second generation lies at the heart of the perspective we seek to advance in this book.

APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

In elaborating a new approach, we also seek to synthesize the extensive research on which we build, assembling the many ideas generated by scholarship on the second generation so that they can be considered as a whole. That pursuit leads us to enlarge the domains of second-generation difference that we seek to explain while also providing a careful delineation of both individual- and group-level difference.

Domains of Difference

In contending that some immigrant offspring might fall downward into a rainbow underclass, the hypothesis of segmented assimilation did not simply spark the debate over second-generation trajectories; it also narrowly focused the terms of discussion around issues concerned with socioeconomic mobility. That the question of whether the children of immigrants would move beyond their parents' economic situation attracted attention is hardly a surprise. Yet as the authors of *Parents Without Papers* note, the experience of immigrants and their descendants is multidimensional, extending well beyond the limited, albeit important, sphere of socioeconomic attainment.[39]

Thus, while the first two empirical chapters of this book focus on educational and occupational attainment, later sections apply the international perspective to political and sociocultural dimensions. One such dimension

entails citizenship, understood both as a status attained by the foreign-born and as an activity in which status citizens and noncitizens alike can engage (chapters 6 and 7). Unlike the social and economic attainments that garner the attention of the majority of researchers—among whom assimilation is understood as a continuous and incremental process—the formal cleavages between citizens and aliens, rooted in law, create sharply defined junctures in the path to political incorporation. Bright and unambiguous legal boundaries leave noncitizens with limited leverage over the conditions under which those boundaries can be crossed. Moreover, aliens are not of one type: some statutorily enjoy most citizenship rights, whereas the status of others is far more precarious. As most immigrants gain residency *after* migration, the trajectory taking them from alien to citizen, though likely to take myriad forms owing to the great differences in at-entry statuses, usually involves a series of transitions across formal status boundaries, each time-consuming, costly, and uncertain.

By contrast, every person, citizen or noncitizen, has the opportunity to participate in civic activity and even to engage in political activities of varying types, although voting remains off-limits to the noncitizen. Nonetheless, citizenship status—not simply the greater knowledge or more diverse contacts that may come with acculturation and socioeconomic progress—often affects the exercise of civic and political citizenship; hence, long-term effects are likely to flow from parents' initial exclusion from the polity, an experience shared by their foreign-born and U.S.-raised offspring. The individual rewards for participation are also low, which is why immigrants focusing on the search for success and the good life may see little reason to participate in public life; indeed, the "success frame" highlighted by Lee and Zhou seems to have its corollary among the Chinese immigrant offspring described in *Inheriting the City*, for whom politics is a matter of little interest. The same factor explains why citizens are not mobilized without the intervention of political parties and organizations—efforts that ignore and do little for noncitizens owing to their lack of the franchise. Last, the political domain is fundamentally different from the spheres of education and work: whereas participation in the latter requires an ability to work together in pursuit of a shared goal, politics in a democratic society is fundamentally about conflict, and immigration itself is a source of very great contention.

Similarly, continuities and changes in the broad sociocultural dimension are unlikely to stem from the same sources as those impinging on the socioeconomic dimension. We understand the sociocultural dimension as pertaining to those aspects of the immigrant and second-generation experience that entail the relationship between "them" and "us." The first, "them," evokes the receiving-country concerns on which prevailing approaches

have long focused: the distinctions between people of some particular national origin and the others around them, of which ethnic identity is a standard indicator. The second, "us," evokes important symbols of difference—in particular, language use and ability—that make it easier to maintain home-country identities and meaningful cross-border ties.

To begin with, the socioeconomic dimension is relatively fixed: parents who arrive as adults largely use the education they received in the country of origin; among their offspring, relatively little additional schooling is obtained after age twenty-five. By contrast, the sociocultural dimension, whether involving the internal ("us") or external ("them") aspect, is relatively fluid: parents and their children can both decide whether to speak the mother tongue and with what frequency and whether to send money to relatives at home, and these choices can change over time. Moreover, first-generation resources, whether found at the familial or group level, are likely to have a relatively direct impact on second-generation attainment but a far more distal impact on either aspect of the sociocultural dimension. Sometimes the "them" and "us" relationships are interconnected, but they can also be independent of one another: ties to the place of origin are subject to erosion, whereas presence in an ethnically stratified society like the United States makes questions of group membership inescapable, even though the boundaries of membership are susceptible to change.

Identifying Inter- and Intragroup Differences: The Case for a Two-Level Model

As we have argued, the search for the sources of both intergroup and intragroup differences is our central quest. Immigrants from any particular country arrive with the shared experience of having grown up and been socialized in that place; this experience may not have influenced all emigrants in exactly the same way, but it is very unlikely to have left no imprint at all. Because immigration policies do not have the same impact on all sending countries but rather either provide options or impose constraints that reflect the relationship between each of these countries and the United States, legal statuses also tend to vary from one national-origin group to another. International migration is a networked phenomenon, with newcomers following and settling down where earlier arrivals put down roots, and these common experiences and attributes, as well as those that reflect a migration's selectivity—such as the average level of education among conationals—make for trajectories that vary from one national-origin group to another. On the other hand, the impact of those common features is offset by the traits that make any one immigrant differ from his or her conationals, whether legal status at entry, the amount

and location of schooling obtained, the behaviors adopted after migration, the decision either to stop or continue speaking the mother tongue, or the choice to marry within or outside the cohort of conationals. Hence, locating the source of second-generation difference has to follow a strategy that can clearly distinguish the differences *between* groups from the differences *within* groups.

We emphasize that the shared features we have identified do *not* include an awareness of a common destiny or interest, such that persons of a common national origin would repeatedly mobilize around their commonalities or consistently interact with others in recurrent ways suggesting that behavior across an ethnic line follows a tacit or well-established script. Rather, we simply assume that these commonalities yield some socially significant similar behaviors, increase the likelihood of within-group interaction—and thereby both sharing of resources and exposure to deficits—and provide legible signals that allow outsiders to think that persons of the same national background may share some underlying similarities. Strictly speaking, then, we are not so much speaking about "groups"—a concept implying that persons with shared attributes understand themselves as fundamentally the same—as about categories of people.[40] Nonetheless, since the concept of "ethnic group" is so widely used and so firmly implanted in this literature, and because it so deeply influences the ways in which both scholars and the public approach the phenomenon, we fall back on this terminology as well.

In everyday as well as scholarly usage, the concept of ethnic (or nationality) group evokes a name, whether that of Mexicans, Chinese, Trinidadians, Italians, Russians, or something else. However, a name is not a variable: that is, it does not identify the salient, relevant characteristics that might make membership matter.

Under certain circumstances, names *can* be used as if they were variables, albeit only if the analyst works with great care. Joel Perlmann's classic book *Ethnic Differences,* a study of educational and occupational attainment among the children of the last age of mass migration, shows just how it can be done. Looking at a very limited number of groups—"Yankees," Irish, Jews, Italians, and African Americans—Perlmann meticulously scrutinizes each group in relation to the others, painstakingly locating each in the relevant social space and disaggregating the features that might explain the unmistakable variation in second-generation outcomes.[41] Moreover, since national origins among the earlier wave of mass migration were not quite as diverse as today's, a smaller number of groups could provide a more representative account. By contrast, contemporary flows are much more globalized: immigrants come from all corners of the earth. Even though the respondents queried by the IIMMLA and the

ISGMNY grew up in a time when migrations were less globalized than the migration streams that have arrived since 2010, national-origin diversity is a salient trait of the second-generation Angelenos and New Yorkers studied in this book.

That diversity renders the traditional group-specific approach impractical, as evidenced by the procedure followed in *Legacies*. The many regression results displayed in the tables of that book repeatedly show the results for "dummy variables" corresponding to ten different nationalities: Cambodia, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica/West Indies, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Vietnam, and "other." Though the authors insist that nationalities reflect different modes of incorporation, the nationalities are never compared to one another; rather, they are simply contrasted to a catchall set of nationalities that make up the omitted category in the regressions. The better procedure would have been to test each nationality against the other and thereby determine whether modes hypothesized to be more or less advantageous yield systematic differences. Yet just for the ten nationalities that *Legacies* consistently examines that task would have required tests for sixty-five pairwise comparisons.[42] That number would be unmanageable when analyzing the pooled ISGMNY and IIMMLA surveys, which include sixty-seven different nationalities.

The alternative involves moving from the names of nationalities to variables that measure the nationality attributes relevant to the outcomes of interest. That procedure in turn involves the use of multilevel modeling, a well-established technique, but one that has been extensively used only to explore ethnic difference from within the European context.[43]

To illustrate the utility of the method, we turn to an example from its most common application in the sociology of education. We can imagine a situation in which we wish to understand variation in schooling performance, for instance, scores on a standardized test. Background characteristics and familial environments—students' age, gender, parents' education, the presence of one or two parents—affect schooling performance and educational attainment. Although we can reasonably hypothesize that more-advantaged students will do better than their less-advantaged peers, we know that what happens in the classroom also affects the performance of children, regardless of whether they come from an advantaged family or not. Consequently, to properly assess the impact of social class variation on performance *within* classes, the analyst needs to control for differences in the quality of the classrooms in which students are taught. Similarly, since student performance is probably affected by the mix of more-advantaged and less-advantaged students, we want to know about the relationship between teacher qualities and children's performance, controlling for compositional differences across classes.

Naturally, each classroom can be given a unique nominal identifier—the name of the teacher. In theory, the researcher could simply compare the achievement of Renee's students to the achievement of Roger's, controlling for the individual-level characteristics of the students in each class. But that would not tell us anything about what, specifically, is advantageous or disadvantageous about Roger versus Renee. In contrast, if we had a large enough number of teachers, we could compare the achievement of students taught by teachers who vary by attributes likely to affect their performance—for example, classroom experience. We could also compare the achievement of students with teachers possessing a master's degree versus teachers with only a bachelor's degree. If we model teachers' experience and teachers' credentials together, we could even make assertions about the effect of teacher credentials *controlling* for teaching experience. Although a one-by-one comparison of Roger and Renee would not yield systematic information about differences in teacher quality, we would be able to predict how teachers possessing those attributes of Roger or Renee that are relevant to the classroom will affect student performance.

In this book, we have simply taken this logic and applied it to comparisons across the children of immigrants from different origin countries. Staying with our example, country of origin is the equivalent of the teacher, and we are interested in examining what, specifically, it is about certain countries of origin that matter for the outcomes of the second generation. Rather than comparing China to Mexico, we instead compare origin countries that vary in their value orientations, whether more rational or more traditional, or in the relative prevalence of more- or less-educated coethnics, or in the prevalence of legal statuses that are more or less favorable. Doing so, however, requires a large sample of origin countries that vary across shared features of both the context of emigration and the context of immigration. Fortunately, both the IIMMLA and the ISGMNY—and even more so the pooled IIMMLA and ISGMNY data set—provide the large number of sending countries with sufficient variation across a range of theoretically informed country-level characteristics (level 2) to test for their explanatory power while controlling for individual- and family-level compositional differences (level 1) across national-origin groups.

CONCLUSION

We now draw this lengthy chapter to a close and thank readers for their attention as we elaborated a more general model of second-generation difference, the various outcomes we believe it can explain, and the analytic strategy we will use to test it. In the chapters to follow, we will demonstrate

the value of the international perspective, in particular the importance of origin-country context for socioeconomic outcomes and the influence of cross-border ties on the sociocultural and political adaptations of the children of immigrants. Using multilevel models provides new insights into the sources of differences across these varied domains: as we will show later, family- and individual-level characteristics prove to be the primary determinants: they exercise considerably more influence than characteristics linked to membership in any immigrant group. In the next chapter, however, we focus on the source of intergroup variation, offering a direct comparison of the predictions generated by our model and techniques and those that have thus far been dominant in the literature.

Chapter 10 | Conclusion: The Making of the Second Generation

WHETHER IN CLASSICAL or updated form, assimilation theory presents a perspective appropriate to the short, albeit terrible, twentieth century, when the nation-states of what we now call the developed world largely kept the rest of the world at bay. At the time, society and state seemed to naturally converge, which is why it was reasonable to think that the process of assimilation could be uniquely driven by the mix of costs and benefits found within the country of destination, with the dynamics internal to that country determining the pace and direction of change.

But now that the social has burst through the societal, that perspective provides a far less accurate guide. In today's age of mass migration, the people crossing borders actively shape their own destinies, doing what neither home nor host state wants, improving their lives through movement and making effective use of the resource that they almost all possess—one another. Yet even the help of kin and friends and the support structure found in migrant communities cannot make displacement to a strange, new world any less difficult and arduous, which is why it is best undertaken by those ready to run risks and to then struggle to make it under adverse circumstances. For that reason, it is often the young who migrate, typically leaving home as adults but doing so at that stage in the life course when they are either bearing or bringing up young children. Consequently, the arrival of immigrants—some of whom do not yet know whether they will stay or return—yields a second, even more fateful result: the emergence of the "second generation," a population made up of the children of foreign-born parents, both those born in the United States and those born abroad but brought here at a very young age.

This book seeks to provide a new way of understanding the sociology of the second generation by breaking with the conventional perspective, which focuses only on the trajectories of the second generation as they

261

unfold in the destination country, and instead bringing both *origins* and *destinations* into view. In so doing, we have sought to highlight the persistent influences stemming from the distinctively international nature of migration across borders. This perspective brings into focus the doubly international nature of migration as both movement across nations, understood as meaningful social units, and movement across states, understood as territorial units. Immigrant offspring are raised "here" by parents who grew up "there"; though they certainly do not remain the same people they were at the moment of departure, those parents can never fully free themselves from the grip of the values and orientations implanted in them in childhood. Hence, the *context of emigration* creates an origin-society legacy that is transmitted from parents raised abroad to children raised in the United States. Moreover, as the U.S.-bound migration streams have diversified, so too have the sources of cultural influences from abroad.

For migrants, movement from the developing to the developed world is transformative: the environment encountered in the societies of immigration extends far beyond its pocketbook effects, as the immigrants and their children benefit from the investment in public goods and the societal security and political stability that undergird economic growth in the countries on which the newcomers converge. Although migration can benefit the many, in reality it works to the advantage of a relatively small number, thanks to the migration controls that developed countries use to keep the rest of the world at bay. Those controls cannot keep everyone out; indeed, they are not designed to do so, but rather to sort and select the desirable few from the unwanted many. But since the popular preference for reducing migration stands in tension with the people flows produced by a globalized economy, the persons who move through the system of migration control are sifted in ways that stratify the foreign-born population by legal status. Ranging from the most favorable (admission as a refugee) to the least advantageous (crossing the border without authorization), legal statuses vary in prevalence from one origin group to another. The incidence of more protected or more vulnerable statuses affects societal perception, the overall level of resources on which coethnics can draw if and when they turn to one another for support, and the facility and speed with which full membership can be obtained. Thus, regardless of individual attributes, the *contexts of emigration* and the *contexts of immigration*—both reflecting the distinctively international aspects of population movements across state borders—have long-lasting effects on the experiences of the foreign-born as well as their descendants, producing interethnic differences.

Yet, as we have emphasized throughout this book, diversity in second-generation experiences does not simply fall out along the lines of national origin; rather, trajectories vary among immigrant offspring whose parents

stem from the very same place. These intraethnic differences arise from a variety of bases; in seeking to develop a perspective sensitive to the distinctively international nature of population flows across borders, we have spotlighted two sources: cross-border connections and civic stratification.

Cross-border connections are common among international migrants; as we have shown, four in five second-generation youth have family members still abroad. However, those connections are not fully ubiquitous, as family reunification is more desirable or feasible for some rather than others; nor are cross-border links uniformly resistant to the tie-eroding pressures associated with settlement. Hence, disparities in the extent, intensity, and type of cross-border connections constitute an important source of second-generation difference—in this case, not so much between different immigrant-origin populations as within them.

Thus, the geographical range of the immigrant families building new lives in the destination country varies greatly. Yet at the outset, all immigrants—both parents and their foreign-born but U.S.-raised children—share one common connection, namely, their legal status. *Every* would-be new American begins as a foreigner standing outside the circle of citizenship and the full package of rights and entitlements that citizenship status confers. That circle can be penetrated, but access is inherently restricted. Consequently, the process leading to full membership takes fundamentally different form than the trajectory traced by conventional theories of assimilation, which explain how an initially strange environment becomes utterly familiar and strange people from a strange place eventually come to think of themselves, and to be treated, as natives. Moreover, in entering the country of immigration, the new arrivals find themselves in a conceptual space between the territorial border and the invisible but no less real border of citizenship; that is the space where immigrant offspring are sorted by a system of *civic stratification,* either directly if foreign-born or indirectly, via their parents, if U.S.-born. These individual-level disparities in status—both those encountered at the moment of entry and those that evolve over time—shape second-generation trajectories, producing variation among people who originated in the same place and hence were socialized by parents who probably shared common value orientations at the time of departure from home.

ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

In introducing this new approach, we acknowledge our debt to the researchers who have come before us and the lessons to be found in the scholarship that they have bequeathed us. Building on the knowledge

from this vast relevant literature, this book seeks to incorporate the insights gained from existing approaches into a new framework that treats both group-level and individual-level sources of differences and does so while attending to the distinctively international features of cross-border migration.

Throughout this book, we have been in dialogue with the authors and the influential books that have preceded us; table 10.1 provides a summary of the approaches developed in these books, the key concepts they contribute, and the level (within or across groups) at which they operate. In the next sections, we ask whether, in advancing a new perspective, we have now shed new light on the second-generation experience and, if so, what might be the distinctive lessons learned from our book.

Contextual Variables and Intergroup Variation

Contexts of Emigration: Value Orientations   In the standard approaches, the people opting for life in a new land appear only as immigrants, yet those same persons are also emigrants, and collectively they bear the traces of their origins in an ever-growing myriad of countries, each with its own specific features and distinctive historical trajectories. This theoretical blind spot—no attention to the ways in which the place of origin leaves its imprint on immigrant parents—leaves the field wide open for ad-hoc "culturalist" explanations. In pop-sociology, such accounts take the form of simple cultural essentialism—hailing the purportedly superior traits of a seemingly successful group or ascribing a pattern of less achievement to supposedly inferior cultural traits. To be sure, the literature does furnish more sophisticated perspectives, such as those that posit an "immigrant advantage" associated with norms about family structure imported from abroad, or those that reframe the issue around cultural toolkits.[1] Yet these formulations have yet to be systematically applied to a wide range of immigrant groups, across a diverse range of outcomes.

We offer an alternative: a thoroughgoing account of origin effects on a wide variety of second-generation outcomes, using standardized information on a large number of sending countries supplied by the World Values Survey. The two dimensions identified by researchers working with the World Values Survey—the survival versus self-expression axis and the traditional versus secular-rational axis—do not represent hermetically sealed, categorically distinctive cultures but rather *value orientations*. Cross-nationally, these orientations vary along a gradient ranging from more to less, and it is difficult to precisely determine where one shades into another; they also differ among the people residing in any one state, though the variation across countries typically exceeds the variation within them.

Table 10.1 Summary of Key Theoretical Approaches and Their Empirical Treatment in This Book

Theoretical Approach	Level of Variation	Concept	Measures Used in This Book
International perspective	Between groups		
	Context of emigration	Home-country cultural background	WVS value orientation measures: survival versus self-expression and traditional versus secular-rational
	Context of immigration	Migration status disparities	Status prevalence scale
		Ethnic capital	Average group years of education
		Skin color stratification	Average group skin color
	Individual and within groups	Civic stratification	Legal status at arrival; time to citizenship
		Cross-border connection	Remitting, home-country travel, relatives abroad, language use when growing up
Neo-assimilation	Within-group: individual	Acculturation	Parental English ability, immigrant generation
		Parental assimilation	Mixed parentage
			Parental education, education received in the United States
Minority mobility model	Between groups	Hyperselectivity	Parental quintiles of education
		Ethnic group resources	Supplementary education

Table 10.1 Continued

Theoretical Approach	Level of Variation	Concept	Measures Used in This Book
Second-generation advantage	Between groups	Urban institutions	High school quality; use of urban amenities
		Ethnic cohesion	WVS value orientation measures: survival versus self-expression and traditional versus secular-rational
Membership exclusion	Within-group: individual	Legal status	Parents' and respondent's status at arrival; respondent's current citizenship status
Segmented assimilation	Between groups		
	Modes of incorporation	Socioeconomically advantaged coethnic community	Average group years of education
		Governmental reception	Status prevalence scale
		Societal reception	Average group skin color
	Individual and within-group differences	Family relations	Parental mother-tongue use; two-parent family; parents of same national origin; acculturation type

These orientations also combine in distinctive ways, such that a secular-rational orientation may accompany a survival orientation in one place, but not necessarily in another.

Just as importantly, the value orientations identified by the WVS are not fixed in stone but rather are products of specific historical, social, and economic circumstances and, as such, are inherently susceptible to change. Hence, the position in the two-dimensional WVS space along which immigrants from any one country fall out is a legacy effect. Although influencing the behavior of immigrant parents socialized in an environment different from the one in which they opted to reside, the origin-country value orientations that immigrant parents transmit to their children in no way preclude adaptation to the very different orientations found in the United States (and other developed, immigrant-receiving states).

Our analysis of educational attainment amply demonstrates the gains to be made from our approach. We show that immigrant offspring originating in countries where the population more strongly espouses "scholarly" values achieve higher levels of schooling and are more likely to attend better-performing high schools than the children of immigrants from more traditionally oriented societies; moreover, that relationship holds true even when we hold constant the parental and group levels of educational attainment. We also demonstrate that although secular-rational values matter for education, they exert only a minimal direct impact on occupational attainment. Instead, the children of immigrants from countries where secular-rational orientations tend to prevail enjoy superior returns to their own investments in education compared to their peers from more traditionally oriented sending societies. Moreover, although survival versus self-expression values are not significantly associated with educational attainment, we show that the children of immigrants from more cohesive groups similarly gain better returns on educational investments.

These findings lend support to the often implicit, and never before systematically tested, expectations that parental sending countries will exercise a lasting cultural influence on the economic lives of the children of immigrants. These impacts stem from experiences shared by immigrant parents who departed from a common point of origin; in turn, the lessons imported from abroad yield interethnic differences among immigrant offspring. However, when we zoom in on ethnic strategies that individual immigrant parents might deploy, we generally fail to find evidence indicating that a specifically "ethnic" toolkit creates second-generation success. For instance, though many immigrant offspring grew up in households where the parents' mother tongue was used—an experience that in turn fostered widespread adult mother-tongue competence—this distinctively ethnic practice proved unrelated to occupational or educational

attainment. Unlike mother-tongue use, commonly found among immigrant households, only a small minority of the second-generation New Yorkers and Angelenos we studied attended after-school cram or language programs that might be considered part of an ethnic toolkit. However, when immigrant parents did use strategies such as language schools, most of the affected respondents did not experience any positive effects. Rather, ethnically specific language schools only helped a very small group: the children of less-educated parents who came from traditionally oriented societies.

Thus, we find that the imported home-country culture matters, albeit at a group level, not an individual level. Moreover, the home-country culture yields effects in ways that vary across different domains of life. When we evaluate second-generation "success" as indexed by socioeconomic outcomes, we find that origins in societies characterized by a secular-rational orientation directly and positively influence educational attainment and also increase the return to respondents' own schooling. However, when we examine another important form of "integration," namely, political participation, we find that, contrary to the commonsense anticipation that immigration will always swell the ranks of the Democratic Party, the children of immigrants from societies with more traditional values are more likely to lean Republican. By contrast, the greater cohesion found in more survival-oriented societies proves positively associated with educational attainment, but not at statistically significant levels. However, this cohesion does translate well in the U.S. labor market, helping second-generation youth find jobs more commensurate with their training. Likewise, the cohesion imported from the homeland facilitates naturalization, yielding higher rates of citizenship density among immigrant families and accelerating the pace at which 1.5-generation respondents naturalize.

Context of Immigration: Migration Status Disparities   For the neo-assimilation approach, the immigrant search for the good life can prove successful because the advent of antidiscrimination policies *within* U.S. boundaries systematically diminished racial and ethnic barriers to achievement, producing the virtuous circle between adaptation and reward that eventually leads to assimilation. Whatever the validity of this claim, it suffers from the blinders produced by focusing internally and ignoring the cross-border dimension. A world of nation-states inherently produces policies of migration control that discriminate *by design,* favoring citizens over aliens, and some aliens over others. In turn, migration control policies yield inter-country differences in the prevalence of different migration statuses; based on objective indicators, our status prevalence measure identifies populations

on a continuum ranging from the most advantaged—those among whom refugee status was most prevalent—to the most disadvantaged—those among whom unauthorized status was most prevalent.

Whereas one of our measures of the context of emigration—a secular-rational orientation in the origin country—had a direct, positive effect on educational attainment, our measure of the context of immigration, the status prevalence scale, had no such impact. Nor did the context of immigration alter the ways in which parents' education affected the levels of schooling attained by their children. Yet differences in status prevalence did yield a significant effect on the relationship between respondents' own education and the occupations they attained: when more-advantaged statuses prevailed, the schooling acquired by second-generation New Yorkers and Angelenos had a more positive impact on their occupational status. Thus, our research confirms qualitative evidence on life-course variability in the impact of legal status. The children of immigrants from groups with a high prevalence of undocumented members are first shielded from illegality's adverse effects in childhood, but then experience an attainment-limiting shadow effect after they enter the labor market.[2]

We expected that differences in status prevalence would affect the acquisition of citizenship, if only because the greater density of persons arriving with more-advantageous status would make a greater fraction eligible to apply for citizenship once the five-year residency requirement was passed. And indeed, this is precisely what we found. After controlling for respondent's place of birth and parents' length of residence in the United States (as well as other individual-level covariates), citizenship family densities were higher for nationalities among which more-advantaged statuses prevailed. Similarly, the individual-level analysis, which included individual-level controls for status at the time of entry, found that a more favorable status prevalence score accelerated the pace of naturalization.

However, some of the associations we anticipated with status prevalence did not materialize. Differences in status prevalence seemed unrelated to the exercise of citizenship, and a higher percentage of undocumented statuses at the group level was associated with *higher*, rather than lower, levels of cross-border visits, though both phenomena were strongly and positively associated with individual-level variations in citizenship and legal status. Nonetheless, when we looked at some of the private aspects of our respondents' lives, most notably language, the reach of the disparities generated by policies of migration control could clearly be seen. Consonant acculturation was more common and selective acculturation less so when respondents belonged to a group that scored high on the status prevalence scale.

Context of Immigration: Group-Level Education and Average Skin Color   The hypothesis of segmented assimilation emphasizes the impact of disparities in the structure of coethnic communities and societal reactions on intergroup disparities. Both variables, however, are vaguely described; moreover, neither is clearly operationalized, and the levels measuring differences in these variables—for example, working-class coethnic communities versus entrepreneurial-professional ones—are assigned to national-origins groups on an ad-hoc basis. In addition, the possibility that societal reaction is negative toward all "nonwhite" groups provides little leverage when only a small and diminishing fraction of immigrants and immigrant offspring have origins in Europe and Canada. In this book, we have introduced the concept of "ethnic capital," as measured by the average level of education in a national-origin group, to capture the ways in which resources can be mobilized via the coethnic community. To assess the ways in which colorism affects a group's susceptibility to discrimination, we have invoked the concept of "skin-color stratification," which we have operationalized as group-level average skin color (on a scale ranging from 1.4 to 7.4 among the groups in our sample).

Ethnic Capital: Group-Level Average Education   The importance of ethnic capital—operationalized as group-level average education—reappears consistently throughout the book. Thus, net of other variables, second-generation educational attainment is higher in groups among whom higher average levels of education in the parental generation prevail; likewise, group-level average education interacts with parental levels of schooling in ways that lead to jobs of higher status. In the New York sample, the group level of education also increased the probability that immigrant offspring would be enrolled in high schools of higher quality. However, contrary to the minority mobility model developed in *The Asian American Achievement Paradox*, which emphasizes the advantages generated by hyperselectivity, immigrant offspring originating in the most highly educated nationalities displayed no distinctive lead. Instead, we found evidence only for the effects of *hyposelection:* New Yorkers and Angelenos from groups with the lowest levels of education did significantly worse than all others.

But if higher levels of average group education positively affected attainment, it broadly depressed civic and political participation. Respondents from groups that were more highly educated in the parental generation were less likely to belong to organizations and less likely to attend protests or civic and political meetings. Of course, the same variable that *directly* exercised these negative effects on civic and political engagement *indirectly* generated positive effects, as higher levels of average group education had

outcomes related to ethnic attachments. However, net of other variables, darker-skinned New Yorkers were less likely to enroll in the highest-quality high schools; in the pooled sample, moreover, skin color interacted with respondents' own education in a way that lowered occupational status for respondents with higher levels of schooling but darker-colored skin. (However, the coefficient was significant only at the 10 percent level.)

By contrast, group-level skin color affected neither the acquisition of citizenship nor its exercise in aspects related to civic and political participation. Though not influencing partisan identity overall, group-level skin color did prove significantly related to the political party choice made by those immigrant offspring New Yorkers and Angelinos who were U.S. citizens and reported having registered to vote. As chapter 7 showed, net of other variables, there appears to be a clear skin-color gradient, with Democratic loyalties among the politically active growing as skin color darkens. Indeed, respondents with origins in Trinidad, Jamaica, and elsewhere in the Anglophone Caribbean had the strongest Democratic loyalties of all, with the Trinidadians still more strongly Democratic than their third-generation-plus African American counterparts.

We note that these findings pertain only to the impact of group-level differences in skin color, not to differences that may be associated with phenotypical variation at the individual level. Unfortunately, the New York survey collected no data on self-reported phenotype, and while the IIMMLA contained such a question, it was asked only of those Los Angeles respondents who identified as Latino or Hispanic in the screener.

Individual- and Household-Level Variables and Intragroup Variation

Theory provides a way of seeing . . . and of *not* seeing. The standpoint adopted by the prevailing approaches—both neo-assimilation and segmented assimilation—metaphorically places the analyst with her back to the border, uniquely focusing on trajectories undergone in the receiving country and the influences that flow solely from there. Yet as we have repeatedly emphasized, international migration inherently involves the internationalization of families; moreover, the process of crossing territorial state boundaries differs from the crossing of social borders by transforming sending-country nationals into receiving-country aliens. These two unique features of international migration require that any comprehensive account of second-generation difference consider variation in cross-border influences as well as the location of immigrants and their descendants in the receiving country's system of civic stratification.

Cross-Border Connections   In this book, cross-border connections appear as independent *and* dependent variables. Throughout these pages, we have hypothesized that internationalized family relationships and parental homeland-oriented activities undertaken when respondents were children yield direct effects on a host of outcomes, among them, the cross-border connections that immigrant offspring maintain as adults. As chapter 5 demonstrated, separation from a parent who remained in the home country strongly depresses educational attainment. Further in-depth analysis of the Los Angeles respondents showed that the children of parents who remitted while they were children had higher levels of schooling than their counterparts whose parents did not repatriate any of their earnings. The finding is counterintuitive, as we would expect the sending of remittances to deplete the parental resources available for investment in education. Yet remitting may be important not simply for its material impact but for what it signals about the nature of the household willing to sacrifice to help relatives abroad. As chapter 7 shows, among the Angelenos, those whose parents earlier sent home remittances reported *higher* levels on all of the aspects of civic and political participation analyzed in that chapter. In chapter 8, where cross-border connections function as both independent and dependent variables, we saw that parental remitting strongly influences remitting among children. Chapter 9 tells us that this same parental activity undertaken during respondents' childhood reduced their preference for English when adults. That all these results occur net of other variables, *including* the presence of parents and relatives abroad, strongly reinforces the possibility that parental remitting conveys a powerful moral message that is absorbed by immigrant offspring.

As chapter 8 notes, internationalized families represent the modal family form: though comparable data are lacking for the New Yorkers, the great majority of Angelenos—80 percent—had relatives still living in the home country at the time of the survey; even among those with only one foreign-born parent, the majority still possessed a kinship connection across borders. As that chapter shows, the cross-border engagements pursued by these second-generation Angelenos proved highly responsive to differences in the location of the kinship network, which exercised statistically significant effects on all the indicators on which this chapter focuses. But the motivation to keep up those ties emanates not simply from the obligations related to family structure; parents' own agency, whether related to remitting, visiting, or mother-tongue use, matters as well.

Although cross-border connections thus deeply affect intragroup differences across a broad range of outcomes, we also note the general trend toward reorienting activities and concerns to the country of reception. Home-country ties may be more widely found and persistent than

conventional approaches previously suggested; nonetheless, these immigrant offspring, in detaching from the place of origin, are continuing a process already begun by their parents.

Civic Stratification   As with cross-border connections, civic stratification functions as both an independent and dependent variable. Chapter 5, analyzing the pooled sample, shows that noncitizens—a sub-category of the immigrant offspring born abroad but raised in the United States from childhood—attain lower levels of schooling and occupations of lesser status than their U.S. citizen counterparts, net of other variables, including the *group-level* legal-status prevalence. Given the nature of the data—the New York sample lacks the detailed information that the IIMMLA provides on respondents' and parents' legal status at the time of entry—these relationships cannot be considered causal, but rather amount to an association. Focusing on the Los Angeles sample, we see that neither respondents' nor parents' upon-arrival legal status altered the impact of citizenship status on educational attainment. Rather, for the foreign-born but U.S.-raised, the channel connecting upon-arrival status to educational and occupational attainment would seem to pass through the point at which citizenship is obtained. Migration control policies influence that outcome, as those who arrive on a temporary visa or without authorization experience a far longer trajectory to citizenship than their counterparts who possessed a green card when crossing the U.S. border. Those effects, moreover, hold net of contextual variables, most notably status prevalence, which at the group level diminishes time to naturalization for members of those nationalities with more favorable immigration statuses.

Not surprisingly, factors affecting access to citizenship influence its exercise, as demonstrated in chapter 7. As a liberal society, the United States offers opportunities for civic as well as political participation to anyone resident on U.S. soil, citizenship or legal status notwithstanding. Nevertheless, net of other variables (including the usual assimilation variables related to generation or language ability), the experience of prior or current exclusion from the polity impeded engagement in public-oriented activities for which citizenship was no prerequisite, including messages sent to political representatives, attendance at rallies or meetings, and taking part in any form of protest. Moreover, the evidence suggests that both the late naturalizers and the noncitizens were only tenuously connected to the civic fabric, as they were less likely than their citizen peers to participate in any civic activity or belong to any civic organization and also less likely to have been contacted by someone else to support a candidate or political party.

Civic stratification affects the cross-border engagements pursued by immigrant offspring in a somewhat different way, though we do note that issues of data adequacy largely limit this analysis to the Los Angeles respondents. Like writing to a public official or attending a meeting, anyone—whether citizen, green-card-holder, or unauthorized immigrant—can send remittances, take an interest in homeland matters, or belong to a homeland organization. Indeed, neither at-entry status nor prior or current experience of exclusion from the polity had any impact on the degree to which immigrant offspring took an interest in homeland matters, nor on their participation in homeland-oriented organizations. But, net of other variables, persons who arrived without authorization or on temporary visas, as well as the late naturalizers, were significantly more likely than others to frequently send remittances—a pattern that may point to the impact of migration control policies, not so much on the immigrant offspring themselves as on their close relatives still stranded in the society of origin. However, reflecting the fact that the aim of migration control policies is to discriminate between noncitizens and citizens—who can exit and enter the United States at will and live outside the country for however long they desire—the noncitizen Angelenos were the least likely to engage in homeland visiting, notwithstanding the fact that almost all of them had a relative still living in the country of origin.

The long reach of citizenship status can be perceived in the analysis of ethnic identity and attachments as well. In the pooled sample, noncitizens were significantly less likely than their U.S. citizen counterparts to prefer English—again, net of other variables. In the Los Angeles sample, a preference for English proved significantly higher among the U.S.-born than among the early or late naturalizers. The analysis of identity preferences among the Angelenos uncovered a similar pattern: noncitizens and late naturalizers were less likely than their U.S.-born counterparts to self-categorize as American, of either the hyphenated or unhyphenated sort; noncitizen respondents were also particularly more likely than the U.S.-born to prefer a national-origin identity. Despite these controls for respondents' status as of the time of the survey, those whose parents had arrived without a green card were significantly less likely than U.S. citizens to identify as hyphenated or unhyphenated Americans.

FINAL REFLECTIONS

In reaching the end of this book, the reader has gained a comprehensive review of how origins and destinations, both features of the distinctively international nature of population movements across boundaries, shape the sociology of the second generation. Like any good story, the one told in

these pages can travel widely, conveying a meaning that extends beyond the place where it unfolded and the time when it transpired. Strangeness is an abiding feature of the migrant experience, as wherever they go and whenever they arrive, migrants encounter a strange environment and are treated as strangers and so must learn and adapt to the new context and change in ways they rarely anticipated at the moment of departure. Connectedness to people and places left behind is also a recurrent phenomenon: migration is always selective, and hence cross-border movements of people inherently produce cross-border family relations. Those cross-border connections are not mere products of the particular country on which this book has focused, the United States, but reappear among migrants and migrant families throughout the world. Thus, immigrant parents bequeath a mixed legacy to their children, imparting lessons learned after migration while also transmitting orientations absorbed well before they took off for life in a new land. These home-society connections—both in the cultural orientations bestowed by parents born in one country on their progeny brought up in another and in immigrant families stretched across territorial boundaries—can be thought of as immigration universals that influence, albeit in different ways and to differing degrees, immigrant offspring now and then, here and elsewhere.

Looking across geographies, the concepts and measures we have chosen to employ in this book can be used to export the international perspective to other migration systems. Civic stratification is a global issue, and one that the current refugee crisis has made particularly relevant in the Middle East and western Europe. While the United States may have one of the largest undocumented populations among rich receiving countries, the phenomenon is in no way unique to the American context, as evidenced by large-scale amnesties in the previous decade in Italy (2002) and Spain (2005) and the current climbing estimates of illegal border crossings and visa overstaying in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Just as in the United States, the undocumented immigrants who have migrated to Europe have children who may have been born in either Europe or the country of emigration but will be raised in Europe. Unlike in the United States, birthright citizenship is not universal throughout Europe, a fact that creates interesting scope for international comparison. The measures of undocumented prevalence and civic stratification on which we have relied in this book are becoming increasingly replicable across other contexts. One example would be the United Kingdom's Labor Force Survey, which asks the foreign-born for their original visa status at arrival. Similarly, the concept of context of emigration and the multilevel modeling framework we use have already been fruitfully applied in cross-national comparative work using standardized data sets that cover many western European

destinations. This research has generally sought to test multiple indicators of sending-country context, including measures of political freedom, GDP per capita, and average educational attainment, as it seeks to understand the influence of these factors on outcomes such as the educational performance of the children of immigrants. Many of the European studies, however, have struggled to find comprehensive, cross-nationally validated measures of sending-country culture and have relied instead on summary measures such as majority religion. We believe that the World Values Survey summary measures of traditional versus secular-rational scores and survival versus self-expression scores that we use here could be very usefully exported into the European context, allowing for transatlantic as well as cross-European comparison. The recent emergence of new-immigrant oversamples of the second generation across multiple European contexts—for instance, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) project—presents new opportunities to assess the relative importance of sending-country value orientations across different migration systems.[3] Such an evaluation will be particularly important in the western European receiving context, where issues of cultural and religious boundaries are more politicized and generate greater inter-ethnic strife than in the United States.

Now looking across time instead of across geographies, we note that in the United States cross-border ties and home-society influences are recurrent aspects of the immigrant phenomenon, but that in this country we do not see other distinctively international features of systems of migration control—themselves the ever-evolving products of specific historical circumstances. As we pointed out earlier, the defining features of the U.S. citizenship regime—most notably, the relatively short residence period required of foreign-born residents and the granting of citizenship to all those born on U.S. soil—emerged from the very different reality of the late eighteenth century. The new republic required people who could conquer and maintain the lands seized from the continent's indigenous inhabitants, but who could also quickly come to see and understand themselves as members of a new nation. That process of nation-building immediately generated a backlash against the newcomers, which steadily intensified as the migrations from Europe brought populations that were increasingly different from the founding group. Yet the continuing need for people to populate expanding territories, combined with the hunger for workers driven by rapid industrialization, impeded the imposition of the migration controls for which some segments of the population called. While immigrants from China were met with exclusion as early as the 1880s, and immigrants from Japan encountered similar barriers roughly thirty years later, migration in the transatlantic sphere remained largely open until

the early 1920s. At that point, the doors along the coastlines were closed, though migration from elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere escaped full control. In the process, access to citizenship also narrowed. Naturalization was barred to all immigrants from Asia; immigrants from Europe could still transition to U.S. citizenship, but starting in the early twentieth century, they were compelled to leap over significantly higher obstacles than those previously in place.

Thus, the second-generation people studied in the pages of this book differ in one profound way from their predecessors of the last age of mass migration: the immigrants of the current age of mass migration, as well as their offspring, are the products of a world of migration policies designed to control population flows across state boundaries. A common set of goals shapes those policies throughout the developed world: to discourage most potential emigrants from ever leaving home; to sift the wanted newcomers from those seen as undesirable; to expel those unwanted persons who somehow manage to slip through gates and cross over walls; and to determine the entitlements allowed to those foreigners who proceed onto national soil, including the right of eventually gaining membership in the people. That world of migration policy and control is responsible not only for the migration status disparities shared by immigrant offspring with origins in different places around the world, but also for the civic stratification that yields differences among people originating in the very same place.

And yet, while the introduction of border controls separates the children of this immigrant wave from all those who came before, in one critical aspect the children of immigrants we study here are also differentiated from those who came after them: namely, they and their parents were mainly already in residence in the United States when Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. Enactment of IRCA allowed unauthorized immigrants present as of 1982 to quickly transition to legal permanent residence, facilitated reunification with spouses and children living abroad, and provided all who legalized with eligibility for citizenship five years later. Pressure from immigrant rights advocates combined with poorly written legislation and feeble implementation led to more expansive legalization than Congress had initially anticipated. Thus, the parents of the Mexican-origin respondents surveyed by the IIMMLA arrived during a period of lax internal and border enforcement, encountered a labor market that exacted relatively modest penalties for unauthorized status, and then enjoyed the opportunity to exit from that status when their children were still relatively young. Indeed, among the Mexican-origin Angelenos with at least one parent who had entered the United States without a green card, almost half of all the parents for whom we have data had acquired U.S. citizenship as

of the time of the survey, and just under 10 percent had not yet transitioned to legal permanent residence status.

Acceptance of undocumented immigration reflects the interplay of domestic interests—employers seeking greater access to labor, citizens preferring greater restriction, and political leaders wanting to satisfy the former while appeasing the latter. Yet population movements across borders are fundamentally international in nature: conflicts between and within states put people into motion, fleeing across territorial borders in search of safe haven. U.S. strategic interests accommodated massive refugee inflows from Cuba starting in the 1960s and Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and 1980s and facilitated entry for Jews from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and then again in the 1990s after the fall of communism. The Vietnamese immigrant offspring surveyed in Los Angeles and the Russian Jews surveyed in New York arrived in the United States via those side doors, mainly entering with legal permanent resident status in hand, which in turn put citizenship within reach after five years, as chapter 6 demonstrated. During the late 1970s and 1980s, by contrast, the same strategic interests sealed the fate of the Guatemalans and Salvadorans, who suffered from the bad fortune of running from political regimes that the United States supported. Hence, while the parents of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrant offspring surveyed by the IIMMLA found de facto safe harbor by crossing into U.S. territory, they mainly did so at the price of unauthorized status—a condition still reflected in low levels of naturalization among Central American–origin parents as well as those of their children born abroad but raised in the United States.

Thus, in the comparison between the second generations of a past more distant (the first half of the twentieth century) and one more recent (the latter decades of the twentieth century), the salient disparity concerns the change in migration control regimes. The former were the children of immigrants who had arrived in an era when border control had yet to regulate the transatlantic zone. Those immigrant parents all arrived as foreigners, but with no further legal distinctions that would privilege some and impede others; all were legally present, and hence all were equally eligible to take up citizenship once the five-year residence period had passed. The immigrant offspring studied in this book, by contrast, were the children of parents who arrived under a policy regime that channeled newcomers through various doors: a front door that provided entry and an ample portfolio of rights to persons with needed skills or with family ties to U.S. citizens or permanent residents; a back door that recurrently granted entry to wanted workers but handed them no residence rights and few other entitlements; and a side door that opened erratically to politically

selected refugee populations, who in turn were granted extensive rights and resettlement assistance.

Consequently, the second generation on which this book focuses represents the first cohort of immigrant offspring to come of age during an era that is simultaneously one of migration and one of control of migration. That distinction marks the central divide between new and old second generations, and it represents a fundamental source of continuity with the second-generation cohort that has grown up in the years since the New Yorkers and Angelenos studied in this book entered adulthood.

Like their predecessors of a century ago, the members of this "new second generation" were raised by parents who were socialized in a foreign place and grew up belonging to families whose connections stretched across state boundaries. And unlike the second generation of a century ago but just like the immigrant children profiled in this book, today's immigrant offspring are the progeny of parents who were sorted by legal status from the moment of arrival, a stratification that in turn deeply influenced their potential for crossing the internal boundary of citizenship and becoming full members in the sense conveyed by that status.

And yet current circumstances are somewhat different. The past two decades have seen steadily intensifying migration control policies and a more broadly drawn line of civic stratification between the children of unauthorized migrants and their peers raised by parents who enjoy the benefits of authorized status. Driven by America's persistent desire for labor and facilitated by the support and financing provided by migrant relatives already settled in the United States, undocumented migration resumed in the 1990s, reaching new heights after the turn of the millennium before stabilizing at around 11 million in 2009. Yet a far harsher environment greeted this wave of undocumented immigrants, starting with stepped-up enforcement at the border that made unauthorized entry more difficult and costlier for those willing to take matters into their own hands.

In focusing enforcement on the border and simultaneously abandoning internal enforcement at workplaces, the United States implicitly opted for a policy that, far from constraining undocumented migration, actually facilitates it. U.S. employers have been accommodated, but the undocumented immigrants of the new millennium have paid an especially heavy price for residing in the United States without authorization. The rights and protections available to undocumented immigrants have undergone particular contraction. Moreover, the wall between undocumented immigrants and those who are candidates to become Americans has risen higher: persons who once crossed the border without authorization can no longer transition to permanent residency without first returning to their home country for an extended stay, a risk that few are willing to take. And paradoxically,

the most notable expansion in social provision since the 1960s, passage of the Affordable Health Care Act of 2010, increased the disadvantages associated with undocumented status, as only the unauthorized were barred from the benefits of expanded government-supported health care.

The last amnesty for undocumented immigrants was approved three decades before the completion of this book in 2018, and so, for many immigrants, undocumented status has increasingly become an enduring trait. At more than 7 percent, the children of the undocumented comprise a sizable and growing fraction of the school population. Although most of these children are U.S.-born, and thus citizens, roughly one in four suffers from their parents' unauthorized status. As a growing body of research has shown, whether U.S. citizens or not, the children of undocumented parents pay a heavy price for the harsh turn in U.S. policy: higher levels of parental stress, diminished resources for parenting, lower levels of children's readiness for school, and disparities in cognitive development that have already shown up in these children by the time they are two years old.

These undocumented children are just one part of a larger population of undocumented immigrants who arrived as children and then continued on in that status into adulthood. There are 750,000 such adults currently enjoying a temporarily protected status under the program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which seems unlikely to long survive. Legalization for the broader undocumented population, having received significant congressional support twice in the years since the millennium, now seems indefinitely postponed. Any future such action is sure to be far less generous than IRCA: under the best-case scenario, some portion of today's undocumented population may gain a multiyear transition into some type of provisional work authorization, with no guaranteed track to citizenship.

More stringent enforcement at the border has been accompanied by sharply stepped-up rates of deportation. Interior deportations rose more than sixfold after 2003 before peaking at just over 180,000 in 2011. Though the pace slowed, dropping by half as of the end of 2016, deportations at this level aggravated the family separations that migrations normally produce. Thus, Mexico records a growing number of children who were born in the United States or previously lived in the United States and who are now enrolled in Mexican schools, a transition that has often proved difficult. For the U.S. citizens among these children whose parents may be unable to maintain residence in the United States, Mexico could be only a temporary resting place; they may plan to return north of the border when they reach adulthood, although their interrupted schooling and their lack of exposure to an American curriculum are likely to impede their successful adaptation to the U.S. labor market.

American refugee policy reached its most generous heights during the years when the Russian Jews and Vietnamese studied in this book entered the United States; since the millennium, however, we have witnessed a much less accepting phase. As in the 1980s, when violence in Central America reached a crescendo in the early to mid-2010s masses of people fled north, seeking safe haven in the United States, and also as in the 1980s, the American government generally refused the migrants' request for asylum. But unlike the 1980s, these very recent arrivals have been mostly women and children, moving on their own. Once on U.S. soil, these children—often traumatized by experiences both before leaving home and on the journey— have generally been transferred to family members, who themselves are often living in an uncertain legal status, trying to cope with a policy context that has grown increasingly harsh.

Assessing the future of this newest new second generation is an inherently risky enterprise. As of now, we can only speculate about where the trends we have described will lead and how the second-generation cohorts coming of age in the next decades of the twenty-first century will progress. Moreover, immigration policies are always in flux, as are the ways in which those policies are implemented. But as we write these lines thirteen months after the inauguration of Donald Trump, in the wake of an election fueled by anti-immigrant animosity and amid continuous controversy over immigration policies, we find ample reason for worry. As we have emphasized throughout this book, the inherently international and therefore political nature of population movements across borders deeply shapes the destinies of the generation that emerges after migration in the country of destination. Indeed, differences in legal status—whether at the group or individual level—recurrently affected the immigrant-origin New Yorkers and Angelenos whose trajectories have been traced in this book. Looking forward, it may be that the cohort we studied did indeed experience a second-generation advantage, but one of a strictly temporal nature, related to the opportune time of their parents' arrival in the United States and the relative warmth of their reception. The America we observe in writing these final lines seems much chillier and, for the children of unauthorized migrants, a good deal less promising: with concern for the next second generation, we uncertainly await troubled times.